


The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations

Joint Warfare Publication 3-50
Second Edition

JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATION 3-50

THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Joint Warfare Publication 3-50 (JWP 3-50) 2nd Edition dated June 2004
is promulgated as directed by the Chiefs of Staff



Director General
Joint Doctrine and Concepts

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PREFACE

Purpose

1. This publication seeks to provide accessible information and practical guidance for military personnel involved at the Operational Level in Peace Support Operations (PSOs). However, compression of the levels of conflict within PSOs, and the nature of the guidance offered dictate that this edition of JWP 3-50 should reach, enlighten, and be of utility to a wider audience. Consequently, comment is also made on the role of senior national and international leaders in the rule of law, education, commercial, humanitarian and health, media, economic and diplomatic spheres as well as the role of the executive leadership of international organisations and non-governmental organisations. JWP 3-50 (2nd Edition) should have particular relevance for training programmes that address the demands of complex emergencies in general, or PSO specifically.

Context

2. With the decision to create the United Nations (UN) and to underwrite peace and security through collective measures, the context of the application of military force was fundamentally altered. Military doctrine and strategy evolved to meet this context. Alongside the mature doctrine of war, a doctrine of peacekeeping emerged and, in the hybrid context of the Cold War, the idealised concepts underpinning that doctrine were adequate. With the end of the Cold War, a significant shift in state practice towards defence of inalienable rights, the dignity of the individual and security in the face of asymmetric terror has been favoured ahead of the absolute sovereignty of nation states. In response to this altered context, PSO doctrine must recognise and embrace the need for continued evolution and improved sophistication. The prevalence of genocide, division, and terrorism of unprecedented impact stand as testimony to this need.

3. Now, the inherently more intricate and exacting role assigned in PSOs requires a doctrine that accommodates complexity, and acknowledges the long-term commitment needed to achieve lasting resolution of crises. Also, to be fully effective, the doctrine must be multinational, multidisciplinary, and comprehensive in its approach. Accordingly, this edition of JWP 3-50 addresses the ‘complex’ of civil and military actors that must be engaged to achieve success. For this doctrine to become fully effective, a consistent and reciprocal level of will to engage by, and with, all agencies will be necessary. It will be some time before we can properly regard PSO doctrine as having reached maturity. JWP 3-50 (2nd Edition) recognises this truth, and contributes to the process of evolution.

Terminology

4. Where appropriate, terms that are already in common military usage and defined in either JWP 0-01.1 '*United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*' or NATO publications, have been used. These are duplicated in the Glossary. New terms that have been defined are similarly available in the Glossary.

Structure

5. In Chapter 1, readers are provided with the background to PSOs and the agreed military definitions associated with PSOs, as the foundation for considering the factors that must be accommodated by an effective contemporary doctrine for the military contribution to PSOs. The concepts and context of PSOs at the strategic level are subsequently developed in Chapter 2. The fundamentals and principles of PSO that supplement existing military doctrine are then explained in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 outlines the planning process and offers advice on the planning of a PSO and the military contribution. Chapter 5 details tasks and techniques usually associated with a PSO; these are particularly pertinent to the military Peace Support Force. Supplementary information is presented in the Annexes. For ease of reference, the Annexes and Appendices are printed on 'yellow pages' with the exception of the United Nations Charter which is on light blue.

6. Given the radically changed strategic context, and to improve the utility of the document for those who must participate in PSO, ideas are presented without reference to the historical lessons that underpin them. It is hoped that those wishing to develop a deeper appreciation of the subject will exploit the substantial body of work referenced in the Bibliography. Footnotes throughout the document serve to embellish the main text and record the key references used.

Use and Evaluation

7. Readers are encouraged to read all chapters sequentially, but may wish to use the table of contents to target their reading. Every effort has been made to avoid prescription; instead, a flexible framework is offered to guide the complex of military and civil actors in planning, mounting, and executing a comprehensive plan that delivers long-term crisis resolution. Every PSO will, in some important way, be different from past experience. The user of this JWP should not therefore seek templates that can be slavishly applied. Taken as a whole, JWP 3-50 (2nd Edition) offers guidance that must be considered and creatively applied to the particular circumstances of a crisis. Having asserted the need for rationalisation, and suggested that work in this arena remains embryonic, it is hoped that this revision will be considered objectively by UN staffs, regional security organisations, international

military staffs, humanitarian agencies, and academic institutions, so that the process of evaluation, enrichment, and coherence may be continued.

LINKAGES

8. For the United Kingdom military reader, JWP 0-01 '*British Defence Doctrine*' (BDD), JDP 01 '*Joint Operations*', JWP 3-00 '*Joint Operations Execution*' and JWP 5-00 '*Joint Operations Planning*', all provide the foundations for, and an introduction to, PSO. JWP 3-50 represents the amplification needed to enable the effective planning and conduct of PSO at the operational level. In PSO, civil military co-operation is vital, accordingly readers are encouraged to read Interim Joint Warfare Publication (IJWP) 3-90 '*Civil- Military Co-operation*'.

9. NATO doctrine for PSO is set down in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.1. In addition, AJP-01(B)¹ '*Allied Joint Doctrine*' Chapter 22 offers important guidance on PSO.

¹ A further NATO publication (AJP-3.4), currently under development, will offer doctrinal guidance on Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO). This grouping will encompass PSO.

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THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

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JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATIONS

The successful prosecution of joint operations requires clearly understood doctrine that is acceptable to all nations and Services concerned. It is UK policy that national doctrine should be consistent with NATO doctrine and, by implication, its terminology, and procedures (other than those exceptional circumstances when the UK has elected not to ratify NATO doctrine). Notwithstanding, the requirement exists to develop national doctrine to address those areas not adequately covered, or at all, by NATO doctrine, and to influence the development of NATO doctrine. This is met by the development of a hierarchy of Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).

Interim Joint Warfare Publications (IJWPs) are published as necessary to meet those occasions when a particular aspect of joint doctrine needs to be agreed, usually in a foreshortened time scale, either in association with a planned exercise or operation, or to enable another aspect of doctrinal work to be developed. This will often occur when a more comprehensive ‘parent’ publication is under development, but normally well in advance of its planned publication.

The Joint Doctrine Development Process and associated hierarchy of JWPs is explained in a current Joint Service DCI.²

² DCI GEN 91 2003.

CHAPTER 1 – PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS - OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND

*‘Keep a permanent watch on the state of peace, security, and stability around the world, seek peaceful solutions, mediate disputes, pre-empt or prevent conflict, assure the protection of the weak, and deal authoritatively with aggressors or would be aggressors’.*¹

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION AND PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS DEFINITIONS

101. For the foreseeable future, United Kingdom foreign policy is likely to underpin its conflict prevention activities with the regeneration or sustainment of fragile states. The United Kingdom government usually undertakes such actions as part of United Nations (UN) led operations or as part of multinational endeavours;² occasionally it undertakes unilateral action, such as in Sierra Leone in 2000. The generic title of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) is given by the military to these activities. Typically, the United Kingdom’s Armed Forces are given responsibility for preventing or suppressing any conflict so that others can undertake activities that will alleviate the immediate symptoms of a conflict and/or a fragile state. Usually, there are associated activities to ensure stability in the long-term. The application of military force to create the right conditions for overall success, e.g. a safe and secure environment, is a key foundation. The way in which the military force is applied, and the means used, can promote or prejudice other immediate and stabilising activities. To this end, it is imperative that the military commanders have a working knowledge of PSO doctrine and its underpinning concepts. It is highly desirable that the leaders of associated activities have an appreciation of the military PSO doctrine so that the probability of success is increased.

102. **Military Terms and Definitions.** Throughout this publication PSO terms are defined in the context of military operations. Where an agreed North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) definition³ is appropriate, the NATO definition will be used. Alternatively, United Kingdom military definitions⁴ will be used. Terms developed in this publication will be provided with a definition at first use and are also contained in the Glossary. These definitions provide a common understanding upon which the doctrine in this publication has been developed.

¹ B Urquhart in A Roberts & B Kingsbury, *United Nations, Divided Word*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1995, p 95.

² Typically ‘coalitions of the willing’, but it is increasingly likely that some PSOs may be European Union-led.

³ NATO definitions are contained in Allied Administrative Publication-6 (AAP-6) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*. Those which are ‘NATO agreed’ are yet to be incorporated.

⁴ United Kingdom definitions are contained in Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01.1 *UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*.

103. Key current PSO and associated terms and definitions are as follows:
- a. **Peace Support Operations.** An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and/or humanitarian operations.⁵⁶
 - b. **Conflict Prevention.** A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and - when necessary - military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities.⁵
 - c. **Peace Support Force.** A military force assigned to a peace support operation.⁷ (NATO agreed)
 - d. **Peacemaking.** A peace support operation, conducted after the initiation of a conflict to secure a ceasefire or peaceful settlement, that involves primarily diplomatic action supported, when necessary, by direct or indirect use of military assets.⁵
 - e. **Peace Enforcement.** A peace support operation conducted to maintain a ceasefire or a peace agreement where the level of consent and compliance is uncertain and the threat of disruption is high. A Peace Support Force (PSF) must be capable of applying credible coercive force and must apply the provisions of the peace agreement impartially.⁵
 - f. **Peacekeeping.** A peace support operation following an agreement or ceasefire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and compliance is high, and the threat of disruption is low. The use of force by peacekeepers is normally limited to self-defence.⁵
 - g. **Peace Building.** A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil and, when necessary, military means, to address the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. It requires a commitment to a long-term process and may run concurrently with other types of peace support operations.⁵

⁵ AAP-6.

⁶ This is interpreted to mean that the application of diplomatic, civil and military means will be impartial. It is recognised that the objective of the operation may be perceived, by some, as partial. For example, a PSO mounted to prevent conflict and reform the government in a failing state, where internal collapse threatens peace, may be seen as partial to the opponents of that state government.

⁷ The definition of Peace Support Force is NATO agreed and published in AJP-3.4 '*Non-Article V Crisis Response Operations*' but awaits publication in AAP-6.

104. **Levels (of War).**⁸ An appreciation that military activities are conducted at different levels involving different people will help non-military readers understand the context of PSO. The United Kingdom interpretation⁹ of these levels can be summarised as follows:

a. **The Strategic Level.** The strategic level concerns the application of the full range of national resources to achieve policy objectives and is the domain of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. The military are one component of the national resources of the Government. Although the changing nature of politics, economics and technology have added to the complexity of the strategic level, military strategists face the same challenges as their forbears: developing, deploying, sustaining, recovering and re-deploying military forces for the attainment of political objectives.

b. **The Operational Level.** The agreed definition of the operational level is *'the level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations'*.¹⁰ In short, the operational level is about employment and provides the vital link, or 'gearing', between strategic objectives and the tactical *employment* of forces. During the planning phase this responsibility rests with the Joint Commander (Jt Comd) who, for a United Kingdom-led operation, would normally be based at the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ). Once a force is deployed to the Joint Operations Area, review and execution of the plans are the activities of the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC). [On a UK-led PSO the JTFC would be the PSF Commander; the title PSF Commander is used in this publication]. On multinational operations which are not led by a United Kingdom officer, the highest United Kingdom military representative is known as the National Contingent Commander (NCC).

c. **Tactical Level.** Tactical Level is the level at which actions actually take place. In a joint military operation, the highest tactical commanders are the environmental Component Commanders (CCs) for Maritime, Land, Air, Special Forces and Logistics, who work directly to the JTFC or PSF Commander. Below them are formation and unit commanders whose task it is to engage directly with adversaries, armed factions or the civil population.

⁸ JDP 01 '*Joint Operations*' identifies 3 Levels of War; for the purposes of this publication the 'of War' has been dropped.

⁹ JDP 01.

¹⁰ JWP 0-01.1.

SECTION II – BACKGROUND

105. This section briefly outlines the history of PSO concepts and doctrine, offering an insight into how this relatively new area of military thought has evolved. A résumé of the rationale for this revision of the United Kingdom’s PSO publication is included. For those seeking greater detail of how collective security and PSO doctrine has evolved, a fuller analysis is at Annex A.

Tracing the History

106. The maintenance of ‘international peace and security’ by ‘effective collective measures’ is one of the UN’s founding purposes. (For reference, the UN Charter is at Appendix A1 - light blue pages.) However, throughout the Cold War, the UN was generally limited to moderating tension and aggression by mounting ‘Traditional’ or ‘Nordic Peacekeeping’¹¹ operations. The fundamental principles of the Traditional approach were: that all parties must consent, force would only be used in self-defence, and peacekeeping forces would be impartial in the context of the dispute. In addition to the ‘Trinity’ of Peacekeeping Principles (consent, limited use of force and impartiality), the UN Secretary General (UNSG) exercised day-to-day control of the peacekeeping operations.

107. Notable successes were recorded for this approach largely because consent of belligerent parties was secured before a peacekeeping force deployed. Few foresaw the abrupt end to the Cold War era, with its inherent stability, and the serious implications for the roles, capacity, flexibility and reach of the UN and those seeking to contribute forces.

108. By the 1990s, it became abundantly clear that the Traditional concept of peacekeeping was inadequate in the face of contemporary conflicts, and that UN capacity to assemble, deploy and control forces in PSOs was poorly matched to the tasks it then faced. In parallel with attempts to reform the UN, military doctrine responded to the more demanding remits now being placed upon PSF Commanders. Unfortunately, the diplomatic convenience of considering mandates in terms of the chapter divisions of the UN Charter had become a restrictive norm for those deployed in support of peace.

United Kingdom Peace Support Experience

109. For the United Kingdom’s military forces, a vast body of learning was drawn upon in the search for a credible and effective PSO doctrine.¹² Counter-insurgency

¹¹ The term ‘*peacekeeping*’ does not appear in the United Nations Charter and was first adopted following the deployment of a UN force to the Sinai in 1956 (UNEF) to secure a ceasefire between Egyptian and Israeli forces.

¹² This ranged from lessons noted during the colonial policing of the North West Frontier, through the notable and informative Malaya campaigns of the 1950s, to experiences in the Oman and Northern Ireland.

doctrine, derived during the period of decolonisation, provided an important framework upon which peacekeeping and counter-terrorism experience could be moulded.

110. Throughout the later part of the 20th Century the Peacekeeping Trinity, consent coupled with the linked principle of impartiality and limits on the use of force,¹³ remained relatively unaltered. However, by the end of the millennium it was clear that the doctrine had not kept pace with events. Critically, the extant doctrine offered little guidance on peace enforcement; a role, which, in Bosnia and Iraq,¹⁴ the United Kingdom and coalition partners were now performing.

SECTION III – THE NEED FOR A CONTEMPORARY PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

111. The end of the Cold War altered the strategic context in which PSOs were conducted. As international actors¹⁵ have elected to ‘do something’ in response to genocide, famine, and barbarity, controversially, recourse to ‘intervention’¹⁶ has increased. Responses have, however, been far from uniform, frequently being determined by issues and interests beyond humanitarian or legal obligation.¹⁷ The UNSG had this to say in 1998:

*‘Why was the UN established, if not to act as a benign policeman or doctor? Can we really afford to let each state be the judge of its own right, or duty, to intervene in another state’s internal conflict? If we do, will we not be forced to legitimise Hitler’s championship of the Sudeten Germans, or Soviet intervention in Afghanistan? Most of us would prefer, I think –especially now that the Cold War is over - to see such decisions taken collectively, by an international institution whose authority is generally respected’.*¹⁸

Intervention, Sovereignty and Obligations

112. Debate over recent years has struggled to balance the precepts of sovereignty with theories that support a higher and imperative obligation to uphold human rights. Whilst international law has not yet accommodated these altered perceptions, state and

¹³ The inherent right to use force in self-defence is well-grounded in law and readily understood.

¹⁴ During operations to protect minorities in the north and south of Iraq following atrocities after the first Gulf War.

¹⁵ The expression ‘international actors’ has been used to encompass both states and the many international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

¹⁶ Here, intervention is considered as inclusive of all actions, both military and legislative, which are designed to exert influence within the jurisdiction of an independent political community.

¹⁷ Actions by groupings that sought to ban the use of anti-personnel mines are illustrative of this trend.

¹⁸ Kofi Annan, UNSG, in an address at Ditchley Park, 26 June 1998.

regional organisation practice, coupled with UN Security Council precedents, suggests that changes in international law, or its interpretation, are occurring.

113. There are occasions when a national government or sub-national organs of government fail to uphold international norms. They may be unable, or unwilling, to prevent abuse, or perhaps prove to be the sponsors of abuse; they may be unable or unwilling to prevent a faction or group being subject to, or threatened with, significant harm. When this happens, a ‘fundamental dissociation’¹⁹ may have occurred.²⁰ Consequently, a responsibility to provide protection²¹ may fall upon the international community. This shift in the concept of sovereignty places obligations on a governing authority as a pre-condition for that governing authority’s own protection under international agreements. Thus, membership of the UN confers the protection of the UN Charter, by moderating inter-state relationships, whilst in parallel imposing intra-state obligations²² that seek to ensure effective governance in accordance with United Nations Charter purposes and principles. To respond to these changes, and the associated responsibilities, those who are tasked with, or choose to assist with, upholding, renewing or restoring acceptable governance need an expansion of the concepts and doctrine that guide their actions.

Working in a Civil - Military Complex

114. The 1990s brought a significant blurring of the boundaries between civil and military personnel engaged in supporting peace. (Synopsis of key international and non-governmental agencies commonly encountered in PSOs are given at Annex B.)²³ The complex of participants, particularly the non-military, is increasingly diverse. However, there are signs that many agencies bringing security, aid, and assistance to those in need are increasingly able to identify common goals and to derive mutually advantageous operating agreements.

¹⁹ When it can then be argued that an authority cannot claim to be *by, for, or of the people* a fundamental dissociation between the people and the ruling elite or governing body can be said to have occurred.

²⁰ This view was first expressed by Weller in, “Sovereignty and Suffering”, Harris, ed., *The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention* (1995), p. 33 *et seq.* And subsequently in “Access to Victims: Reconceptualizing the Right of Humanitarian ‘Intervention’”, Asser Institute, *International Law and The Hague’s 750th Anniversary as the Capital of International Law* (1999), p.353 *et seq.*

²¹ An extensive literature exists on this topic, and whilst no work can yet claim to be definitive, ‘*The Report of The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*’ (International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Dec 2001) does offer a comprehensive, balanced and compelling contemporary analysis of the intervention / sovereignty paradox. See also www.yale.edu/acuns/NEW_GG/GG.index.

²² These obligations have 3 facets. Firstly, the governing body is responsible for the safety and welfare of its citizens. Secondly, failure to discharge this responsibility will be subject to internal censure by the people and ultimately by the international community through the UN. Thirdly, these obligations are personal in character such that individual agents of the state can and will be held responsible for their acts of commission or omission. The inception of the International Criminal Court (ICC) stands testament to this reality and the resolve to uphold and enforce international human rights norms as codified in treaties and other legally binding instruments.

²³ Synopses are also given for the key agencies and departments of the United Kingdom government, and of the government of the United States of America (as a result of its pre-eminent position in international affairs).

115. In parallel, government departments traditionally associated with military action, and other departments, are increasingly working in collaboration. Even so, PSOs do impose demands in planning, executing, and supporting action that may be at odds with the different departmental working cultures. These cultural differences manifest themselves in varying attitudes towards coordination, tolerance of ambiguity, the need for and nature of planning and, critically, the legitimate role of the military.

116. Many civilian agencies and departments of state routinely function with a high tolerance for ambiguity. In these agencies and non-military departments, several differing perspectives on an issue may hold sway at any given time, and decision-making has evolved to accommodate the ebb and flow of international and domestic sentiment, political will, political intent, and media attention. In these areas, ambiguity affords freedom to negotiate and manoeuvre. In contrast, military staffs generally seek to minimise ambiguity by making informed assumptions where absolute clarity proves impractical. In mounting and directing PSO neither 'institutional' position should be regarded as improper. Facets of each approach are appropriate to the PSO environment, and collectively improve the probability of success.

117. For many civilian agencies and government departments, the term 'planning' is associated with higher management process and the need to formulate programmes driven by economics or donor considerations. Whilst analogous planning is undertaken in the management of defence, military planning at the operational level is focused on the use of military force and is conducted using highly developed and trusted procedures. Although wedded to the value of detailed planning, most military staffs are acutely aware that no plan is ever executed without revision. Accordingly, British Defence Doctrine, especially the concept of Mission Command,²⁴ places great emphasis on timely action and initiative, whilst remaining responsive to superior direction.

118. Notwithstanding the wider intervention debate, there is invariably tension between government departments as to how and when military forces should be used. Until the 1990s many held that military force, as an instrument of foreign policy, was too frequently held idle waiting for wars that might never arise. Events have since demonstrated the wider and near constant utility of military force and the prevalence of protracted PSOs. The demands of this new era have seen scarce military resources, training capacity, and equipment expended in activity well in excess of earlier planning assumptions. In such a changed environment senior commanders and ministers face a difficult task in matching capability to commitment, especially as many PSOs are of indeterminate and potentially long-term duration. Budgetary, procurement, training, and manning plans are now adjusting to accommodate the new reality.

²⁴ JWP 0-01.1.

The Comprehensive Approach

119. Events have shown that the prospects of success in a PSO are much enhanced if a comprehensive response is used. In adopting such an approach, planning and execution must be coordinated across government departments and potential participants. Unfortunately, there remains a tendency for government mechanisms to be optimised for the demands of routine government, or short-term crisis response, rather than the specific, complex, and protracted demands of PSOs. In the absence of unifying leadership and suitable coordinating structures, the full range of contributions may not be used, or may be delivered in a less than efficient manner. Rivalries may manifest themselves in obstructionism or the imposition of conditions for engagement. Moreover, the rivalry may become part of the problem. Further risk may also be introduced by the tendency, in moments of crisis, for ad hoc arrangements to subvert proven working practices, methods of communication, and decision-making. Such ad hoc arrangements prejudice the chances of long term success by seeking short-term gain only.

120. In the United Kingdom a crisis management organisation has been established to counter many of these pitfalls. For the military commander, at the operational level and above, understanding precisely how the Defence Crisis Management Organisation²⁵ (DCMO) is configured for a given emergency is of critical importance. The commander must know how strategic direction of the campaign will be determined and how he can support or exploit the range of effects available to his force, the contributing governments and the mandating authority. Adoption of a comprehensive response demands that strategic and operational level planning be conducted using a sophisticated doctrine to guide a suitably configured command and control system.

The Way Ahead

121. The key to success in effectively underwriting peace is the will to fund the necessary action, the will to do what is needed for as long as it is needed, and ultimately the will to accept casualties in defence of the basic freedoms of distant strangers.

122. If collective security is to become a universal reality a more reliable understanding of the rights and obligations conferred by sovereignty is needed. However, to assist in bringing this into effect military doctrine must respond to the existing perceptions. Hence this evolution of PSO doctrine. By updating and reviewing the United Kingdom national PSO doctrine, the ability of Her Majesty's Government to underwrite peace and augment the rule of international law may be enhanced.

²⁵ More detail on the Defence Crisis Management Organisation is provided in Chapter 5.

123. There is an aspiration that others will accept this experience-based revision of the United Kingdom approach to PSO, and in particular the military contribution. Ideally, it will achieve a near-universal, consistent, and more flexible doctrine. This may, in turn, guide the actions of those seeking to uphold the principles of the UN Charter and contemporary conceptions of collective peace and security. Practically, recognition of the need for a symbiotic relationship with, and by, the military is key, so that the objectives of all those contributing to a PSO, their working practices and cultures continue to be acknowledged and, importantly, deliver benefits.

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CHAPTER 2 – PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS - STRATEGIC CONTEXT AND CONCEPTS

201. It is important for all those working in a Peace Support Operation (PSO) to have an understanding of the strategic context within which a PSO is conducted. An appreciation of the strategic intent, the desired solution or outcome, or any interim stages to be achieved, will shape the way in which the operation is conducted and the means that are used. Whilst no 2 PSOs will be the same, the use of generic concepts and principles at the Strategic Level will aid initial planning and the implementation of an operation.

SECTION I – INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

202. The agreement on, and issue of, the mandate for a PSO to counter a threat to peace is a matter of international politics. The creation of a military Peace Support Force (PSF) is subject to the same political process. The conduct of international politics is about applying national power, within the international political system. Typically national power is applied in conjunction with allies and partners in support of national and collective interests. National power consists of a trinity of diplomacy, economic power and military power,¹ each of which can also be used as an instrument of policy.

The Diplomatic Instrument

203. The diplomatic power of persuasion results from a wide range of attributes: the ability to negotiate, to broker agreements, to massage relationships between allies and potential partners and generally to get one's way by force of argument rather than by resorting to economic or military means. Effective diplomacy relies on a combination of reputation, integrity and both economic and military substance to back up the negotiating skills necessary to turn them into influence. The diplomatic instrument is constantly in use, particularly during a PSO when the need to influence allies and neutrals is as essential as the need to use military force against those perpetuating conflict.

The Economic Instrument

204. Overseas investments and the ebb and flow of capital and trade provide scope for the exercise of economic influence. The economic instrument is multi-faceted. As with all instruments of policy, economic action has to be used appropriately and in

¹ Recognising the increasing importance of Information, the US has added it to the three traditional instruments, resulting in 'DIME'. The United Kingdom approach is to see Information as an essential underpinning of the economic, diplomatic and military instruments in achieving political objectives, not as a separate and discrete instrument. See JWP 0-01 '*British Defence Doctrine (BDD)*', 2nd Edition, Page 2-4 and 2-5.

conducive circumstances. One aspect of the economic instrument is the imposition of economic sanctions. This is controversial, as sanctions are seldom prompt or precise in their effect within the global economy and because success is difficult to measure. The economic instrument may require the application of military force to bolster the desired effect, for example, through embargo operations to enforce economic sanctions.

The Military Instrument

205. Military power is the definitive instrument of policy – the instrument to be brought into play when other means are inadequate, have failed in some way, or require reinforcement. The status of military power and the ability to engage successfully in combat could be the key to restoring peace to a country, region or ethnic group. However, nations must also be conscious of the utility (and limitations) of military forces in conflict prevention, including defence diplomacy.² The military, in turn, should be conscious of the preconceived ideas and indeed misperceptions that other actors might have of them.

The Essence of Strategy in Peace Support Operations

206. The key to the successful conduct of a PSO is the considered use of the most appropriate mix of instruments in the prevailing circumstances. Although diplomatic means are always employed, they often require economic or military actions to support and enhance their effect. Indeed, it will very often be the case that diplomatic means are only successful because they are backed up with an implicit or declared threat to use other means if diplomacy fails. Any threat, no matter how it is communicated, must be credible and must be capable of being carried out if the conditions warrant it. To be an effective Instrument of National Power, the military instrument must be maintained and developed in a manner consistent with the demands that are likely to be placed upon it. It should not operate in isolation but only as part of a fully co-ordinated and coherent strategy in which the diplomatic and economic instruments will be as important in their way as the military forces and the military component of the strategy supporting them. Overall, the diplomatic, economic and military instruments have to be used in relation to one another and a co-ordinated multinational, and national cross-government, Information Campaign³ should be used to enhance their effectiveness.

² Defence Diplomacy: *'The promotion of conflict and crisis prevention by dispelling hostility, building trust and inculcating the supremacy of civilian control of the military, and, more generally, to support and develop wider British interests'*, JWP 0-01.1 *'United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions'*.

³ Information Campaign: *'Co-ordinated information output of all Government activity undertaken to influence decision-makers in support of policy objectives, while protecting one's own decision-makers'*. (JWP 0-01.1)

SECTION II – THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

207. A military intervention, by a PSF, within a multi-functional PSO is usually required where the restoration or maintenance of peace cannot be successfully achieved by states applying diplomatic and economic pressure. Typically, the PSF is used to promote, create and maintain a safe and secure environment where short- and long-term solutions can be put in place. Short-term solutions typically address the symptoms of conflict and consequently the PSF may also be engaged in providing humanitarian assistance.⁴ Long-term solutions characteristically seek to create a situation where further conflict is unlikely and the PSF may be involved in reforming the indigenous military and other combatants so that they can maintain the peace.

The United Kingdom’s Military Instrument

208. Within the United Kingdom, the military instrument supports the national foreign and security policy. The Defence Aim is:

*To deliver security for the people of the United Kingdom and the Overseas Territories by defending them, including against terrorism; and to act as a force for good by strengthening international peace and stability.*⁵

209. Analysis of the Defence Aim within the Ministry of Defence has identified a number of likely policy responses to international crises. In turn a range of military tasks have been approved in which United Kingdom Armed Forces are likely to be involved. All the tasks draw upon military capabilities in different ways. For the United Kingdom the distinction between tasks that fall within the definition of Peace Support Operations and other tasks lies, not in doctrine or the range of military capabilities that may be employed but, in the effects that the military instrument will be required to achieve.

210. In PSOs, the desired strategic effect, or intent, is to uphold international peace and security by resolving conflicts by means of prevention, conciliation, deterrence, containment or stabilisation. Generally, in other contingent overseas operational tasks, the intention is to prosecute the conflict or dispute until the enemies are disrupted, defeated, destroyed or surrender. Despite the differences of intent, the application of military power in all instances can be guided by adherence to a core military doctrine, interpreted as necessary for the intended outcome.

⁴ Humanitarian Assistance: ‘Support provided to humanitarian and development agencies, in an insecure environment, by a deployed force whose primary mission is not the provision of humanitarian aid. Should the deployed force undertake such humanitarian tasks, responsibility should be handed-over/returned to the appropriate civilian agency at the earliest opportunity’. (JWP 0-01.1)

⁵ Defence Strategic Guidance 2003.




Figure 2.1 - Distinguishing Peace Support Operations

211. Figure 2.1 illustrates the differentiation of the strategic effects sought in a PSO and other tasks. The key points to take from this model are:

- a. Combat techniques are applicable across the full range of military tasks.
- b. Governments, under the auspices of the UN, a regional organisation or a coalition, may consider at least 4 policy response options⁶ which can be broadly characterised as:

- (1) **Option 1.** Mount a PSO that seeks to exploit the complementary operation of the Instruments of National Power in an effort to bring about long-term conflict resolution.
- (2) **Option 2.** Mount a focused intervention using the military instrument of power assisted by a limited range of other agencies to neutralise immediate threats to peace and security thereby establishing stability⁷ in the conflict.
- (3) **Option 3.** Mount a deliberate intervention that gives priority to the military instrument of power prosecuting the conflict to achieve assigned military aims.

⁶ These 4 options reflect 5 Military Tasks (MT) identified in Defence Strategic Guidance 03: MT 4.3 - Peacekeeping, MT 4.4 - Peace Enforcement, MT 4.5 – Power Projection, MT 4.6 - Focused Intervention, and MT 4.7 - Deliberate Intervention.

⁷ This is a relative construct, and may be established at high or low levels of tension. Stability achieved will be maintained through a mixture of deterrence and coercive measures.

- (4) **Option 4.** Deploy stand-off military capabilities that are able to deter or coerce potential belligerents away from conflict while the other instruments of power are used to secure a lasting peace.

212. Previous responses to crises have often involved transitions between, or combinations of, these options. However, such approaches are far from efficient. Shifting intent alters the effects that must be achieved, and, therefore, the means assigned to the task. The effect-based differentiation brings a clearer focus upon what is to be achieved, and hence the means and methods that must be employed to ensure success.

The Spectrum of Tension

213. For many years the use of military force has been conceptually compartmentalised. These compartments have been identified by reference to the theoretical or legislative context of the use of military force. As a consequence there have been clearly demarcated divisions, ‘war-fighting’ in a war,⁸ or outside war as ‘Operations Other Than War’ (OOTW).⁹ In so doing, doctrine has fallen victim to similar compartmentalised thinking. Whilst a desire to adopt simple models may be understood in the context of the Cold War era, their unaltered application in the inherently more complex and challenging world of the 21st Century would be inexcusable.

214. Shifting international understanding of collective security, and the lessons of recent history, now demand an altered focus from the apparent context of use, to the outcome or effect that is to be achieved; this is the strategic intent. To be of practical value, modelling of military power’s utility, and hence the precepts guiding its use, must recognise the place and purpose of military power in the progression of politically defined objectives. Figure 2.2 illustrates how, with respect to PSO doctrine, the spectrum of tension has evolved into an increasingly compartmentalised matrix that misrepresents the fluid nature of such crises.

⁸ War: ‘The most extreme manifestation of armed conflict, characterised by intense, extensive and sustained combat, usually between states’. (JWP 0-01.1)

⁹ A plethora of variations has been applied to this grouping of operational tasks, these include: Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), OOTW, Other Operations, Stabilisation Operations, and Support Operations. This JWP supports rationalisation of PSO terminology and accordingly favours the expression ‘Operations Other Than War’ as it has the advantage of being open to literal translation without risk of corruption or ambiguity. OOTW: ‘Those military operations which are conducted in situations of conflict other than war. Such operations, in which military activities are likely to be firmly subordinated to the political throughout, will be designed to prevent conflict, restore peace by resolving or terminating conflict before escalation to war, or assist with the rebuilding of peace after conflict or war’. (JWP 0-01.1)




Figure 2.2 - The Evolving Spectrum of Tension

215. Through a focus on the intended outcome or effect, the span of PSO, illustrated in Figure 2.3, reinforces a rational and readily understood representation of the contemporary use of military capability across the spectrum of tension.¹⁰ The model returns to the view that the use of military force, and its combat capabilities, complements diplomacy across the spectrum of tension and a PSO can occur at any point on that spectrum.

¹⁰ The contemporary use of military capability across the spectrum is amplified in JDP 01 'Joint Operations', Chapter 2, Section II 'The Nature of Modern Conflict'.




Figure 2.3 - Contemporary Peace Support Operations Model

The One Doctrine Concept

216. The ‘one doctrine’ approach to military operations¹¹ provides for the application of tested guiding principles¹² across the Spectrum of Tension¹³ as the best assurance of military success. The differentiation between PSO and other military tasks is based upon the outcome or effects to be achieved. However, this approach does not preclude the identification of additional guiding fundamentals and principles for PSO planning and execution. These supplementary PSO fundamentals and principles are identified in Chapter 3. The essential elements of British Defence Doctrine (BDD) will be familiar to members of the United Kingdom Armed Forces, however, others in the complex of actors will benefit from an awareness of the principle tenets. At Annex C there is a summary of the key themes of: the Principles of War, the warfighting ethos, the manoeuvrist approach, the application of mission command, the joint, integrated and multinational nature of operations, and flexibility and pragmatism.

¹¹ JDP 01 ‘Joint Operations’, Chapter 2, Section II, ‘The Nature of Modern Conflict’.

¹² The key principles identified in BDD.

¹³ See para 213.

SECTION III – INTERIM AND STEADY-STATE CRITERIA

Articulating Strategic Intent

217. While distinguishing a PSO from other operations may be clear from the strategic intent, the precise outcome that is desired for the long-term is often less clear for a number of reasons. It may not be possible for nations to agree on the desired final outcome of engagement in a PSO. The urgency for immediate action to relieve suffering and prevent escalation or stop further conflict may override the need to define the final outcome. The crisis may prevent meaningful engagement with an indigenous population in order to determine an acceptable outcome. It may not be possible to gain early international consensus on a long-term outcome. However, it is usually possible to gain international agreement to initiate a PSO, and thereby a mandate, for an interim result or objective.

218. It is against the desired outcome or interim objective that nations will determine their own national strategy. And as a result they will establish their contribution to the nature and length of their engagement in a PSO and any supporting PSF. Historically, the final outcome sought is either a degree of stability at which disengagement can occur without risk of a return to a crisis in the short term or the point at which a number of criteria have been satisfied that indicate that long-term stability is self-sustaining. For PSOs it is convenient to consider ‘steady-state criteria’ as the analysis of an end-state. The steady-state criteria will comprise a broadly based list of essential criteria that must be achieved and be self-sustaining before a PSO can be treated as accomplished. Ideally, the mandate agreed at the strategic level should make unambiguous reference to these criteria and only exceptionally should the mandate include time criteria. In the absence of agreement on the desired final outcome, ‘interim criteria’ may be agreed as goals to be attained en-route to defining and attaining the steady-state criteria. Ideally, the success of a PSO will be measured against the intended outcome; practically it will be easier to measure the individual interim and steady-state criteria that have been met.

Interim and Steady-state Criteria - Military Guidance

219. Military commanders have often found themselves obliged to operate with ambiguous or limited strategic guidance. In June 1999, General Sir Michael Jackson as Commander KFOR was obliged to operate with scant direction from NATO,¹⁴ no end-state had been declared, and no clear focus had been developed on the civilian dimensions of the situation. In such circumstances General Jackson was obliged to formulate an ‘interim end-state’¹⁵ that could unify civil and military objectives. The text produced read as follows:

¹⁴ Jackson, General Sir Michael, ‘KFOR: The Inside Story’, in RUSI, February 2000, P18.

¹⁵ An unfortunate oxymoron that tends to cause debate of process and doctrine, in preference to the issues at hand.

‘Kosovo is a province of FRY,¹⁶ under effective UN administration, with arrangements in place for local elections, with all refugees having returned to their homes, with ethnic communities no longer able to intimidate one another, with the UCK¹⁷ de-militarised and re-integrated into society, with nominal FRY forces undertaking agreed activities within Kosovo, with a growing appreciation of the benefits of respect for the rule of law, with an independent UN appointed judiciary, and an effective UN Civilian police force, with a recovering agricultural economic sector and opportunities identified for economic diversification, with increased inward investment, and reducing inflation, thereby encouraging further normalisation and improvement of conditions in Kosovo.’

220. Although General Jackson’s definition was complete and able to enfranchise a wide range of actors, it would undoubtedly have helped to shape and refine the campaign had the strategic aim of the intervention been adequately and transparently declared at the strategic level. Where strategic guidance is incomplete or ambiguous, the responsibility for guidance to a PSF lies with the military commanders.

221. The concept of using steady-state criteria as the mandated goal in PSO campaign planning¹⁸ seeks to apply the lessons of the past. If the mandating authority does not know, cannot, or will not define the desired outcome for a PSO, an unnecessarily indirect route may be followed. Ideally, steady-state criteria will set targets for sustainable development, transparent government, electoral process, security sector reform, judicial probity, human rights observation, equitable social structures, and respect for other international norms of behaviour. As the PSF is often the first representation in a crisis region of the authority of a PSO mandate, the PSF may be able to create a safe and secure environment in which the complex of actors can operate without an adequate view of the steady-state, or interim criteria. However, in such circumstances the military activity may not adequately take account of the wider aspect of the PSO and thereby prejudice success overall.

SECTION IV – THE CONSTITUENTS OF A NATION OR SOCIETY AND THE COMPLEX OF ACTORS

222. The conclusion from Chapter 1 was that post Cold-War state practice and the prevalence of intra-state crises and conflicts has combined with the emergence of globally significant non-state actors to offer new threats.¹⁹ These threats challenge traditional perceptions of how we should protect international peace and security. When considering the origins of a conflict and, more importantly, how the origins may

¹⁶ Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

¹⁷ Ustria Çlirimtare e Kosevës (Kosovo Liberation Army)

¹⁸ See Chapter 4.

¹⁹ A more detailed consideration is given in Annex A.

be addressed by a PSO, it is helpful to have a conceptual model of the key constituents of a nation or society. The instruments of National Power are supplemented by internal components of national and local governance including the rule of law, an education system, a commercial sector, the institutions concerned with the welfare and health of the population, , and an information infrastructure including the media. In this model the constituents come together to form the nation or society with levels of interdependency between each of the constituents. In addition, the constituents themselves will be based upon the culture and history of the nation or society. This is shown graphically in Figure 2.4.

Constituents:




Figure 2.4 - The Key Constituents of a Nation or Society

223. The origins of crises often lie in the failure of nations or societies to govern adequately one or more of these constituents in a manner which benefits their population, and eradicates or suppresses the potential sources of conflict. In each key constituent, there may be issues or perceptions of inequality with regard to ethnic origin, class, gender or religion, or challenges to the underlying cultural values. These issues or perceptions may provide the nutrients for, or be, the seeds of conflict. Using the conceptual model, the origins of conflict may be more readily identified. This may assist in determining how to regenerate, reform or sustain the constituents that are failing or have failed using the Instruments of National Power (typically under United Nations (UN) or regional organisation auspices) and involve interested parties, such as international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Where the seeds of conflict lie in ethnic origin, class or religion, action will be needed in each of the constituents to ensure that the potential for conflict is reduced or removed. The action may be complicated by the need to take account of other factors that are changing, or have changed, the society or nation irreversibly, such as HIV/AIDS and genocide.

The Complex of Actors

224. Experience of conflicts in Bosnia, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, support the need for a response that brings all the international community's power to bear upon a given crisis to achieve a decisive effect. In so doing, the failures in the key constituents can be addressed in a complementary and long-term response. Typically, this will involve a 'Complex of Actors'. These are representatives from the international community working alongside representatives of the indigenous populations in each of the constituent areas, as well as the PSF in collaboration with any international civil authority, such as a Special Representative either of the [UN] Secretary General (SRSG) or the European Union (EUSR), or a Head of Mission (HoM). This is represented in Figure 2.5.




Figure 2.5 - The PSO 'Complex of Actors'

225. Without the active co-operation and consent of the indigenous population there can be no self-sustaining peace. At best there may be subservience and a dependency on a PSO to maintain peace. Representatives of the indigenous population may not be forthcoming until a PSO has established an environment in which all indigenous representatives can work without fear. The complex of actors will therefore change as a PSO progresses.

SECTION V – THE ‘FRAMEWORK’²⁰ CONCEPT

226. **Comprehensive Planning.** When a specific conflict or crisis emerges, members of the complex of actors should all have their part to play in a strategic planning process to achieve conflict resolution. However, practical necessity and recent events have shown that the pursuit of an effective and timely response is best served through the adoption of a ‘framework’ body. This framework could be provided by the UN, NATO, or a regional body such as the European Union (EU) or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). In the case of a coalition, a single nation may be selected as the framework nation.

227. **Application of the Framework.** The framework concept can be applied at all levels of planning and execution, however, the impact of the concept is most pronounced at the Operational Level. It is this level that forms the nexus between those shaping the strategic environment and promulgating their strategic vision, usually by means of a mandate, and the web of operational and tactical actors that will strive to achieve the desired effects. For the PSF this level involves the creation and execution of the Operational Plan in order to achieve the Campaign Objectives. Above and below the Operational Level the breadth and diversity of the actor complex constitute the difficulties inherent in, and fundamental strength of, a PSO response. In the rare event of a purely national response the model remains of relevance, with the breadth of the Strategic Level representing the executive pan-governmental engagement; this must be mirrored at the Tactical Level by actions and actors from the ministries able to contribute to the desired effects.

228. **Practical Constraints.** In attempting to co-ordinate a complex of actors and potential effects, the planning process must be iterative. Each iteration should refine context-specific options through exposure and discussion. The need for a rapid response, though often an important consideration, should not lead to ill-considered and narrowly-conceived planning. Defining the ‘something’, in ‘do something’, is the most important aspect of PSO planning. The task demands close attention to detail, and early engagement of as many members of the actor complex in the planning process as possible, within the strictures of operational security. The mechanism used to achieve complementary action by the actor complex across the key constituents of a nation may be thought of as Lines of Activity.²¹

²⁰ Two terms are in common use: ‘Lead Nation’ and ‘Framework Nation’, each is based upon an acceptance that in mounting a comprehensive response, efficiency is best achieved through a core agency or nation adopting a leading role. In NATO and the EU, the ‘Framework Nation’ will provide the Commander and the main body of the HQ staff; procedures and processes will conform to alliance standards but reflect the modus operandi of the ‘Framework Nation’. A ‘Framework Nation’ leads an alliance-based response. By contrast, the ‘Lead Nation’ assumes full responsibility for the planning and execution of the entire operation with other nations’ or agencies’ force elements embedded into standing ‘Lead Nation’ structures.

²¹ Military commanders will be familiar with the concept of lines of operation within an operational campaign plan; the strategic lines of activity within a comprehensive PSO plan are analogous.

229. **Guidance.** As a minimum, the initial strategic guidance from the strategic level should provide:

- a. Steady-state and/or interim criteria to be achieved.
- b. A clearly defined mandate or the route towards obtaining a mandate.
- c. Limitations on the nature of action and means that may be employed by the PSO. This direction should encompass all the instruments of power able to contribute effects across the key constituents of a nation that will assist in satisfying the criteria.

SECTION VI – AUTHORITY FOR A PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION, CAMPAIGN AUTHORITY AND COMPRESSION OF LEVELS

Authority for a Peace Support Operation

230. The fundamental consideration that must be addressed at the outset and throughout a PSO, by those contributing to the operation, is the authority for the operation to be undertaken, ie its international legitimacy. In absolute terms, the authority for a PSO is usually derived from the politically brokered mandate. Differing authorities can approve a PSO mandate, as discussed in Chapter 1. The most widely respected authority for a PSO to begin is that conferred by a UN mandate.²² However, regional mandates can provide for more timely, preventative, or responsive action, than might be possible through the UN.²³ However, such mandates are vulnerable to perceptions of bias and may prove sensitive to variations in international will. Similarly, the legitimacy of unilateral or small coalition action is frequently challenged, and can act to compound the underlying causes of a conflict when the PSO is thought to reflect a disregard for international law, the customary diplomatic process, or to be symptomatic of colonialist or hegemonic pretensions. Small coalitions do, nevertheless, offer an attractive compromise between responsiveness and political legitimacy. In addition, the mandate that is established at the strategic level is critical in shaping a PSO and the supporting PSF. In particular, it will determine the freedom of action allowed at the operational level in pursuit of campaign objectives.

²² Although at times attractive, due to the machinery of the UN system, retrospective authorisation has invariably attracted international opprobrium and accusations of acting above international law.

²³ The attainment of consensus across the diverse UN membership has catastrophically delayed responses in the past and, despite extensive reform initiatives, it seems unrealistic to expect that the diplomatic process will be abridged in the near future.

Campaign Authority

231. Campaign Authority is the term used to describe the amalgam of four related and inter-dependent factors:

- a. The perceived legitimacy, by the various actors within the complex, of the international mandate that establishes a PSO.
- b. The perceived legitimacy of the freedoms and constraints, explicit or implicit in the mandate, placed on those executing the PSO.
- c. The degree to which factions, the local population and other actors subjugate themselves to the authority of those executing the PSO; from unwilling compliance to freely given consent.
- d. The degree to which the activities of those executing the PSO meet the expectations of the factions, local population and others.

232. While the mandate should confer legal authority on a PSO, a successful outcome requires compliance with and consent to be bound by, agreements brokered as part of the PSO. How the PSO is conducted, specific activities undertaken and expectations managed, not least by any PSF, will vary the level of Campaign Authority. This will be reflected in the extent to which factions, the local population and others co-operate with or hinder the activities of the PSO. Because of the interdependence between the four factors, individual assessments are difficult. Hence, Campaign Authority is a conceptual tool that can be used at the Strategic, Operational and Tactical levels; it defines the capacity of a PSO to act in the collective interest of all parties, and thereby achieve a sustainable peace. The level of Campaign Authority that a PSO can achieve will be grounded in the authorising agency mandate, but the means used, and tempo, will also be reflected in the levels of consent and compliance that can be achieved and maintained. Ideally, all parties will consider both the PSO and its activities as legitimate; they will freely consent to work with the PSO and their expectations will be satisfied.

Compression of the Levels

233. In PSOs, action taken at the lowest tactical level may need to be especially responsive to strategic decision-making, with the tactical outcomes having immediate strategic significance. For example, the comments or actions of a corporal may prompt ministerial statements as a result of media reporting. This may lead to political and military leaders at the strategic level wishing directly to influence the lowest tactical actions, missing out the intermediate operational and higher tactical levels of command. This compression is exacerbated in the multinational environment that dominates PSO. The effects of ‘reach back’ in to several national capitals may be seen as fragmenting the will of the international community to achieve the outcome it

desires to see. In turn this may undermine the Campaign Authority by placing restrictions on the execution of the PSO. Figure 2.6 contrasts the theoretical modelling used in earlier conflict analysis with the contemporary reality of PSO.



Figure 2.6 - Contrasting Traditional Levels and the Compressed Reality of PSO Planning

234. In addition, the strategic level has merged across the complex of actors. Strategy is generally expressed in government policy statements that set down ‘policy goals’. Nationally, these policy goals encapsulate the national strategic direction on defence, which in turn will influence the manner in which the national forces deployed as part of a PSF may be employed.

SECTION VII – PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS ACTIVITY TYPES

235. The PSO concept encompasses activities before, during, and after conflict. It thus embraces types of activity to **prevent** conflict, **intervene** in a conflict, **regenerate** and **sustain** following conflict. Figure 2.7 models this PSO concept. The activity types are not sequential phases; indeed, the ‘ideal’ situation would embrace concurrency. These types of activity can be defined as follows:

- a. **Prevent.** An activity, within a PSO, that demands action to monitor and identify the causes of conflict and timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation or resumption of hostilities. Consequently, it can be characterised as anticipatory, preceding conflict; or sustained, in the post conflict phase, when it seeks to protect and consolidate the reform and development process.

- b. **Intervene.** An activity, within a PSO, that demands action to bring about and/or uphold a cease-fire/agreement or impose a mandated settlement.
- c. **Regenerate.** An activity, within a PSO, that demands action in pursuit of the internationally mandated steady-state conditions.
- d. **Sustain.** An activity, within a PSO, that demands action by indigenous bodies/agencies to maintain or better the steady-state criteria set by the international mandate.




Figure 2.7 - Activity Based Analysis of a PSO

236. This conceptual model provides a tool for considering the nature of activities that may be undertaken simultaneously during a PSO. Its use during planning is covered in detail in Chapter 4.

SECTION VIII – THE PEACE SUPPORT FORCE

237. It is usual for a PSO to include a unified multinational military force under a single military commander, the PSF. The removal of PSO compartmentalisation within the Spectrum of Tension means that the full range of combat techniques should be available to assist in a diverse range of tasks. Moreover, the military instrument of strategy is now applicable pre-conflict, during conflict, and in the post-conflict period as part of a complementary complex of actors, in pursuit of UN Charter purposes and principles. The PSF should be an integral part of the PSO, and the PSF Commander usually has his own complementary campaign plan. Despite the removal of distinctive compartments, there is still a temptation to divide both the PSF campaign plan and the PSO into time or event-based phases.

238. Earlier PSO doctrine suggested distinct boundaries between phases of PSO and tended to create the impression that forces could be deployed under a mandate, for a particular period, prepared and equipped to deal solely with the demands of a

particular task, such as Peacekeeping. In practice, this led to grave errors, most notably in Srebrenica, where peacekeeping forces were unable to respond to the escalation of violence and tension. More alarmingly, some nations and security coalitions have assumed, with scant appreciation of the risk, that a force of limited capability, trained and authorised to conduct only specific operations, can have full utility in the inherently volatile context of PSO. Experience has shown that PSO campaigns do not progress in a linear manner. Campaign Authority, which defines a PSF's capacity to act, as well as the nature of the force required to uphold the mandate, varies fluidly with time and location.²⁴ The concept and use of PSF Stances is intended to acknowledge and accommodate this reality.

Peace Support Force Stances

239. There are 3 distinct PSF 'Stances': Enforcement, Stabilisation, and Transition. Each is characterised by principles that condition and guide the use and the capabilities of the military force in relation to the desired outcome or effect. It should be noted that boundaries between stances are 'soft', and hence realistic, as they reflect a gradual shift in emphasis, rather than the hard step changes driven by time or a discrete event as suggested by earlier models. Whereas phases are considered in terms of events or time, stances should be considered in terms of the required effect or dominant condition.

240. The definitions that follow describe military force stances according to the context in which the PSF must operate. However, it is imperative that force capabilities and Rules of Engagement²⁵ are sufficiently robust and flexible to match the unpredictable fluctuation of Campaign Authority.

- a. **Enforcement.** Military forces are part of the complementary Instruments of National Power used to secure and/or implement a cease-fire or settlement. When necessary, they will employ the coercive and deterrent effects of military force to implement and uphold an internationally derived mandate. The level of Campaign Authority will be uncertain, and a high risk of conflict escalation could well exist in a large proportion of the population, possibly across a wide geographic area. An Enforcement Stance therefore demands the possession, and when necessary, the use of credible coercive or deterrent force.

²⁴ This fact has been graphically described by General Charles C Krulac, 31st Commandant USMC, who coined the expression '*The Three Block War*'. In his illustration, General Krulac highlighted the fact that a PSF unit could find itself obliged to employ a range of military stances on the same day, within the space of 3 city blocks on the same operation.

²⁵ Rules of Engagement: '*Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered*', JWP 0-01.1.

b. **Stabilisation.** Following an agreement or cease-fire, and the emergence of a generally permissive environment, the PSF acts as part of a complementary Instrument of National Power to reduce the level of tension and increase the level of Campaign Authority. The level of Campaign Authority will normally warrant the use of military force in self-defence alone. However, it may be necessary to use the coercive and deterrent effects of military force to uphold the internationally derived mandate. Attention will focus upon the monitoring and identification of the underlying causes of conflict, with timely action being taken to prevent the escalation of tension, or the resumption of hostilities. A Stabilisation Stance therefore demands the possession, demonstration, and when necessary the employment, of sufficient credible coercive or deterrent force as well as Campaign Authority building measures.

c. **Transition.** The PSF acts as one of the Instruments of National Power to address the underlying causes of conflict. Through a long-term commitment to indigenous military reform, re-integration, training, and reconstruction the international military forces help to achieve the final steady-state conditions that were specified as the PSO campaign objectives. The level of Campaign Authority will generally be high, with the use of military force rarely warranted. The PSF will continue to monitor the underlying causes of conflict, and initiate timely action to consolidate, and provide incentives for, coherent progress towards the campaign objectives. Priority will be given to the planning and execution of the handover of security responsibilities to suitably trained, equipped, and effective indigenous forces. Once this handover is complete the conditions will be set for significant reductions in PSF force levels, with the balance of effort switching to continue training and advisory roles as part of sustained Conflict Prevention activity. A Transition Stance therefore demands the possession of credible coercive and deterrent force. The PSF will be used in concert with, or as advisors to, the indigenous forces once they have achieved prescribed operational capability. This will maintain or enhance the Campaign Authority, and provide a credible deterrent to resumption of hostilities.

Force Stance Agility

241. **Planning Realities.** Experience has repeatedly shown that full definition of interim or steady-state criteria will rarely be completed before the decision to engage has been taken. As a result, military and civil actors will find themselves obliged to formulate plans and assessments based upon informed assumptions of the strategic intent. At the outset, the military role in the campaign may have primacy, as efforts are made to establish a safe and secure environment into which other agencies can

employ their individual strengths to effect. Primacy, and/or 'main effort'²⁶ will shift, and military forces must be sufficiently agile to match their response, in terms of behaviour and stance, to the prevailing circumstances.

242. **Geographic Realities.** It is unlikely that Campaign Authority will be consistent across the geographical area of a PSO. Campaign Authority will vary with the location of factions and groups within the local population. Hence, the stance may change across the Joint Operations Area and it may ebb and flow in a particular location. Campaign Authority should be assessed and constantly mapped to ensure that the appropriate Stance, and hence capabilities, can be maintained in specific localities and for the whole PSF.

Multinational Strategic Support

243. The PSF Commander must have the strategic and operational support of the national contingent commanders in a multinational force. There must be no doubt that the PSF is fully capable of enforcing its mandate, and that the political will to do so is steadfast.

²⁶ Main Effort: 'A concentration of forces or means, in a particular area, where a commander seeks to bring about a decision', JWP 0-01.1.

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CHAPTER 3 – PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS FUNDAMENTALS AND PRINCIPLES

*‘The use of Force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a moment; but it does not remove the necessity for subduing again: and a nation is not governed, which is perpetually to be conquered’.*¹

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

301. The acceptance that there are no distinct compartments for Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in the spectrum of tension and the constantly changing demands of PSO engagements has generated new doctrinal concepts. Consequently, 4 types of PSO activity: Prevention, Intervention, Regeneration, Sustainment, and 3 Peace Support Force (PSF) Stances: Enforcement, Stabilisation and Transition, have been introduced. In concert with this conceptual shift, the guiding principles for PSO show a marked change from earlier models. The rationale for the change comes from 2 areas. First, an appreciation of what the international community seeks to achieve when mounting a PSO. Secondly, the practical implications of the way in which State practice have come to shape the tasks faced by PSF operational commanders and their civil counterparts. The following observation, made by an experienced multinational PSF Commander, reflects the impact of this reality:

[A PSO co-ordinates] *‘The application of state power to direct or facilitate the movement of the social, economic and political affairs of others in the direction that the intervening states think they should go. The political objectives of the intervening states may be ill defined, transient, limited, variable, and unpredictable. Politicians may exercise tight control. A clear finite mission statement and final political end state is unlikely. PSOs evolve; success or failure opens or closes doors of opportunity. The environment is often one of deep-rooted mistrust, suspicion, and reluctance to make concessions, unpredictable, and intransigent. This could be true even after the signing of a peace agreement. The bad guy may become the good guy and vice versa. It is a complex and fluid situation.’*²

302. In planning and prosecuting a PSO, civil leaders, military commanders and their staffs at all levels need be cognisant of certain fundamentals and principles. These fundamentals and principles are not rigid rules, but guidance on how a PSF, and the individual strengths of the actor complex, can be applied to best effect. In essence, the relevance, applicability, and relative importance of each fundamental and principle

¹ E Burke, *‘Speech on conciliation with America’*, 1775.

² Remarks made by Major General Wilson, UK Royal Marines, on completion of his tour as COS KFOR December 2001.

will change with the circumstance of the PSO. Judgement and common sense should dictate how each fundamental or principle is applied to achieve success; blatant disregard will not necessarily lead to failure, however the risk of failure may increase. Importantly, leaders and commanders should remain flexible in their thinking. For the PSF these fundamentals and principles augment the existing elements of British Defence Doctrine³ (BDD) under the philosophy of one doctrine.⁴

SECTION II – FUNDAMENTALS OF A PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION

First Fundamental - Creating, Sustaining, and Enhancing Campaign Authority

303. The fundamental that must be addressed at the outset and throughout a PSO is the Campaign Authority. Campaign Authority⁴ is derived from perceptions of the politically brokered mandate, and the prevailing levels of consent and expectation. The interdependence between the facets of Campaign Authority should be analysed at the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical levels.

304. For the commander of the PSF at the Operational Level, the mandate is critical in shaping force structure, and prescribing the freedom of action allowed in pursuit of campaign objectives. The existence of a mandate and the absence of any form of consent on behalf of the local population does not remove the obligations of commanders and service personnel to act responsibly within all the aspects of international law, such as the Law of Armed Conflict.⁵ Indeed, the signatories to the treaty that created the International Criminal Court (ICC)⁶ underlined their commitment to ensuring that both military and civilian personnel are held responsible for their actions. Moreover, all civil and military leaders must remain acutely aware of the potential for censure⁷ and alert to prevailing levels⁸ of the Campaign Authority for a given PSO. Assessment of Campaign Authority, and action to reinforce it, needs to take place constantly, amongst the population at which the PSO is aimed, and on a global, regional and national basis. In addition, it may be appropriate to focus upon the level of Campaign Authority within a given ethnic, cultural, or religious grouping. In all cases, the level of Campaign Authority will be subject to the influence of events

³ JDP 01 '*Joint Operations*' and JWP 0-01 '*British Defence Doctrine*'.

⁴ Discussed in Chapter 2.

⁵ Joint Service Publication 383 '*Joint Service Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict*' provides guidance for the United Kingdom Armed Forces.

⁶ This court may review the actions of political and military leaders when breaches of international norms are held to have occurred. However, the ICC takes jurisdiction only when the nation of the accused declines to investigate the charge. Note: The US is not currently a signatory to the ICC.

⁷ In addition to the censure associated with legal process, commanders and head of mission in PSO must accept, and constructively operate, under the constant scrutiny of media commentators who will represent a range of political, ethical and religious stances.

⁸ These perspectives must be rigorously and constantly assessed by Operational Analysis (OA) and the results should inform adjustment of the campaign plans and the means of execution.

and their presentation by the media. In many situations, perceptions held will not be as a result of first hand knowledge or experience, but rather the compound effects of views, opinion and sentiment, in part projected by the media. Consequently, unless perceptions are changed they will be seen as reality. As a result, the level of Campaign Authority must be regarded as a highly sensitive factor, variable with time, location, and vertically within the hierarchies of the complex of actors, authorising agencies, and nations engaged in a PSO.

305. The PSF must demonstrate its resolve on deployment to the Joint Operations Area (JOA). Any subsequent adjustments to the PSF Stances should be driven by assessments of Campaign Authority, which may include Operational Analysis (OA). Throughout the campaign successive PSF Commanders are responsible for the application of the Rules of Engagement (ROE)⁹ and International Law, even in the face of attempts by parties hostile to the PSO either to gain an advantage or to undermine the PSF mission.

306. All actors in the PSO complex must be encouraged to understand and fulfil their role in enhancing the level of Campaign Authority. This is achieved by maintaining the highest possible standards of professionalism, compassion, and regard for the higher aims of the campaign, both on and off duty. Through Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) or other special agreements the PSF may enjoy certain immunities related to its duties. Notwithstanding this, its members must routinely respect the laws and customs of the host nation and must be seen to have a respectful regard for local religious and secular beliefs. This latter point is particularly important where local religious or cultural beliefs may consider behaviour routinely acceptable to members of the international community as socially or culturally unacceptable. Such a perception would undermine Campaign Authority.¹⁰ It is important that PSF Commanders act to ensure that common standards of behaviour are recognised and implemented across the nations contributing to a PSF.

307. When considering national sentiment, sub-division can realistically and usefully be made between the ruling elite, the body of the (potential) electorate, and importantly, those civil and military personnel committed to supporting operations. In attempting to maintain morale, enhance Campaign Authority and support national will, the PSF Operational Commander¹¹ must focus on perceptions in the JOA whilst maintaining an awareness of international opinion. Variations of perception in one

⁹ JWP 0-01.1.

¹⁰ In extreme circumstances, the cultural differences may be such that PSF Rest and Recuperation facilities and arrangements may need to be arranged outside the Joint Operations Area. Judgement will be needed to ensure that these arrangements do not isolate the PSF from the people and the benefits of close encounters. It is also important to consider the impact of international community expenditure in the local economy and emergent business sectors. An excessive reliance upon this expenditure, or pandering to what should be a transient demand, may induce an unhelpful dependence and thus act against campaign objectives.

¹¹ The shaping and nurture of international cohesion and resolve is an issue for the strategic level command of the troop contributing governments, and the authorising agency or agencies.

grouping may rapidly affect other parts of the national or international population. Accordingly, operational commanders must exploit Information Operations as part of their combat power in the PSO campaign.¹²

Second Fundamental - Credible and Reasonable Force

308. To implement and uphold the terms of the internationally agreed mandate, a PSF must moderate the use of available force to achieve the desired effect without detriment to the Campaign Authority. Force must be credible and used in a manner that is reasonable to achieve the mandated outcomes or desired effect. The action should be proportional and discriminatory such that it is confined in effect to the intended target. Moderation of the force used will be achieved through the terms of the mandate, observance of international, domestic, and host nation law where it exists, and through commander's and nationally imposed rules of engagement. Controlled, and with a clear focus upon all aspects of the effects achieved, a military force should act to enhance the Campaign Authority and hence promote and enable the realisation of the long-term strategic goals set down in the mandate.

Third Fundamental - Perseverance

309. Experience has demonstrated that PSO engagements are likely to be long-term, and they should seek to address the underlying causes of conflict and instability. Perseverance demands that the complex of actors identify campaign objectives, and pursue them with a complementary, resolute, and tenacious attitude until the interim or steady-state criteria have been reached.

310. The underlying causes of the conflict are unlikely to be addressed if the full range of skills in the actor complex is not exploited because: action is short-term; force levels are inadequate; rules of engagement are overly restrictive; interim or steady-state criteria are superficially defined; or campaign plans are poorly conceived. For example, a PSO that has a mandate which is valid for only 6 months is likely to create the impression of stability for the period because those interested in perpetuating a crisis will suspend their actions and wait until the mandate expires. Planning with an honest and realistic appreciation of the factors inherent in 'perseverance' should ensure that the actor complex, particularly the international community, understands what needs to be done, and most importantly, for how long.

¹² See Chapter 5, Section V.

SECTION III – GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF A PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION

First Principle - Comprehensive and Complementary Campaigning

311. To produce the decisive effect in a PSO, analysis, planning, and execution of a campaign must involve comprehensive and complementary action. To achieve this there are 4 facets to be considered:

- a. Comprehensive Campaigning.
- b. Complementary Campaigning.
- c. Military Implications.
- d. Specific Focus.

Comprehensive Campaigning

312. The aim of Comprehensive Campaigning is to exploit the tenable synergistic effects through the co-ordinated activation of each Instrument of National Power. Having analysed a PSO on this basis, a set of interim or steady-state criteria,¹³ linked to the Instruments of National Power, should define the strategic objectives. For the PSF, operational military planning cannot take place in a vacuum, and must retain a sharp focus on the extent to which military activity will contribute to the fulfilment of the criteria. In a PSO, all the means to achieve the prescribed interim or steady-state criteria are not under a single authority. The need for comprehensive campaigning to exploit each actor's strengths by collaboration or co-ordination is therefore increased. However, the complexity of the task faced in formulating comprehensive plans should not be reflected in the nature of the directions issued to subordinate levels. With effort, these plans can be incorporated into direction that exploits the principle of Mission Command¹⁴ so that those being tasked can succeed.¹⁵

Complementary Campaigning

313. It is more difficult to apply the key Principle of BDD, Selection and Maintenance of the Aim,¹⁶ across the Spectrum of Tension and complex of actors in a PSO. Achieving and maintaining the principle of complementary campaigning should be adopted. Considerable effort may be required to agree the purposes of the PSO and

¹³ See Chapter 2, Section III.

¹⁴ See Annex C for a summary of Mission Command a fuller explanation is available in BDD.

¹⁵ Not all agencies and assigned units will have adopted, or be able to operate competently guided by the principle of Mission Command. Operational commanders must actively differentiate between those force elements or assets imbued with the necessary ethos and those for whom a different approach may be more helpful.

¹⁶ See Annex C for a summary; a fuller explanation is available in BDD.

to set down these shared goals as steady-state criteria against which planning can take place. Arguably, unless a debate occurs and there is shared intent to address the underlying causes of the conflict, any use of military force cannot be considered to be a PSO.¹⁷ The debate will be led by diplomacy and involve experts in the other Instruments of National Power. Diplomatic actors at the strategic level should strive to produce direction on what needs to be done. It is imperative that the ‘something’ in ‘do something’ is defined and, more importantly, that it is fully understood by all parties to the conflict, and the complex of actors that may contribute to achieving the desired outcome. When direction¹⁸ has been issued, efforts can begin to identify the actors who could achieve the PSO objective.

314. Focused analysis of the desired outcome by all actors will ensure that nugatory or counter-productive action is avoided during the initial stages of the PSO. The definition of steady-state criteria will identify groupings of actors who have an interest in complementary planning and negotiation. These groupings may not match traditional military command chains. As a result, bespoke arrangements that cover the constitution, communication, and administration of these ‘functionally-based groupings’¹⁹ may need to be agreed and widely publicised. Military commanders and their subordinates may find themselves co-opted in these structures, and it is vital that suitable military personnel are selected to work in such a diverse environment. In particular, personnel used to operating in a military environment must appreciate²⁰ the value placed upon informal as well as formal relationships when working in a PSO complex.

315. Once appointed, the UN’s Special Representative (SR) of the Secretary General (SRSG), European Union Special Representative (EUSR) or a Head of Mission (HoM) should have prime responsibility for achieving unity of effort across the PSO complex. This responsibility should, whenever possible, be matched by granting the SR/HoM delegated and meaningful authority over assigned civil and military resources. Where a command relationship is not formally established the success of a PSO is likely to depend on a close working relationship between the

¹⁷ See Chapter 2, Section II.

¹⁸ Although seeking such clarity may bring accusations of idealism, the evidence of the past suggests that errors in the mounting of a campaign can have catastrophic effects. Repeatedly, poor objective definition has led to creeping development of the mission, and hence the range of assets and materiel required. Cohesion and diplomacy are undermined, and often the outcome has proved to be an open-ended and costly compromise. Conflict has not been resolved, and an untidy commitment continues to drain limited international will and materiel resources. It is also increasingly the case that an informed and global media, or international bodies such as the ICC, may call leaders to account for their actions or omissions. Those empowered to direct action must, therefore resist the habit of constructive ambiguity. Without clear direction subordinate levels of command can only guess what may be required, no basis for shared goals can be found, and the principle of Comprehensive Campaigning is forsaken.

¹⁹ Functional groupings will naturally form around lines of activity eg law and order.

²⁰ Training to achieve the requisite capability already exists at the tactical level especially in preparing those destined to operate in designated Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC) appointments. However, staff at all levels should be aware of the underlying tenets of CIMIC and the operating norms of other agencies if they are to function efficiently at parallel levels in the PSO complex. See IJWP 3-90 ‘*CIMIC*’.

SR/HoM, PSF Commander and other leaders of the international community. Mission success will demand considered, timely and close liaison by the SR/HoM with the authorising agency, leaders of Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs), national government departments, inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).²¹ At times, the diverse demands of the many organisations can work to the detriment of the PSO and its effective leadership. In what will almost invariably be ad-hoc structures, leaders and commanders at all levels must actively seek to manage this risk by minimising friction and maintaining a clear focus on the higher-level purpose of the PSO. Where a PSF precedes the appointment of an SR or HoM, the military commander may find that he has to initiate and fulfil the co-ordinating role.

316. A product of complementary campaigning, ideally orchestrated by the SR/HoM, should be a series of individual campaign plans with a Comprehensive PSO Plan being a summary of the individual campaign plans for each line of activity. For example the line of activity to create a safe and secure environment is usually the responsibility of the PSF. However, the PSF may be assisted by the group of actors involved in establishing the rule of law. Moreover, the PSF may be assisting in the distribution of humanitarian aid by providing protected convoys. The PSF Campaign Plan will, itself, contain lines of operation to achieve the safe and secure environment, but one or more of the lines could be associated with convoy protection. The campaign plan associated with the rule of law may incorporate assistance/lines of operation to the PSF. Complementary campaigning requires co-ordination during execution. The ebb and flow of the different campaign plans may require the holder of the Comprehensive PSO Plan to indicate the current priorities if the steady-state criteria are to be achieved.

Military Implications

317. In a PSO, specific military objectives will constitute milestones, or decisive points, along the way to achieving the politically defined interim or steady-state criteria. Attainment of the interim or steady-state criteria does not necessarily imply that a military end-state has been reached and *vice versa*. In a PSO, military engagement is usually required until the indigenous structures prove able to uphold the interim or steady-state criteria for security and rule of law without external assistance. Unchecked or protracted development of comprehensive and complementary campaign plans can degrade the military force's ability to achieve operational tempo, lead to military frustration, mission failure, and the potential unnecessary loss of innocent lives. A balance must be achieved and it may prove useful for initial military planning to proceed based on an agreed military end-state or interim end-states rather

²¹ As the adversary or belligerent organisational structure becomes more complex, a commensurate improvement in the sophistication and scope of the response will be needed. This reality is accommodated in the principle of Specific Focus.

than waiting for the interim or steady-state criteria to be fully defined.²² Nevertheless, the pursuit of short-term military success should be sensitive to the aim of achieving social, economic, and political transformation.

Specific Focus

318. An important factor in achieving a lasting resolution, and hence the prevention of further conflict, is the evolution of a Comprehensive PSO Plan that remains pertinent to the problem at hand. The imperative at the outset is to analyse dispassionately the conflict from a global, regional, and local perspective. Efforts expended to gain an accurate understanding of the crisis and its root causes will be vital. Having evaluated the crisis, plans to resolve the crisis can be developed at 2 levels: Strategic, exploring the global intent and impact, and recognising the regional balance of power dynamic; and Operational, focusing specifically on the problems presented within the target geographic area. Planning is covered in Chapter 4.

319. Stress, friction and chaos will invariably challenge the best-made plans. Clarity of purpose and sound objectives, set down and widely understood from the outset, will greatly assist in overcoming these effects. Furthermore, complementary and comprehensive operations that are perceived as successful will have compound effects. The cohesion and morale of actors in the PSO complex will be strengthened. The level of Campaign Authority will also be enhanced, winning over the silent majority. In contrast, those parties opposing the Comprehensive PSO Plan will find their morale, capability, and will to resist much diminished.

Second Principle - Preventative Action

320. In addition to the increase in intra-state conflict, the globalisation process has irreversibly extended the scope, nature, and reach of those that reject international norms of behaviour. In response, many nations now recognise responsibility to protect their citizens from the coercive or lethal intent of destabilising factions keen to exploit global reach and the lethality, or impact, of terrorism and asymmetric warfare. For the occasions where conflict is the likely result of failing or failed governance, Conflict Prevention remains an enduring feature of an effective PSO. Discharge of a nation's responsibility to protect, occasionally and exceptionally, may demand precautionary action to alter the will of destabilising factions and deny them capabilities that give them global reach. Preventative action can be taken both as part of a PSO, or in response to an emerging threat that may also require the restoration of good governance to some or all of the key constituents of a nation or society.

²² It should be understood that the Comprehensive PSO Plan, which seeks to encompass action by the PSO complex, would be conducted ideally against the steady-state criteria. Adoption of interim criteria or militarily defined end-state, or interim end-state, is an expedient that recognises the imperative for timely action and operational tempo. The need to act with the clear vision of the likely interim or steady-state criteria cannot be over emphasised.

321. The threat and the need to act in accordance with international practice will define the nature and timing of preventative action.²³ Preventative action using Instruments of National Power will normally be proportionate, discriminatory, and confined in effect. Adherence to the fundamentals and principles of PSO will ensure the desired effects are achieved without detriment to any existing Campaign Authority or the authority of a campaign initiated by the preventative action.

322. In addition to the direct effects associated with preventative action, a wider range of deterrent and coercive effects also become tenable. Factions may be deterred when they are forewarned of the intention to destroy the moral and physical components of their power. In addition, those who would actively or passively harbour or sponsor these groups are persuaded or coerced into observance of international practice by the judicious application of the preventative acts.

Third Principle - Sensitised Action

323. PSO requires all personnel to develop a detailed understanding and respect for the law, religion, customs, and culture of the range of actors engaged in the PSO complex, particularly with respect to the indigenous population. Ideally, intelligence activity will inform the training process, and constant effort will be needed during a PSO to ensure that responses and actions remain culturally appropriate and are perceived by the recipients as intended. Through the sensitive action of individuals or groups, within the actor complex, mutual trust and respect can be developed. The need for sensitivity is not confined to a current PSO, there are second order effects. Where the actors have a reputation from a previous PSO for being sensitive, it is likely that their presence will enhance Campaign Authority. Similarly, across the divide between the PSF and the belligerent parties, understanding and rapport can be developed over time. Campaign Authority is improved markedly by investing research, planning, and training to accord with this principle. A culturally astute and responsive PSO will increase the prospects of success.

Fourth Principle - Security

324. The creation of a safe and secure environment is invariably a primary objective of a PSO, and one that is usually undertaken by the PSF. Self-defence is an inherent right and force protection²⁴ is a command responsibility in any military operation. In addition, the PSF may also be given specific responsibilities for the protection of

²³ Overt, covert or a combination of both, these actions will frequently demand the collection, collation, and presentation of information of evidential quality using forensic techniques and equipment beyond the requirements of combat. United Kingdom forces have extensive experience in this area through protracted engagement in Northern Ireland and the Balkans. The demands of international legal process pose new challenges that must be met by additional training, equipment, and operational level planning consideration.

²⁴ Force Protection: *'a process which aims to conserve the fighting potential of a deployed force by countering the wider threat to its elements from adversaries, natural and human hazards, and fratricide'*. (JWP 0-01.1)

civilian components of the PSO. This will have to be taken into account when planning the size and composition of the force and rules of engagement.

325. Frequently, aid agencies may employ local civilians or expatriates as guards and escorts. The employers should consider security screening and monitoring to ensure that those employed do not jeopardise the employers' actions and/or undermine the Campaign Authority. Precise responsibilities and operating procedures for private security arrangements will require co-ordination with the activities of the PSF. The PSF Commander must regularly review this interaction.

326. All military personnel involved in a PSO must recognise that a balance must be struck between hard force protection measures and those 'soft measures'²⁵ that can significantly contribute to overall force protection. Civil actors operating within a JOA should be accurately briefed on threats, in particular mines and minefields, and should be encouraged to make their personnel aware of the risks and dangers they may face. Most responsible civil sector actors will be keen to participate in threat briefings. In a comprehensive PSO, all participants should make every effort, to ensure that the process involves the mutually beneficial exchange of information and views.²⁶

Fifth Principle - Transparency

327. PSO campaign aims, as defined by the politically ascribed steady-state or interim criteria, must be easily understood and obvious to all parties. The parties to the conflict and the indigenous populace must be made fully aware of what the mandate demands of them, and what the consequences would be for failing to comply. Likewise, they should also be made aware of the clear advantages to be gained by compliance. Failure to achieve a common understanding may lead to suspicion, mistrust, or even hostility. Information should be communicated through sources appropriate to the JOA. Where no adequate or efficient information system exists, high priority should be given to the construction or provision of an appropriate public information network that is both effective and trusted.

328. While transparency of intent should be the general rule, this must be balanced against the need to ensure operational security. Force protection or mission success

²⁵ These measures would include quick impact social projects and CIMIC activity that serves to enhance Campaign Authority and support from the majority of the people in the JOA. Through improved contact with the people, information flow, understanding, trust and the intelligence picture can all be improved. Resort to a fortress mentality has rarely proved effective as means of force protection.

²⁶ Dialogue, trust, and understanding between military and civil actors is a delicate area that requires personnel trained in, and familiar with, the respective agency's agenda. Those briefing civilian agencies should have undergone additional training and should not simply be intelligence specialists delivering a standard military threat assessment. Officers briefing civil sector representatives must ensure that their information is of the highest quality and currency as the lives of IGO and NGO workers may well depend upon the data offered. In addition, the long-term credibility of the PSF and the CIMIC staff, in particular, will depend upon the quality of these briefings, the perceived value to all concerned, and the rapport achieved. When available, a PSF commander should attend briefings, present a personal assessment, and garner the views of civil actors, many of whom may have regular access to regions and population groups denied to the PSF.

will occasionally render transparency wholly inappropriate. Careful and high level consideration needs to be given to the exercise of transparency.

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CHAPTER 4 – PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS CAMPAIGNING

‘A crisis-driven response to conflict that measures success in terms of arresting disease and starvation and achieving a ceasefire must be embedded within the painstaking tasks of relationship and confidence building, and of the design of and preparation for social change.’¹

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

401. To achieve comprehensive and complementary campaigning² in a Peace Support Operation (PSO), it is necessary that all those involved have a general appreciation of campaigning. This chapter serves as a précis of military campaigning and guidance,³ with an emphasis on those aspects pertinent to a PSO.

Campaigning

402. Campaigning at the operational level consists of three notions, Operational Art, Operational Design and Operational Management.

- a. In the United Kingdom Operational Art is defined as ‘the orchestration of all military activities involved in converting strategic objectives into tactical actions with a view to seeking a decisive result’.⁴ For PSOs this may be interpreted as ‘the orchestration of all peace support activities involved in converting strategic intent into practical actions with a view to satisfying steady-state criteria’. Thus Operational Art uses creative and innovative thought to find possible solutions to problems; these solutions may be viewed as ‘Operational Ideas’.
- b. Operational Design is the process that further develops and refines Operational Ideas into a Campaign Plan. The Campaign Plan, which articulates the overall scheme for operations, results from the Operational Estimate and is largely constructed using a number of theoretical building blocks collectively known as the Campaign Planning Concepts (CPCs).
- c. Operational Management is the integration, co-ordination and synchronisation of deployed multinational and joint operations using control

¹ Lederach J P, *‘Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies’* United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, 1997, P77-78.

² The first Principle of PSO as detailed in Chapter 3.

³ The United Kingdom approach to military campaigning exists in corresponding publications: JDP 01 ‘*Joint Operations*’, JWP 3-00 ‘*Joint Operations Execution*’ and JWP 5-00 ‘*Joint Operations Planning*’.

⁴ JDP 01.

mechanisms to order activities in time and space and to ensure that priorities are clearly understood.

403. The 3 notions have been developed and refined for use in military operations⁵ and are therefore readily applicable to the Peace Support Force (PSF). However, the principles and processes they embody can be applied to the development of complementary plans by other agencies contributing to the PSO.

Peace Support Operation Campaigning

404. A PSF and its commander may be the first formal representation of a PSO in a region in crisis. Invariably non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are already in the region; indeed it may be through their efforts that the crisis has been highlighted and the decision to mount a PSO taken. Until such a time as a civilian representative, such as a Special Representative (SR) of the United Nations Secretary General⁶ (SRSG), or a European Union (EUSR) or a Head of Mission (HoM), is appointed and given primacy, the PSF military commander may have to lead the PSO. As a result, the PSF Commander may be required to develop both a Comprehensive PSO Plan and the complementary PSF Campaign Plan. The campaigning will take account of:

- a. The political intent.
- b. The Instruments of National Power.
- c. The declared, or implied, interim or steady-state criteria and military end-state.
- d. The key constituents of a nation or society.
- e. The Complex of Actors.
- f. The Implications of Campaign Authority.
- g. The compression of the levels.
- h. The types of PSO activity.
- i. The PSF stances.
- j. The need for force stance agility.
- k. Military Doctrine and the supplementary PSO fundamentals and principles.

⁵ JDP 01, JWP 3-00 and JWP 5-00 contain the detailed guidance on operational art, operational design and operational management.

⁶ The United Nations Secretary General.

SECTION II – PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION PLANNING

Types of Peace Support Operation Plan

405. Complementary campaigning identifies the need for a range of plans to be drawn together to support and implement a comprehensive strategy: the Comprehensive PSO Plan. To avoid confusion, reference will be made to 2 types of plan only:

a. **The Comprehensive Peace Support Operations Plan.** A master plan of how the international community plans to employ the Instruments of National Power to achieve the interim or steady-state criteria in a PSO; and how the indigenous population and other organisations, that are willing to complement diplomatic, economic and military campaign plans, intend to make their contribution to the same effect. Typically the plan will address the need to regenerate, reform or sustain key constituents of the nation or society in crisis, as well as addressing the immediate symptoms of the crisis. The activities of the complex of actors, with a common theme, may be drawn together into Lines of Activity. Each line of activity may have interim criteria to be reached en-route to the overall steady-state criteria.

b. **The Peace Support Force Campaign Plan.** The plan of how the Military Instrument of National Power, the PSF, will be employed in achieving the interim or steady-state criteria in a PSO. Typically the campaign plan will have Lines of Operation where capabilities are used together to realise Decisive Points en-route to the achievement of a military end-state. The PSF Campaign Plan should be complementary to the Comprehensive PSO Plan. The PSF Campaign Plan may include military contributions to most of the lines of activity within the Comprehensive PSO Plan.

The Planning Cascade

406. Planning a PSO usually begins with a politically-led agreement within the international community to ‘do something’. National governments consider their contributions to an international or national response and their crisis management organisations plan their national strategy.⁷ In turn, government departments refine their plans on how they intend to meet their national strategic objectives. (NGOs may choose to act independently⁸ and plan their response according to their unique purpose. However, a synergistic approach is recommended because the overall effect is likely to be greater than the sum of the parts.) Leaders and commanders are appointed to create campaign plans, determining how their department or organisation

⁷ Within the European Union (EU) an EU-wide response may be developed; this is known as the EU Crisis Management Concept.

⁸ Understanding the likely behaviour of other organisations is outlined in Annex B.

should organise and utilise their resources to achieve their objectives. Once these plans have been generated, those working in the crisis area develop tactical plans to determine how to achieve the assigned elements of the plan. Plans are modified and refined as the overall intent and individual missions become better defined, the constraints and difficulties become more obvious and requests for additional information and resources are either satisfied or rejected.

The United Kingdom Crisis Management Sequence

407. The United Kingdom also maintains a diplomatic mission at the United Nations (UN) Headquarters in New York. The United Kingdom is also fully represented within the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union and NATO. The representatives' roles in each body are to inform the United Kingdom of potential operations, to take part in the formal and informal contingency planning discussions and negotiations, and to brief the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) accordingly. After consultations with the authorising political organisation, strategic contingency planning within the United Kingdom takes place within the Cabinet Office and the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO). Other government ministries involved will include the FCO, the Department for International Development (DFID), and the Department for Trade and Industry. Drawing upon the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), the Permanent Under-Secretary for Defence, and other departmental heads, will offer initial advice to Ministers. If Ministers decide to proceed further, Planning Guidance will be issued by CDS to the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO). This will initiate the development of the Military Strategic Estimate that will form the basis of advice to Ministers on the feasibility of a military operation and the scale of the national commitment. Once Ministers have agreed a course of action, CDS issues a Strategic Directive. After further consultations between departments and, where appropriate, the appointed SR/HoM (should it be a UN or multinational and multi-agency PSO), CJO issues a Mission Directive, including a mission statement, to the PSF Commander/Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC)⁹ or National Contingent Commander (NCC). After further detailed consultations with other involved players, the PSF Commander determines his military plan and the military objectives to be achieved by his subordinate commanders at the tactical level. Ideally, the complete planning process should include representatives from the civil sector and other major agencies that could become involved in the operation.

Types of Planning

408. In the United Kingdom, military strategic planning is initiated following recognition of a situation that may warrant a response by the Armed Forces. There are two main types:

⁹ Where the operation is a United Kingdom-led PSO the JTFC will be the PSF commander.

- a. Advance planning.¹⁰
- b. Crisis response planning.¹¹

409. During peacetime the Government, including the MOD, monitors world events and in certain circumstances directs that contingency plans be developed in case the United Kingdom has to exercise a military option. If, however, the situation is such that the United Kingdom will be militarily involved and the lead times are short then the MOD will adopt its crisis planning process. This process may utilise existing contingency plans or create new plans. These types of planning equally apply to PSOs.

SECTION III – APPLICATION OF OPERATIONAL ART IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Operational Art¹²

410. Operational Art is heavily dependent on an understanding of the complete problem, an understanding that has 3 main facets. The first is a comprehensive insight into the local population, in particular the adversaries or factions; their values, aims and intentions, and their responses. Second is the ability to visualise 2 aspects: the practical activities that may make up a comprehensive response to a crisis (which in turn hinges on an understanding of available capabilities), and the effect of practical actions on both the adversaries, and the Alliance or coalition of which the PSF will normally be a part. Last, but reliant on the first 2, is an understanding of risk, its effect and how it is to be minimised and managed.

411. When devising a Comprehensive PSO Plan the SR/HoM or PSF Commander will:

- a. **Identify the final conditions** - Steady-state criteria - **that will achieve the strategic (mandated) objectives**. This may be self-evident in theory but is not always easy to achieve in practice and the use of interim criteria may be necessary.
- b. **Order activities**, both sequentially and simultaneously, **that lead to the fulfilment of the final conditions** - it is unlikely that the strategic objectives can be achieved by a single action.

¹⁰ Advance Planning is 'conducted principally in peacetime to develop plans for contingencies identified by strategic planning assumptions. Advance planning prepares for a possible contingency based upon the best available information and can form the basis for Crisis Response Planning' (JWP 5-00 'Joint Operations Planning').

¹¹ Crisis Response Planning is 'based on current events and conducted in time sensitive situations' (JWP 5-00). Essentially, unforeseen events for which no specific Advance Plan exists.

¹² The application of Operational Art is covered comprehensively in JDP 01 and JWP 5-00.

- c. **Apply the available resources**, including those allocated such as the PSF and those organisations willing to work alongside for mutual benefit, such as international government organisations (IGOs) and NGOs, **within the constraints imposed**, and inherent to the type of resource, **to sustain the sequence of actions**. If a commander believes that insufficient resources have been allocated to him, he may attempt to seek more from the mandating authority and contributing nations.
- d. **Identify the risks involved, their effect and how they are minimised and managed**. To achieve success, the commander must be prepared to take acceptable risks. In doing so, he must ensure that those with responsibility for and involved in decision-making at all levels are aware of those risks. He should plan a contingency action in case the selected action should fail.

Operational Ideas

412. Operational Ideas are, in effect, the output of Operational Art. They represent the basis of a Campaign Plan and are further refined by the process of Operational Design. In generating Operational Ideas for their appropriate plans, the SR/HoM and PSF Commander should seek to express their ideas in terms of the four key functions derived from the manoeuvrist approach:¹³

- a. **Shape**. Shaping the region in crisis/battlespace in a manner most likely to achieve the objectives. This includes shaping perceptions on the validity of the mandate and its permissions, creating consent and managing expectations, thus determining Campaign Authority.
- b. **Attack/Build**. Attacking the adversaries' cohesion and will at places and times of the commander's choosing, in order to undermine their Centres of Gravity (CoGs). Build a regenerated nation or society.
- c. **Protect**. Protecting the Campaign Authority and progress to date and ensuring the will of the complex of actors perseveres. For the PSF, protect the fighting power, and multinational cohesion.
- d. **Exploit**. Exploiting opportunities and the situation by direct or indirect means.

413. In addition, there are 3 closely inter-linked concepts which are particularly useful in the formulation of Operational Ideas: CoG Analysis, Campaign Fulcrum and the Decisive Act. The key to Operational Art is to identify beforehand what is going to be decisive, to restore peace and to cause adversaries to be reconciled. Identifying the decisive act comes from an analysis of CoGs.

¹³ See Annex C, JDP 01 and JWP 5-00.

Centre of Gravity Analysis

414. The CoG is defined¹⁴ as the ‘characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight’. In PSO it is the CoGs of the warring factions, or parties in dispute, and the potential CoGs for the reformed nation or society that are most likely to be of interest. The first step is to identify the adversaries’ CoGs. Denial or destruction of, or threats to, these CoGs should deter or coerce the parties from conflict. However, it must be clear why they are CoGs and what each does to make it a CoG. These are termed the Critical Capabilities. The next step is to examine what is needed to achieve each Critical Capability, in other words, the Critical Requirements. These Critical Requirements are then examined to determine if they are in some way incomplete, or vulnerable. These become the Critical Vulnerabilities: the things that can be exploited in order to undermine the adversaries’ CoG. Having completed this analysis it is then possible to develop objectives that will assist in undermining those CoGs. These objectives are selected by comparing the degree of criticality with vulnerability and the friendly capability to attack those vulnerabilities. In due course, and having attacked the vulnerabilities, it is quite possible for CoGs to change and therefore the analysis must be constantly updated.

415. Using similar analysis, it is possible to identify Critical Capabilities, Requirements and Vulnerabilities for each of the key constituents of a nation or society. However, in rebuilding a nation or society the vulnerabilities of each constituent need to be addressed rather than attacked. For those implementing the PSO, their CoG may be the cohesion of the complex of actors and their determination to succeed - their perseverance.¹⁵

416. **Campaign Fulcrum.** There is a stage in every operation or campaign where the tide turns and the initiative switches irreversibly. This will be caused by a number of issues acting in combination, but the value of attempting to identify this event is in order to be prepared to exploit fully its potential. In a PSO, the fulcrum may be seen as the point at which Campaign Authority increases and becomes self-perpetuating. It may also be seen in a negative sense. It might be the result of, for example, a failure to build any Campaign Authority, or a change in political context.

417. **The Decisive Act.** Closely linked to the idea of campaign fulcrum is an associated concept, that of the decisive act or the decisive operation. Activities are now viewed as stepping stones towards a higher goal. It is important to try to find something, or a series of linked events, that will be decisive within a PSO, that causes

¹⁴ AAP-6.

¹⁵ See Chapter 3, Third Fundamental.

opponents to lose the initiative forever; in other words *shaping* activities leading to a *decisive* operation.

SECTION IV – APPLICATION OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

418. The output of Operational Design is a campaign plan. In the context of this publication, it will be the PSF Campaign Plan, but the process is equally applicable to developing the Comprehensive PSO Plan. This results from the estimate process and the use of the CPCs.

Campaign Planning Concepts

419. The CPCs are used to conceptualise and describe a campaign. In broad terms they serve 3 purposes: to focus effort in the Estimate;¹⁶ to help describe, in plans and directives, what needs to be achieved; and to assist in monitoring the execution of a plan or operation. They can be used individually, although they are all closely related, and are best used as part of a set. It is for the SR/HoM and/or PSF Commander to decide their utility in developing the Comprehensive PSO Plan in the prevailing circumstances. For the Comprehensive PSO Plans the analogous concepts are shown in Table 4.1.

PSF Campaign Plan	PSO Comprehensive Plan
End-state	Steady-state Criteria
CoG Analysis	CoG Analysis
Decisive Points	Interim Criteria
Lines of Operation	Lines of Activity
Sequencing, Phases and Stances	Sequencing, Phases and Stances
Contingency Planning	Contingency Planning
Culminating Point	Culminating Point
Operational Pause	PSO Pause

Table 4.1 Analogous Campaign Planning Concepts

420. **Steady-state Criteria or End-state.** Steady-state criteria and end-state¹⁷ describe the state of affairs that needs to be achieved at the end of the Comprehensive PSO Plan and the PSF Campaign Plan, respectively, to terminate or to resolve the conflict. It is necessary to ensure that both the plans reflect a common understanding of what conditions constitute success. All activities and operations should be judged against their relevance to achieving the steady-state criteria or end-state.

¹⁶ This process is described later in this Chapter.

¹⁷ JWP 0-01.1.

421. **Interim Criteria or Decisive Points.** The successful achievement of Interim Criteria and Decisive Points (DPs),¹⁸ which are actions or events usually targeted on Critical Capabilities or Vulnerabilities, are preconditions to achieving the steady-state criteria or end-state. Identifying interim criteria and DPs during the estimate process is a fundamental part of campaign planning that leads to the development of objectives and tasks.

422. **Lines of Activity or Operation.** Lines of operation¹⁹ are the link between Decisive Points in time and space on the path to the end-state. Lines of activity establish a relationship between Interim Criteria, in order to construct a development path to the steady-state criteria, and to ensure that criteria are satisfied in a logical progression. Lines of operation establish the interrelationship between decisive points, in order to construct a critical path to the end-state, through a CoG, and to ensure that events are tackled in a logical progression. Lines of activity or operation are usually functional or environmental for example, activities to reinstate rule of law or maritime activities.

423. **Sequencing.** Sequencing²⁰ is the arrangement of activities within plans in the order to achieve the steady-state criteria or end-state. Although simultaneous action on all lines of activity or operation may be ideal, lack of resources usually compels activities, actions and the allocation of resources to be sequenced accordingly. Alternatively, sequencing activities and actions may reduce the risks to an acceptable level. Once a sequence has been determined, it may be appropriate to divide a campaign into phases.²¹ This process can assist in developing the entire campaign logically and in terms of available capabilities, resources and time. However, there is a temptation to tie PSF capabilities and force structures, i.e. force stances, to phases that are determined by time or discrete events. For a PSF campaign, the predominant PSO conditions rather than time or discrete events should determine PSF Stances.²²

424. **Contingency Planning.** Contingency Planning is the process by which options are built into a plan to take account of opportunities and setbacks. The development of contingency lines of activity or operation will greatly enhance the flexibility of the campaign plans.

a. **Branches.** Branches are options for a particular phase, and provide the flexibility to retain the initiative.

¹⁸ Decisive Point is 'a point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information environment' (AAP-6).

¹⁹ Line of Operation: 'In a campaign or operation, a line linking decisive points in time and space on the path to the centre of gravity' (AAP-6).

²⁰ JWP 0-01.1.

²¹ Phase is 'a discrete and identifiable activity along a Military Line of Operation in time and/or space that allows for the reorganisation and redirection of forces as part of the superior commander's plan' (JWP 0-01.1).

²² See Chapter 2.

b. **Sequels.** Sequels provide options for the next phase. One of the sequels to the current phase may simply be the next pre-planned phase. However, to ensure that the campaign can proceed even in the face of setbacks, prudent planners will prepare several sequels to the next phase. Once a sequel is activated it will become the next phase in the campaign.

425. **Culminating Point.** An operation reaches its culminating point when the operation can just be maintained but not developed to any great advantage.²³ The value of attempting to identify a Culminating Point is to be able to exploit fully the potential of this event when an adversary's is reached, or plan pauses in order to avoid one's own. Intelligence, operations and logistic staffs need to liaise closely to avoid, delay the onset, or minimise the effects, of a Culminating Point.

426. **Peace Support Operation or Operational Pause.** A PSO or operational pause²³ is a pause in one or more PSO activity or PSF operations, respectively, whilst retaining the initiative in other ways. Activities and operations cannot always be conducted continuously. Concentration of resources or force and economy of effort may determine the need to concentrate activity on one line of activity or operation in time or space. To achieve this, a pause might be planned on another line of activity or operation. Implicit in the term 'pause' is allocation of time and or resources within the overall campaign plan to regain and, if necessary, maintain the initiative on a line of activity.

The Estimate Process

427. The estimate process is a military problem solving mechanism for drawing together a vast amount of information necessary for the thorough analysis of a set of circumstances, in order to allow the development of feasible courses of action (CoAs) and the subsequent translation into a plan. The estimate process is central to the formulation of the Campaign Plan and the subsequent issue of operation orders and directives. Although there are variations in scale or focus, there is nothing fundamentally different about the products of the process, the estimates, carried out at different levels, by different components or in various functional areas. The term 'Operational Estimate' is used to describe the process carried out by the PSF Commander and his staff at the operational level. Other estimates, either environmental or functional, at the operational or tactical level, may contribute to the Operational Estimate. In turn, the Operational Estimate may contribute to the PSO Estimate should the SR/HoM or PSF Commander choose to use the process for the Comprehensive PSO Plan. The prevalence of fluctuations in political will, which is central to the formulation of PSO plans, and changes in the operational environment mean that the estimate process should be revisited throughout a PSO to ensure that the ramifications are properly considered. The estimate process comprises 6 stages:

²³ JWP 0-01.1.

- a. Stage 1: Review of Situation (Geo-strategic Analysis).
- b. Stage 2: Identify and Analyse the Problem.
- c. Stage 3: Formulation of Potential CoAs.
- d. Stage 4: Development and Validation of CoAs.
- e. Stage 5: Course of Action Evaluation.
- f. Stage 6: Decision.

428. **Review of Situation.** This geostrategic analysis should include the politico-diplomatic short and long-term causes of the conflict. It should consider the political influences including: public will, competing demands for resources, and the political, economic, legal and moral constraints. Also included should be international interests, positions of international organisations (IO) neutral to the conflict; and other competing or distracting international situations.

429. **Identify and Analyse the Problem.** Experience would suggest that mandates developed by consensus are rarely as precise as a SR/HoM or PSF Commander would wish. It is for the SR/HoM, assisted by the PSF Commander and his equivalents within the actor complex, to determine precisely what is to be accomplished and is essentially the deduction of what has to be done and why. The mission analysis should consider what other instruments of policy, particularly diplomatic and economic, will be used to support the strategic objectives. This should include the determination of any implied tasks or preconditions, such as political imperatives which have pre-eminence over all else. The impact of time on the execution of the mission will also have priority.

430. **Formulation of Potential Courses of Action.** Through a combination of intuition and process, a thorough analysis of the problem will produce various CoAs. Not all of the potential courses will be possible without close consideration before adoption. It may be appropriate at this stage for the SR/HoM or PSF Commander to provide some initial guidance to the staff developing the estimate. Thus at this point the **ends** should be clear and some possible **ways** and **means** may be beginning to emerge. The rest of the estimate must set about **proving the art of the possible** by the application of planning factors and by confirming/maximising the understanding of the problem.

431. **Development and Validation of Courses of Action.** The job of the various staffs is now to develop and validate potential CoAs by considering the impact of specific factors in more detail. Each course must be credible and achievable. Each should be formulated with a likely concept of operations and should outline the missions, activities and tasks to be accomplished, the resources required and the

estimated time and space required. In order to validate each course, the effect of action by the adversaries on each one must be analysed. The result provides CoAs for evaluation.

432. **Courses of Action Evaluation.** The comparison of CoAs should evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each course with the aim of identifying the best course of action. If appropriate, elements of different courses should be merged to form one. The risk associated with each course, together with its potential gain, should be highlighted. CoAs should also be compared against the adversaries' CoGs. The analysis concludes with the revalidation of suitability, adequacy and feasibility of each course, determines what additional requirements exist, makes required modifications and lists the advantages and disadvantages of each course. Will the actor complex, and contributing nations in particular, perceive the likely cost or risk of the proposed CoA as justifiable and sustainable?

433. **The Decision.** The decision is the logical result of the estimate. Having evaluated the workable courses of action the SR/HoM or PSF Commander is in a position to decide which one is most likely to be successful. Following this, the relevant campaign plans are developed. **What** is to be done, explaining as appropriate the elements of **When, Where, How, Why** and by **Whom**?

SECTION V – KEY CONSIDERATIONS

General Considerations

434. **Command.** The complex political and multi-agency nature of PSO creates unusual challenges for those in command. Actions, at any level, can have considerable and disproportionate strategic effects, and the levels of command tend to compress²⁴ Moreover, command, or rather co-operation and/or co-ordination, in the context of the complex of actors may bring opportunities to achieve unexpected effects, but it may also impose limitations on the conduct of operations. Within the PSF, each national military contingent is likely to have separate national command arrangements that could impinge on operational tempo and flexibility. This is of particular concern where unexpected escalations of violence may occur. It must be remembered that the SR/HoM and PSF Commander, as individuals, may become key actors in the conflict. In particular, the PSF Commander must have the ability to plan, lead and execute the military campaign along with political, diplomatic and media awareness, negotiating skills appropriate to the actor complex and an understanding of international law. Given the crucial role, the selection of a PSF Commander, with suitable experience and attributes, is critical.

²⁴ See Chapter 2, Section VI.

435. **Legal Aspects.** As identified in Chapter 1, the legal position of a PSO is not always clear-cut. Moreover, the multinational nature of a PSO and the changes that will take place when a crisis region moves from open conflict to self-sustaining peace demand that legal advice is available to both the SR/HoM and PSF Commander. Legal advice will be required prior to and throughout each operation. Typically, it will address:

- a. Strategic Matters:
 - (1) The Mandate.
 - (2) The Law of Armed Conflict/Humanitarian Law.
 - (3) The Applicability of European Union Legislation (e.g. the European Convention on Human Rights).
 - (4) The Jurisdiction, Authority and Accountability of the SR/HoM and PSF Commander.
- b. Operational Matters:
 - (1) Rules of Engagement (ROE).
 - (2) War Crimes and War Criminals.
 - (3) Protection of Special Sites:
 - (a) Cultural.
 - (b) Archaeological.
 - (c) Ecological.
 - (4) Establishing the Rule of Law.
 - (a) Establishing a body of law.
 - (b) Establishing police primacy.
 - (c) Establishing a judiciary.
 - (d) Establishing a penal system.
 - (5) International Monitors and Inspections.

436. **Legal Status.** The legal status of those directly engaged in the PSO under the terms of the mandate (servicemen and women, civilians and their property) should be

secured by legal instrument with the indigenous ‘host’ government, where one exists. The type of agreement depends on the degree of accord between the parties to the conflict and with the strategic mandating authority. A large measure of accord is normally reflected in a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which has the standing of a treaty. When such an accord is not realistic, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), or an exchange of letters, may substitute. The 4 fundamental issues to be addressed are:

- a. The independence of the force in relation to the authorities of the crisis country; where they exist.
- b. Freedom of movement.
- c. Arrangements for the criminal jurisdiction of the force.
- d. ROE.

437. The mandate, SOFA or equivalent, and ROE, as well as national and international laws, conventions and agreements, will control the conduct of operations. The SR/HoM and PSF Commander should seek a precise initial briefing on legal aspects, and should also have a legal representative on their permanent staff. When no local accord can be agreed, the 1946 ‘*Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN*’ has been used as the basis for the protection of personnel and materiel.

438. **Operational Environment.** The operational environment of a PSO will include tangible and intangible aspects. The former will include topography, lines of communication, climate, the general living conditions, ethnic distribution, languages, religion, customs, and respect for human rights. The social infrastructure within the crisis region, or lack of it, and the potential influence of neighbouring areas, should also be taken into account. When considering the social infrastructure the impact of disasters such as HIV/AIDS and other diseases should not be overlooked. Intangible elements of the operational environment will include the indigenous and any displaced groups’ culture, psyche, and perceptions of Campaign Authority. The potential for sudden and unexpected escalations of the conflict, and the degree of control of the leadership over the military, paramilitary, criminal and other elements of the population, should also be assessed. These intangible elements are likely to exert a significant influence on the conduct of the PSO and the appropriate force stances to be adopted. An effective assessment, conducted jointly, with input from humanitarian agencies and other actors with relevant local experience, will inform a realistic appreciation of the region, the origins and nature of the current conflict, and potential reactions to intervention should they be required.

439. **Parties to the Conflict.** In addition to CoG analysis, a detailed and thorough assessment should be made of the parties, willingly or unwillingly involved, and the

dynamics of the conflict. When there are multiple parties to a conflict and those parties are disorganised and undisciplined, such an assessment may prove far from straightforward. However, as far as possible this assessment will need to cover a wide range of military, paramilitary and civilian groups, and each will require careful analysis of their political and military aspirations, motives, organisations, strength, weapons, equipment, doctrine, leadership, training, discipline and general attitudes. Such analysis should lead to an overall view of the parties, their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threat, and intentions. Their past record in honouring agreements and cease-fires must be a critical element in this assessment.

440. **Influence of the Media.** Specific guidance on relationships with the media is available.²⁵ Fiercely and rightly independent, the media will resist all attempts to ‘manage’ their activity, except when military co-operation proves the only realistic means of access or information. Few media agencies can claim to be fully impartial. Some will be selective in their representation of the truth for their own ends and those of the party they have elected to support; others may have a particular line they wish to promote, such as increased international involvement for humanitarian reasons. Despite the apparent moral ascendancy of ‘*must do something*’ or ‘*must do more*’ headlines, the secondary effects of the media must be carefully considered by the SR/HoM and PSF Commanders.

441. **Other Agencies.** In PSO, the range of actors operating in the crisis region will have a profound and important impact on the conduct of the campaign. At all levels commanders should make a detailed assessment of the other agencies operating within the area. This assessment should be based upon the overall campaign plan lines of activity so interaction and co-ordination can be readily implemented. Planning should take account of the identity, role, interests, intentions and methods of operation of those elements of the actor complex within the area of responsibility. Only through painstaking preparation in this area can comprehensive and complementary plans be produced.

442. **Transfer of Responsibility.** A PSO will frequently require the hand-over or take-over of functions and responsibilities between militaries and civilian actors. These transfers should be pre-planned, co-ordinated, and managed by the SR/HoM and PSF Commander. The parties to the conflict for their own advantage may exploit alterations, in operational competence and discrepancies in the responsibilities transferred. The greatest risk to a successful PSO may lie in the management and manner of transferring responsibility.

443. **Allocation of Resources.** In a multinational PSO, the quantity and quality of other national contingents may be difficult to predict. Planners should also take account of the availability of local resources, note the resources of the actor complex,

²⁵ See JWP 3-45 ‘*Media Operations*’.

and any neighbouring nations support that could be employed. Planning staff should liaise closely with the actor complex and host nation agencies to identify and bid for local resources. Access to local materials and construction resources may need to be carefully controlled, and the availability of specialists able to restore the life support infrastructure, such as bakeries, flourmills, water treatment plants, sewage works, power generation plants, quarries, sawmills, and other strategic industries, should be considered. The contributions that can be made by resources from the joint military components are detailed in Annex D.

444. **Simultaneity, Tempo, Peace Support Operation Activities and Planning Timelines.** Simultaneity and tempo are employed to undermine the will of adversaries, rather than simply overwhelm them by mass. British Defence Doctrine utilises the concept of the OODA²⁶ loop and the aim of attempting to get inside the adversaries' decision-making cycles, thereby achieving a superior operational tempo. When constructing the PSF Campaign Plan, the aim may be to bring force to bear on the adversaries' entire structure in order to overload their decision-making cycle. The goal is to overwhelm or cripple their capability (and will) to fight by placing more demands on the adversaries than can be handled. Tempo is relative to the adversaries' decision action cycle and is critical in exploiting friendly capabilities whilst denying the enemy freedom of action. It may be the means to establish and build Campaign Authority at the outset of a PSO. The aim is to operate at an appropriate tempo in order to dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the adversaries' ability to react. However, the ability to maintain tempo in the overarching Comprehensive PSO Plan will depend on the complex of actors and their willingness to work closely together. However tempo is relative, and in seeking to address the underlying causes of a crisis, it is inevitable that the timelines guiding PSO planning will be extended. The history of PSO in the 1990s demonstrated a capacity to respond to the immediate needs of crises, however, more recent events have bolstered international willingness, and capacity to take a long-term view that will shape the immediate responses.

²⁶ Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action.




Figure 4.2 - The Time Dimension in PSO Planning

445. The PSO activities²⁷ illustrated in Figure 4.2 show the complementary commitment that may occur. The figure also illustrates the likely timelines for a major PSO, such as those mounted in Kosovo, Bosnia or East Timor. The following detailed description of the likely activities will assist in recognising the need for simultaneous activity:

- a. **Prevent.** (The outer ellipse) Preventative activity is primarily either diplomatic or economic. However, deterrent deployments and other military activities will play an essential role. The period of Preventative action, for a PSF, may involve training, equipping, counter-insurgency assistance and a forward presence to deter those who resort to violence to secure their political aims. Parallel efforts by the complex of actors may use other means to deter conflict or achieve conciliation before conflict breaks out. Effective and comprehensive planning may result in a panoply of outcomes. Again however, the effects achieved by military force alone will be limited. It has been shown that early engagement, accompanied by realistic investment in the planned effects can have a disproportionate influence on a PSO. The costs associated with preventative action, despite the protracted time scales involved, are likely to be dwarfed by the expenditure required to fund a military intervention. Less obvious is the potential need for preventative activity to stop a crisis destabilising neighbouring areas and states.

²⁷ See Chapter 2.

b. **Intervene.** (The innermost ellipse) For the military and police, intervention usually involves the use of force to establish the secure environment in which others can act to achieve the campaign objectives. Realism will demand that immediate problems are met with effective, and perhaps short-term, solutions. Nevertheless, the existence of a long-term, Comprehensive PSO Plan should ameliorate the potentially negative effects of this short-term activity. Whenever operational tempo permits, decisions should be biased towards the long-term effects that must be achieved. This will be particularly important in considering the nature and scope of both deterrent and coercive uses of force. The selection of targets to be defeated will usually be made giving more weight to secondary effects and their impact on Campaign Authority. For example, targets vital to the achievement of long-term goals may be withheld, or attacked in a manner that will allow recovery or repair of the resource. Frequently, humanitarian aid will be a prime concern at this stage. Dire need will demand complementary action by elements of the humanitarian and military sectors, known as Humanitarian Assistance.²⁸

c. **Regenerate.** (The second inmost ellipse) Regeneration commences as soon as the secure lodgement has been achieved in the crisis region. Primacy will normally shift from the security sector, and the immediate needs of Intervention, to the long-term Regeneration and development of structures, institutions, and constituents specified in the campaign mandate. The nature of the military and policing task will change, with a priority for the training and equipping of indigenous security forces. It is important that plans are enhanced as knowledge of the crisis region and the local people improves. Given the protracted timescales envisaged, important changes in international will and support will have to be assessed, accommodated, or perhaps resisted through diplomatic and information activity.

d. **Sustain.** (The extended ellipse) Sustainment occurs when indigenous forces, structures, and institutions have begun to assume and finally take full responsibility for the territory and its peoples. The mandated 'Peace' has become self-sustaining, in accordance with or exceeding the Steady-State Criteria set for the PSO, when sustained preventative action is no longer required.

²⁸ Humanitarian Assistance is 'support provided to humanitarian and development agencies, in an insecure environment, by a deployed force whose primary mission is not the provision of humanitarian aid. Should the deployed force undertake such humanitarian tasks, responsibility should be handed-over/returned to the appropriate civilian agency at the earliest opportunity' (JWP 0-01.1). This can be contrasted with the deployment of military forces on *Humanitarian Disaster Relief Operations* (JWP 3-52). In these circumstances the primary military mission is to act to alleviate suffering and need. An insight into the principles that guide genuinely humanitarian action can be found at Appendix 1 to Annex B where the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Approved Code of Conduct for Humanitarian Actors is reproduced. Military commanders are advised to read and understand these humanitarian principles, and to recognise the important differences between them and the principles of PSO.

446. **Balance.** For the Comprehensive PSO Plan the long-term objective of a PSO should be about the restoration or rebuilding of a nation or society following a crisis. The key constituents of a nation or society were identified in Chapter 2; these constituents form a useful basis for balanced PSO planning. The constituents may be remembered by the mnemonic ‘RECHIMED’ as follows:

- a. **R**ule of Law,
- b. **E**ducation,
- c. **C**ommerce,
- d. **H**umanitarian and Health,
- e. **I**nformation,
- f. **M**ilitary,
- g. **E**conomic,
- h. **D**iplomacy (including Administration and Governance).

PSO planning may incorporate these as lines of activity in the Comprehensive PSO Plan (and may be reflected in the lines of operation within the PSF Campaign Plan as appropriate). Regard for the context and specific demands of a campaign may demand variations and additions.²⁹ Given the protracted engagement needed to bring about such a lasting change it is unlikely that any single nation will undertake a PSO. For the PSF Campaign Plan, maintaining balance across the force is key to allowing freedom of action and responsiveness. Balance refers to the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the force as well as the nature and timing of operations conducted. The aim is to maintain a friendly force balance whilst disrupting the adversaries’ balance by striking from unexpected directions or dimensions. Realistic planning must accommodate the shifting needs of the campaign; constantly looking ahead to ensure the engagement of the necessary military and civil actors, at the correct time, in the correct strengths, and with the necessary capabilities to ensure success.

Peace Support Force Considerations

447. **Peace Support Force Campaign Conduct.** The conduct of the PSF campaign will generally include the planning stages listed below. Allowance should be made in each phase for changes in the Campaign Objectives, the operational environment and Campaign Authority.

²⁹ E.g. Civil Reconstruction, DDR Programme, Truth Commission, De-mining and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Mapping and Survey, Life Support, Agricultural reform.

- a. **Preparation.** The preparation phase covers all activities prior to departure, including warning, reconnaissance, planning, liaison, assembly, administration and training.
- b. **Deployment.** The deployment phase starts with the departure of a PSF from its national bases and ends with its arrival in the designated crisis area, the Joint Operations Area (JOA). The deployment stage will also include a period for the integration of contributing nations' forces into a multinational PSF.
- c. **Operations.** The operational phase begins with the arrival of a PSF in the JOA and covers its reception, move to base locations, preparatory measures, tactical deployment, and the subsequent conduct of operations. Establishing a PSF's own security and sustainment are prime planning considerations in the early stages of an operation. Preparation will include briefings, reconnaissance, liaison visits, training, and administration.
- d. **Redeployment.** Any redeployment phase starts with a cessation or handing over of operational tasks. When appropriate, redeployment will cover the transfer of operational and administrative activities to relieving troops, international or indigenous agencies or civilian authorities. Post-operational activities will embrace all after-action activity, including post-operation reports, the submission of lessons learned information, and national administration.

448. **Peace Support Force Organisation.** It may prove necessary to deploy a number of National Contingents as part of a PSF each under a NCC. These contingents may be joint in nature and have a National Support Element (NSE) to serve as a co-ordinating headquarters for the force. This is shown in Figure 4.3.




Figure 4.3 – Illustration of Multinational Peace Support Force Organisation

449. **Specialist Advice.** It is now common practice for United Kingdom PSF Commanders³⁰ to find several specialist advisors as standing members or supplements to their staff, typically these would include:

- a. **Political Advisor.** A Political Advisor (POLAD) is usually a MOD Civil Servant appointed through the Permanent Joint Headquarters. He or she will possess broad Whitehall experience and will advise on the political implications of actions, events, and decisions. Normally, the individual will deploy with and become part of the battle staff acting with an equivalent military rank of OF 5.³¹
- b. **Legal Advisor.** The Legal Advisor (LEGAD) will be part of the PSF Headquarters staff. The military officer deployed will be appointed by the legal services and will commonly be OF4³² or OF5 rank.
- c. **Foreign and Commonwealth Office Advisor.** A more recent development has been the provision, by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) of a specialist desk officer with relevant country or regional experience. The FCO Advisor (FORAD) will offer a wealth of in depth knowledge particularly of regional actors and the diplomatic scene. In addition, many of those selected will be proficient linguists with an understanding of the local culture.
- d. **Humanitarian Advisor.** Appointed by DFID, the Humanitarian Advisor (HUMAD) provides a valuable linkage with the Humanitarian Sector and should be seen as a full member of the staff operating at OF 4 or 5 level. Given the comprehensive approach to PSO adopted by the UK the HUMAD has a key role to play in the overall campaign particularly in advising UK government on humanitarian need. Most appointees will have extensive field experience in managing major aid and development programmes and will thus be able to access and operate within the IGO/NGO network.
- e. **Other Advisors.** The unusually large emphasis on Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) during a PSO may mean that the PSF Commander elects to give his CIMIC staff within his headquarters a greater role than usual in planning. Likewise the need to establish security and uphold the rule of law may drive a requirement for a Civilian Police advisor with the headquarters staff.

450. **Assessment of Tasks.** Commanders may need to concentrate on analysis of the effects to be achieved. The commander must retain a clear focus upon the wider

³⁰ The SR and HoM are likely to be assisted by similar specialists.

³¹ OF 5: Captain RN, Colonel or Group Captain or equivalent United Kingdom Civil Service Band B2.

³² OF 4, Commander, Lieutenant Colonel or Wing Commander or equivalent United Kingdom Civil Service Band C1.

process of which he is a part. Critically, it must be remembered that, at times, the activities of other agencies may have a higher priority or primacy over the military mission. Particular attention must be paid to ensuring that implied tasks, which are subject to wide interpretation, do not become antagonistic to Comprehensive PSO Plan objectives. Close political-military co-ordination in defining tasks, specific and implied, should ensure coherence between tactical activity and the strategic intentions of the mandating authority. A commander should identify the necessary objectives and tasks, then prioritise them. Commanders should also be aware of those tasks that have to be carried out concurrently by other agencies, and those that may only occur sequentially with military activities. Having reached this stage, subordinate commanders are then able to select and prioritise the techniques most appropriate to accomplishing the tasks³³ and objectives identified.

451. **Resource Allocation.** Having assessed the required tasks and the techniques required to accomplish them, a commander's next step is to allocate his available resources to those tasks. He should also, where appropriate, negotiate with NGOs and others in the actor complex to ensure co-ordination or de-confliction between his military activities and those of the civilian organisations. This should be done for each military line and phase of operation, and will determine which activities may be done concurrently, and which will need to be undertaken sequentially. This process will provide a general overview of what is feasible and set prudent limits on a commander's aspirations. Accordingly, the 'troops to task' calculation may adjust the lines of operation and sequencing.

452. **Financial Considerations.** Early in the planning process for the PSF Campaign Plan there are 2 financial issues to be addressed. First, the financial authority for the costs of maintaining the PSF, and secondly, the costs of project work:

a. **Authority.** The funding of a national contribution to PSF will rest with the government. In the case of a UN operation, while the authority to establish a PSF belongs to the Security Council, the power to authorise the expenses of the operation rests with the General Assembly. There are 2 methods of funding UN PSO:

(1) **Assessed Contributions.** Under the authority of United Nations Charter Article (UNCA) 17, paragraph 2,³⁴ PSFs are normally paid for by members of the UN on a scale worked out to take account of their ability to pay.

³³ Typically in a PSO this may involve participation in a Security Sector Reform, or a Disarm, Demobilise and Reintegration Programme - see Chapter 5 on PSO operational tasks.

³⁴ A copy of the UN Charter is at Appendix 1A.

(2) **Voluntary Contributions.** A force may be financed entirely by voluntary contributions. Inevitably, the main burden of costs falls upon those states contributing the forces and equipment.

b. **Projects.** Specific financial provision may be made for projects undertaken as part of a ‘Hearts and Minds’ programme or a broader package of regeneration activity. Where possible these projects should seek to draw on local resources and the local infrastructure and thereby create a bridge between relief and development. In some situations it may be necessary for military units to become project managers and implementing partners for projects sponsored by the contributing nations.³⁵ Flexibility should guide this relationship and the focus should fall upon responsive tasking, funding and action cycles. The HUMAD³⁶ will have a central role to play in the planning of projects. History has shown, however, that project funding can create a ‘dependency culture’, with distorted and inflated prices, such that local businesses are unable to sustain themselves in the longer-term. The paramount need is to ensure that quick impact projects are planned with a clear view of the long-term campaign objectives. Reference to the SR/HoM’s Comprehensive Campaign Plan, and the functional grouping associated with infrastructure projects, should ensure that pitfalls are avoided.

453. **Training.** In addition to the full spectrum of military capabilities, PSOs require particularly high standards of individual skills, discipline, leadership and morale. Training is vital to deliver these standards and thus deploy a credible PSF. The exact training requirements and force competency standards must be identified early in the planning process so that suitable pre-deployment training can be organised and resourced. This will require a ‘trainer’ to be included from the outset, and in any JOA reconnaissance, so that Training Directives can be developed and published. The foundation of PSO pre-deployment training will be the revision of core combat skills. Superimposed on these core skills will be the specific needs of the JOA and the planned campaign. Generally, a JOA specific training package should include:

- a. An understanding of the different Force Stances and PSO activities.
- b. An understanding of the Fundamentals and Principles that guide PSO.
- c. A basic understanding of the background of the situation within which the force will be operating, including consideration of, mandate and rules of engagement.
- d. A basic understanding of the culture of those involved.

³⁵ For the United Kingdom projects are likely to be sponsored by the DFID.

³⁶ See Para 449d.

- e. An outline of the civilian agencies operating in the theatre.³⁷
- f. In addition, to these points there may be the requirement to update individuals on the following skills:
 - (1) Media Handling.
 - (2) Mine awareness.
 - (3) Basic language skills.
 - (4) The use of interpreters.
 - (5) Negotiation skills.

454. **Grouping and Missions.** In a multinational command and multi-agency operation the diverse capabilities of different national contingents and agencies should be considered. Planning should take account of the effects sought within given missions. The inherent strengths and weaknesses of each subordinate grouping should be realistically considered against the tasks. If possible, groups should be flexible, self-contained, and able to fulfil their own security and force protection requirements.

455. **Reserves.** The volatile nature of PSO usually requires the creation of reserves, at each level of command, to allow for the unexpected. As well as demonstrating resolve, possible reserve tasks may include preventative deployment, reinforcement, and extraction of the force should the operation become untenable. Reserve deployments that cross national contingent boundaries should, if possible, be subject to contingency planning, and rehearsed.

Comprehensive Peace Support Operation Plan Considerations

456. The Comprehensive PSO Plan requires similar consideration of the activities to be achieved and the matching of activities with resources as the PSF Campaign Plan. The need for the plan to be comprehensive has already been stressed with the SR/HoM or PSF Commander orchestrating the complementary plans and co-ordinating their execution. As an illustration of the difficulty, a planning example is given. Figure 4.4 illustrates a simple Comprehensive PSO Plan. It shows how the lines of activity are brought to focus upon the CoGs of the warring factions, or parties in dispute and then the development of the key constituents of the nation or society. Ultimately leading to the mandated steady-state criteria, possibly by attainment of the interim criteria.

³⁷ See Annex B.




Figure 4.4 - Illustrative Comprehensive PSO Plan

457. The complexity of the planning task is revealed if one of those lines of activity is considered in detail. Moreover, the tasks that must be reflected in the campaign plans of other actors, such as the PSF Campaign Plan, are demonstrated. For example, to establish the Rule of Law, the following tasks must be achieved:

- a. Establish rudimentary security regime through military or ideally conjoint military civil patrolling.
- b. Establish the applicable body of law and constitution (if applicable).
- c. Establish working relationship with International Committee of the Red Cross.
- d. Establish jurisdiction.
- e. Establish an effective and trusted judiciary.
- f. Agree and publish Detention Rules.
- g. Establish trusted judicial review procedures.
- h. Complete judicial review of existing detainees.
- i. Establish robust anti-corruption unit to ensure police and judiciary act with probity.
- j. Complete media campaign to bolster trust and regard for law and order process and institutions.

- k. Train and equip interim law enforcement personnel.
- l. Establish arrest & detention facilities compliant with international norms.
- m. Agree and enact Joint Policing Procedures.
- n. Establish and populate a Criminal Intelligence database.
- o. Establish international policing links to counter organised crime.
- p. Indigenous Police training academy established.
- q. Indigenous Law and Order Institutions assume autonomous responsibility for law and order.

458. In planning terms, these tasks constitute criteria that must be attained in a logical way if law and order is to be established. This can be represented as shown in Figure 4.5. The upper half of the figure shows the sequence of the criteria detailed in paragraph 454; the key point to note, however, is that no single actor is able to achieve all of the effects needed to establish law and order. Thus, the lower half of the figure shows how members of the complex of actors must ‘weave together’ their individual efforts to achieve the desired result. This rope analogy³⁸ has the added benefit of illustrating how the actor complex can achieve decisive effects and thus display great strength. If any one strand becomes weak the overall structure, though weakened, is unlikely to fail, as other strands may be able to take up the additional strain. Moreover, the tasks are complementary as they can be undertaken in parallel, and can be coherent and synchronised.




Figure 4.5 - Illustrative PSO Rule of Law Line of Activity

³⁸ General Sir Michael Jackson, seminar briefing entitled ‘*An Integrated Approach to Complex Emergencies: The Kosovo Experience*’, Eynsham Hall 10 May 2001.

SECTION VI – APPLICATION OF OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Conduct of the Campaigns

459. Conferences, directives, orders, and Standard Operating Procedures provide the main means by which the intentions of the SR/HoM and the PSF Commander are conveyed to other agencies and subordinates. In PSOs, mechanisms for active co-ordination of the actor complex have to be agreed at the outset if unity of effort is to be achieved. Generally, communication has involved a series of committees and conferences established at every level. At the highest level a ‘Cabinet’ based approach to managing the SR/HoM’s Comprehensive PSO Plan has been appropriate in many cases. Beneath this ‘Cabinet’ functionally based groups meet to consider specific lines of activity.

Campaign Effectiveness Analysis

460. The process for understanding success across the overall campaign is Campaign Effectiveness Analysis (CEA).³⁹ It is the analysis conducted at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to monitor and assess the cumulative effects of actions with respect to interim criteria and CoGs in order to achieve the overall steady-state. The aim is to take a broad view of the PSO and determine if the required effects, as envisaged in the Comprehensive PSO Plan, are being achieved. Assessments will incorporate intelligence, including monitoring of media and other measures such as Campaign Authority, and political input to look for that level of effect on both sides. CEA also provides guidance for high-level decisions on national and military strategy. Ongoing assessments will allow the SR/HoM and PSF Commander to determine when interim criteria and decisive points have been achieved and if necessary to adjust their plans to maintain progress towards the steady-state criteria or end-state. The fluidity of PSO may require constant adjustments in response to events, even at the lowest level.

³⁹ Campaign Effective Analysis is ‘*Analysis conducted at the strategic, operational and tactical level to monitor and assess the cumulative effects of military actions with respects to centres of gravity in order to achieve the overall campaign end-state*’ (JWP 0-01.1).

CHAPTER 5 – TASKS AND TECHNIQUES ON PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

Tasks and Techniques

501. There are a number of tasks, primarily associated with the Peace Support Force (PSF), which are either unique, in that they lie outside the usual ambit of military forces and their commanders, or have unusual emphasis during a Peace Support Operation (PSO). The variation in the specific geopolitical circumstances of each PSO makes it impractical to positively associate tasks with PSO activity types.¹ Table 5.1 is an indication of the degree of relationship between tasks and PSO activity types. Such tasks are undertaken on a PSO for 1 or more reasons, which also provide a method for categorising the tasks and techniques, as follows:

- a. **Campaign Authority Promotion.** To enhance perceptions of Campaign Authority by persuasion and influence or a combination of consent promoting techniques.
- b. **Operational Environment Control.** To control the operational environment through the use of military force.
- c. **Interim Management.** To assume responsibilities more usually undertaken by civil administration or agencies that either, do not exist, or are unable to operate because of the crisis.
- d. **Common.** Serving more than one purpose, i.e. common to the previous 3 categories

502. The techniques employed in meeting the tasks within a PSO may draw upon core military skills. However, the unique circumstances of each PSO may require commanders to create practical and pragmatic solutions of their own. Where possible, guidance on the more common techniques is given with the associated task in this Chapter. The following sections outline tasks and techniques most associated with PSO according to the categories. However, contents of each section should not be regarded as exhaustive.

¹ PSO Activity Types: Prevent, Intervene, Regenerate and Sustain, are detailed in Chapter 2.

Tasks	PSO Activity Types			
	<i>Prevent</i>	<i>Intervene</i>	<i>Regenerate</i>	<i>Sustain</i>
Campaign Authority Promotion				
Campaign Authority Enhancement and Assessment	Possible	Likely	Likely	Likely
Negotiation and Mediation	Possible	Likely	Likely	Possible
Control				
CIMIC	Possible	Likely	Likely	Possible
Confidence Building Measures	Likely		Likely	Possible
Control Measures	Possible	Likely	Likely	Possible
Early Warning	Likely			
Electronic Warfare	Possible	Likely	Possible	
Explosive Ordnance (Mine) Clearance	Possible		Likely	Possible
Freedom of Movement		Likely	Possible	
Incident Control	Possible	Likely	Likely	Possible
Intelligence Operations	Likely	Likely	Likely	Possible
Interposition	Likely	Likely	Possible	
Observation and Monitoring	Likely	Possible	Likely	Possible
Protected or Safe Areas		Likely	Possible	
Protection		Possible	Likely	Possible
Response	Possible	Likely	Likely	Possible
Sanctions	Possible	Likely	Possible	
Surveillance	Likely	Likely	Possible	
Interim Management				
Co-ordination		Likely	Likely	Possible
Demobilisation, Disarmament and Re-integration		Possible	Likely	Possible
Electoral Process Support			Likely	Possible
Human Rights Activity	Possible	Likely	Likely	Possible
Humanitarian Assistance	Possible	Likely	Possible	
Interim Administration		Likely	Possible	
Reconstruction			Likely	Possible
Refugee and Displaced Persons Assistance	Possible		Likely	Possible
Rule of Law	Possible	Likely	Likely	Possible
Common				
Enforcement and Investigation		Possible	Likely	Possible
Information Operations	Possible	Likely	Likely	Possible
Liaison	Possible	Likely	Likely	Possible

Table 5.1 - Degree of Association between Tasks and PSO Activity Types

503. The applicability of each task, each technique and the appropriate force stance to be adopted by the PSF should be considered by the PSO authorities, the Special

Representative (SR) of the [UN] Secretary General (SRSG) or European Union (EUSR) or the Head of Mission (HoM) and/or the PSF Commander. The employment of control techniques, however, will generally be only an option for a force able to adopt an Enforcement Stance. A PSF should possess the potential and agility to escalate or de-escalate its stance to match the threat situation.

SECTION II – CAMPAIGN AUTHORITY PROMOTION

Campaign Authority Enhancement and Assessment

504. **The Nature of Campaign Authority.**² The PSF Commander is unlikely to have any influence over the original mandate for the PSO; however, subsequent action can shape the response of the complex of actors to the mandate and afford increased operational flexibility. Information operations and the media can influence compliance, expectations and perceptions of the legitimacy of the mandate. The conduct of the PSF and the civil actors associated with an intervention will be critical in this respect. Actions to enhance Campaign Authority can be viewed from two perspectives:

- a. First, those actions associated with the conduct of the international community, in particular the PSF.
- b. Secondly, from the perception of those intended to benefit from the PSO, the parties to the conflict and indigenous population.

505. **Actor Complex Conduct.** The PSF and the associated civil international community must understand how their conduct, on and off duty, will affect how the local population perceives the campaign. To ensure that personnel are properly equipped to participate in PSO, they should receive thorough and current briefings on the local cultural, ethnic, religious, and moral issues, and history of the conflict. The conduct of a PSF, in particular, should be designed to enhance consent and promote the co-operation of the local people, in order to create more operational space and greater freedom of action. This can best be achieved by the deployment of a PSF with sufficient capability to deter hostile actions by the judicious application of force to demonstrate and reinforce credibility. When force is used, it will be necessary to have a sound appreciation of the full range of effects that actions may trigger. The need to promote Campaign Authority may, at times, constrain the use of force and some combat techniques. This should not be confused with the principle within the overriding Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) that limits the application of force to that which is reasonable to achieve the desired outcome. When the level of Campaign Authority is in doubt in all sectors and areas of the community, its enhancement should be a priority task. When Campaign Authority is more certain it may be

² Campaign Authority is discussed in Chapter 2.

possible to use more robust methods in confined areas without detriment to the overall level of Campaign Authority. Campaign Authority may be enhanced by a ‘Hearts and Minds’ programme using military resources to provide carefully targeted support to the local community. The less formal, but equally important role, of improving relations with the local population, is the responsibility of all members of PSF. It is an Operation Support Staff (J3 Ops Sp) responsibility to advise commanders of those actions that will have a negative effect on community perceptions of the PSF, such as collateral damage or actions that might cause cultural offence. Relations may be developed through formally hosted events or informal meetings during the normal course of military operations. While projects may largely be supervised by specialist teams, all service personnel should consider themselves agents in the ‘Hearts and Minds’ campaign. Through training and long periods of engagement in PSO, United Kingdom Armed Forces have a well-developed ability to forge the required levels of contact with the local populace. Commanders may find advantage in offering guidance to other nations less experienced in this approach. A ‘Hearts and Minds’ programme requires careful co-ordination with information and media operations to ensure that it is not perceived as blatantly manipulative or conducted in a way that might degrade Campaign Authority. Such projects should be undertaken with advice from both the Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC) staff and the Humanitarian Advisor (HUMAD). Effort should be made to ensure that the programmes do not create any dependency in the local population and steps taken to ensure that responsibility for the services provided to be transferred to local civil control as soon as practicable. All staff should be clear that this work is not Humanitarian Assistance (HA).

506. **Legitimacy, Compliance, Expectations and Justice.** From the outset of a PSO, there will be a need for strenuous efforts to enhance Campaign Authority. Individuals’ views of the legitimacy of the mandate, their consent to be subject to the authority of a mandate, their compliance with those implementing the mandate, and their expectations of the mandate are all separate, but related, Campaign Authority issues. The view of legitimacy is unlikely to change readily; however, if the people and parties can be made to recognise their interdependence and the gains to be derived from compliance, their motivation to co-operate will increase. Compliance may exist already or may need to be encouraged by inducements and rewards, or enforced by coercion or deterrence. A generally compliant environment, however, allows the PSF to identify and manage recalcitrant elements and promote co-operation amongst the remaining elements of the population. Campaign Authority can be further promoted if it can be shown to the parties that their status and authority will increase if they show themselves able to resolve issues without resort to violence. If the immediate military object in a PSO is to bring an end to any fighting, commanders must communicate with the leaders of those engaged in the fighting. However, the victims of violence and those who are not party to the violence and who already wish to live in peace are often left voiceless and with unsatisfied expectations. This invariably means that

those involved in the fighting determine the terms of any settlement. Consequently, crimes against humanity and violations of the fundamentals of international law may appear to be rewarded. In such circumstances, peace with impunity for the perpetrators and without justice for the victims is unlikely to enhance Campaign Authority. Indeed, it is likely to provide a cause for a return to conflict in the long term. Accordingly, the creation of a self-sustaining and politically defined steady-state requires that the SR/HoM and PSF Commander do not focus their activities exclusively on those involved in the fighting, but also work to enhance the perceptions and consent of those already engaged in peaceful activities.

507. Diplomatic/Economic Assistance and Communications. Throughout a PSO, a combination of diplomatic leverage, perception management, judiciously targeted economic measures, and the deterrent or coercive use of force should be applied to ensure compliance with the directive of the authorising body, whilst steadily enhancing Campaign Authority. Experience has shown the need for continued effort, not only to expand areas of general consent but also to communicate consent up and down a party's chain of command. For example, when the SR/HoM or PSF Commander has secured the agreement of a leader to a particular course of action, they should ensure that the terms of that agreement are promptly and accurately passed. It is vital that those party members facing subordinate PSF Commanders are able to avoid misinterpretation and non-compliance. Liaison officers with faction headquarters can help monitor the passage of orders and agreements and, if necessary, assist with their transmission.

508. Assessment. Periodic assessments of the level of Campaign Authority should be made against the permanence, fragility or volatility of consent, across all elements of the population, and within the hierarchies of the parties to the conflict. In the aftermath of an inter-state conflict, the degree of consent should be relatively clear cut and agreed in a peace plan by the disputing states. In the event of an intra-state conflict or civil war, the parties/factions may be difficult to differentiate from the general population. The consent of the parties will usually be driven by local events and prevailing popular opinion; this may give geographic variations in the level of Campaign Authority. Whilst there may be consent at the strategic level, by virtue of national or party commitments to an agreement, at the tactical level there may be renegade local groups who disagree violently with their strategic leaders, and who may be hostile to the PSF. This may result in non-compliance by elements of one or more of the parties and attempts to restrict the freedom of movement of the PSF. In this case making any judgements of Campaign Authority is highly problematic. However, this does not remove the need to make an assessment. The level of co-operation given by the indigenous population to those implementing the PSO and the degree of coercion required to achieve that co-operation will be a good indication of the level of Campaign Authority.

Negotiation and Mediation

509. **The Significance of Negotiation and Mediation.** By negotiation and mediation, positive relationships between the factions and the PSF can be formed that enable agreements to be reached, promote the process of conciliation and enhance the level of Campaign Authority. Objective and effective negotiations, which are created, controlled, and fostered at every level by the PSF, will develop a climate of mutual respect and co-operation necessary for the successful resolution of the conflict. In this context, negotiation and mediation, and the associated activities of arbitration and conciliation, may be described as follows:

- a. **Negotiation.** This refers to direct dialogue between parties. In the conduct of negotiations, the PSF will usually have its own operational objectives.
- b. **Mediation.** This describes the activities of a go-between connecting parties to a dispute. In this role the PSF representatives act as the means whereby opposing parties communicate with each other and are encouraged to identify and reach mutually agreed solutions.
- c. **Arbitration.** In arbitration, an authoritative third party provides a judgement by considering the opposing positions and suggesting a settlement. There is less initial scope for arbitration in most PSO environments. Arbitration requires a degree of control that may take some time to establish.
- d. **Conciliation.** This describes the process that occurs as the result of agreements achieved by successful negotiation, mediation and arbitration. By a series of compromises by all parties, an agreement is reached which accommodates many of the aims and aspirations of the parties such that there is little or no motivation to resort to conflict and greater motivation to work together for a common good.

510. **Aim.** The aim of negotiation and mediation is to reach agreements to which all parties have concurred and which will help to build Campaign Authority and to contain, de-escalate and resolve the conflict.

511. **The Wider Context.** Negotiation and mediation may be conducted independently but more normally as an adjunct to other PSO activities. It is a skill required at all stages of a PSO and will need to be exercised at every level. Consequently, all personnel could be involved, from senior commanders meeting with faction leaders, to individuals at isolated observation points who may find themselves trying to control an incident or arbitrating in a local dispute. Negotiation and mediation may be conducted as part of a deliberate process, or as an immediate response to a life-threatening incident. In these cases, it is important to remember that

the commander of the PSF involved at the incident is often perceived as part of the problem. He should, therefore, set the scene in order that his senior commander and, should one exist, the senior commander of the hostile party, can solve the problem. When there is no chain of command, identifying other people of influence, such as the local mayor, religious leader, or women's representatives could be crucial in resolving the problem. Identifying and addressing the source of the incident and the most appropriate level of authority to deal with it, lies at the heart of preventing further incidents.

512. **Process.** The selection of individuals, or groups of individuals, who are acceptable to the parties, is fundamental to the successful conduct of negotiations. Essentially, there are three stages in the process of negotiation and mediation:

a. **Stage 1 - General Preparation.** A clear aim should be defined to determine what is to be achieved. This will take into account many factors including the objectives and capabilities of the hostile parties as well as a realistic appraisal of what is feasible. In practice, the initial aim may be no more than to get competing factions to meet, and future objectives may be discussed and refined during subsequent meetings. Specific preparations will include researching the background and history of the issue to be discussed so as to help the negotiator or mediator to identify those arguments that the belligerent parties may employ. Options, limitations, minimum requirements, areas of common interest, and possible compromises, should be identified. If negotiating, the PSF representative should be clear on those points that must be won or protected and those that may be used as bargaining chips. He should also make a thorough study of the participants who will attend the meeting. This should include their:

- (1) Cultural origin.
- (2) Personality.
- (3) Faction Status, authority and influence.
- (4) Known habits and attitudes.

b. **Stage 1 - Hosting Preparation.** If hosting the meeting, specific arrangements should take account of the following:

- (1) **Location.** In the conduct of formal negotiations or mediation, the site should be secure and neutral. In the control of an incident, those persons relevant to defusing the problem should be identified and persuaded to conduct negotiations away from those more immediately involved in the incident.

(2) **Administration.** The administrative organisation should include such items as arrival and departure arrangements, the provision of parking, communications, meals and refreshment. The meeting should usually have an agenda, a seating plan and note-takers, perhaps supplemented with interpreters and other advisers on specialist subjects. Separate rooms will probably be required by each party to allow them to confer in private.

(3) **Attendance.** Attendance should be at an appropriate and equal rank level. Offence may be caused if senior representatives from one faction are required to meet with junior representatives from another. To avoid unmanageable numbers attending, the size of each party should, where possible, be agreed beforehand. A policy on the carriage of weapons and bodyguards should be announced in advance. When appropriate, PSF Commanders should also bring bodyguards. Attention to protocol and other courtesies should not be overlooked.

c. **Stage 2 - Conduct.** In the case of mediation, parties to the conflict will confer with the go-between in separate locations. Negotiations, on the other hand, will be held openly in one location with all the participants present. Although it may be extremely difficult, the first item on any agenda should be for the participants to agree the purpose of the meeting. If hosting the occasion, the PSF representative should offer the customary salutations and exchange of courtesies, and ensure that all parties are identified and have been introduced to each other. Refreshments should normally be offered or received. Some introductory small talk is useful on such occasions to make everybody feel more at ease. The following negotiating techniques should be borne in mind:

(1) **Preserve Options.** The opposing sides should be encouraged to give their views first. This will enable the negotiator to re-assess the viability of his position. If possible, he should avoid taking an immediate stand and he should be wary of making promises or admissions unless it is necessary to do so.

(2) **Restraint and Control.** Belligerent parties are often likely to prove deliberately inflexible. They may distort information and introduce red herrings to distract attention from discussions which might embarrass them. Nonetheless, visible frustration, impatience, a patronising manner, or anger at such antics, may undermine the negotiator's position. Cheap 'point-scoring' may achieve short-term gain, while, in the longer term, it is likely to undermine or forfeit goodwill. Loss of face is likely to increase the belligerence of faction leaders. Face-saving measures by the controlling authority will probably

serve the longer-term interests of all parties. Whenever possible, respect should be shown for the negotiating positions of other parties. Speakers should not normally be interrupted; however, incorrect information and matters of principle should be corrected, if necessary, with appropriate evidence. Facts should take preference over opinions. Negotiations should be conducted in a firm, fair and friendly manner.

(3) **Argument.** If necessary, the negotiator should remind participants of previous agreements, arrangements, accepted practices and their own pronouncements. However, this should be done tactfully and accurately with regard to facts and detail. It may be appropriate to remind participants that they cannot change the past but, if they wish, they could have the power to influence the future.

(4) **Compromise.** Partial agreement or areas of consensus should be carefully explored for compromise solutions. Related common interests may offer answers to seemingly intractable differences.

(5) **Linkage.** Linkage of a point of negotiation with their wider ambitions is a technique frequently used by parties. Linkage is to be anticipated if subsequent actions and negotiating positions are not to be compromised.

d. **Stage 2 - Written Summary.** Negotiation and mediation should be finalised with a summary of what has been resolved. This summary has to be agreed by all participants and, if possible, written down and signed by each party. A time and place for further negotiation should also be agreed.

e. **Stage 3 - Follow-up.** Effective follow-up is as important as successful negotiation. Without a follow-up, achievements by negotiation or mediation could be lost. The outcome of the negotiations or mediation has to be promulgated to all interested parties. Background files should be updated with all pertinent information, including personality profiles of the participants. Agreements have to be monitored, implemented or supervised as soon as possible. The immediate period following a negotiated agreement is likely to prove the most critical. To preserve the credibility of the negotiating process, what has been agreed has to occur, and any breach of agreement, should be marked at the very least by an immediate protest.

513. **Languages.** The ability to negotiate and mediate will place a premium on basic language skills. However, working through interpreters is currently more usual and therefore should be practised before deployment. The use of locally recruited interpreters may provide a short-term solution but reliance on such a source of linguistic support can have disadvantages. Local interpreters may use ethnic or tribal

dialect deliberately to give offence. Intelligence services, friendly and hostile, regularly employ many linguists, so security checks will be required.

514. **Negotiating Peace and Ceasefire Agreements.** PSF Commanders have a clear interest in the detailed provisions of agreements and cease-fire terms. Personal and time-consuming involvement will be required from higher authorities, and will be highly influential in ensuring success. Agreements should include precise arrangements and procedures to cover the following:

- a. **Peace Support Operation Mandate and Statement of Intent.**
 - (1) Acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the PSO.
 - (2) Statements of expectations.
- b. **Constitutional and Judicial Arrangements.**
 - (1) Likely Constitutional Reforms.
 - (2) Applicable Body of Law.
- c. **Jurisdiction.**
 - (1) Leaders' jurisdiction over their faction members.
 - (2) Jurisdiction over all factions.
- d. **Establishing a Cease-fire.**
 - (1) Cease-fire Line.
 - (2) Zone of Separation.
 - (3) Control Zone.
 - (4) Area Cease-fire.
- e. **Cease-fire Management.**
 - (1) Investigation.
 - (2) Arbitration.
 - (3) Attribution.
 - (4) Penalties and rewards.

- f. **Response Statement.**
 - (1) Content and timing of press releases by faction on an agreed response.
- g. **Demobilisation.**
 - (1) Arrangements.
- h. **Disarming.**
 - (1) Arrangements.
- i. **Re-Integration.**
 - (1) Arrangements.

SECTION III – CONTROL TASKS AND TECHNIQUES

Overview

515. The PSF Commander may be called upon to support collective control measures. As with other dealings with the parties to the conflict, prohibitions and restrictions have to be proportionate, legal, and applied with due consideration of the need to retain and enhance Campaign Authority. However, the primary purpose of the PSO Control Tasks and Techniques that follow is to modify the operational environment for the benefit of the PSF such that it can execute its role in the PSO.

Civil-Military Co-operation

516. **Overview.** CIMIC is a formally adopted NATO³ term, and the United Kingdom approach to CIMIC is published in IJWP⁴ 3-90. The United Kingdom views CIMIC in the context of enabling military operations to make a more coherent contribution to the achievement of United Kingdom and international political objectives.⁵ This is achieved through the CIMIC process, which should be commanded and which addresses the relationship between military and civil sectors. CIMIC should be fully integrated into the chain of command, as it enables the interface for co-operation, co-ordination, mutual support, joint planning, and information exchange between the joint force and the civil sector. CIMIC is applicable throughout the full spectrum of tension (not just PSO), although the profile of the CIMIC process will probably be greatest in PSO. It is also applicable throughout the levels of operation, although it requires greatest focus at the operational level.

³ See NATO CIMIC doctrine (AJP-9).

⁴ Interim Joint Warfare Publication (IJWP).

⁵ UK CIMIC Policy D/JDCC/20/8/1 dated 6 Feb 03.

517. **Civil-Military Co-operation in Peace Support Operations.** CIMIC is an important military element of the PSF Campaign Plan, and should enable the PSF Commander to achieve effective civil-military liaison and undertake in a coherent manner those tasks and activities that flow from the Civil-Military line of operation and which are conducted in support of the civil environment. Liaison will be required with the full range of civilian actors, from international organisations (IOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to local authorities, civilian leaders, and the general population. This liaison is necessary to manage the impact of the civil sector on the military operation (and vice versa), and to harmonise plans and activities in support of the civil environment, both to reduce friction and to increase effectiveness.

518. **Civil-Military Co-operation Organisation.** CIMIC is a function that should be embedded within J3 Ops Sp, to achieve the necessary operational linkages with, in particular, Information Operations (Info Ops), Media Operations (Media Ops) and targeting. The commander is supported by permanent staff who will be trained and understand the principles of CIMIC, and augmentees in the form of CIMIC advisors from the Jt CIMIC Gp (formerly the United Kingdom Civil Affairs Group). The Jt CIMIC Gp may also provide CIMIC teams (typically 4) to facilitate the interface with the civil environment, and also functional specialists (who may not be military), to provide expert advice. A Civil-Military Operations Centre (CMOC) may be established to be the focus for liaison with civil agencies. The CMOC should ideally be in a position of maximum accessibility for civil actors. A CIMIC centre may also be established with access for the general public. The CMOC may contain a media operations section.

519. **Civil-Military Projects.** Civil Military projects provide the linkage between security, regeneration and, the desired steady state conditions that define the campaign's objectives. The guidelines and priorities established within the overall regeneration programme projects, in support of the local community, may be conducted independently by the military, but more usually in conjunction with civilian agencies, utilising local firms and facilities. Priorities should be co-ordinated at formation level and integrated into the PSF Campaign Plan that will, in turn be matched with the Comprehensive PSO Plan. Civil-military projects may cover a wide range of activities within local communities and, as such, should be directed by local authorities where these exist. Such projects will often require assistance from military specialists such as engineers, medical and veterinary officers, military police, military provost staff, special forces (SF), and logistic support.

520. **Civil-Military Co-operation Funding.** United Kingdom funding for such projects can be most effectively used if the Department for International Development (DFID) directs it through the Civil Secretary's office and into unit imprest accounts. Individual units can be project sponsors, managers and implementing partners with

DFID. Experience indicates that a ‘quick impact project’⁶ process, operating under the guidance of the HUMAD, can be most effective in meeting military needs, ensuring that humanitarian imperatives are accommodated, and making effective use of funds. The HUMAD will be aware of humanitarian actor programmes and involvement within the community.

Confidence Building Measures

521. Confidence building measures may contribute to the lowering of tension in an area and thus represent a step towards the restoration of the rule of law. They may take several forms:

- (1) The establishment of an effective liaison and communication network.
- (2) Mutual and balanced reductions in armed personnel and combat equipment.
- (3) The separation of forces.⁷
- (4) Zoned restrictions on the deployment of weapons and manpower.
- (5) Advance reporting of military activities or exercises.
- (6) Joint inspections of disputed areas.

Control Measures

522. **Overview.** Close control may be exercised directly by physical measures or indirectly, by deep perception management techniques. Close physical control can be exercised by: the routine presence of service units and troops, the use of specific techniques and operations such as cordon and search operations or other combat operations.

523. **Typical Control Measures.** Control measures may take several forms:

- a. **Restricted Air and Maritime Zones, Guards and Checkpoints.** Military operations will usually require control to be established to monitor, limit or deny access to many areas. This may be achieved by the use of guards and guard ships, air exclusion zones (for the restriction of war supplies, for example) and checkpoints, including vehicle checkpoints, to monitor the movement of displaced persons or refugees. Duties, procedures, and the

⁶ Quick Impact Projects is ‘Activity undertaken by the military within the civil environment, in support of the mission. Quick Impact Projects are characterised by the need to create an immediate effect, they can shape local perceptions, and they should contribute to the achievement of a more secure environment’ (IJWP 3-90).

⁷ See Para 540.

required tactics, will depend on the mandate, any Status of Forces Agreement, Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the PSF Standing Operational Procedures (SOPs). ROE must clearly define the orders for opening fire. At the tactical level, guards and checkpoints may constitute a major interface between the contingent and local populace. It is therefore important that service personnel carrying out these duties are aware of local customs, particularly in respect of dealing with women, the very young and the old. Restricted areas may include the following:

- (1) Air and Maritime Zones.
- (2) Significant or sensitive terrain (such as Cease-fire Lines, Zones of Separation and Control Zones).
- (3) Installations.
- (4) Centres of population.
- (5) Stocks of war supplies.

b. **Powers of Search and Arrest.** The powers of the PSF to search and arrest civilians will depend on the mandate and Status of Forces Agreement. The conduct of searches and arrests, especially of war criminals, is covered at paragraphs 556 and 562. Control may also need to be exerted over the passage of war supplies and preventative action needed to combat criminal activities and the smuggling of contraband items such as drugs. This may all be indistinguishable from more politically motivated violations. In the early stages of a demobilisation operation, forces may be empowered to board shipping, confiscate items and arrest offenders. In any military assistance programme, civilians or faction members suspected of illegal activity should usually be handed over to the civil authorities. Checks on the personnel and vehicles of the PSF may also be used to demonstrate that the force itself is observing the law and to deter or detect any criminal activity among its own members.

c. **Crowd Control.** In circumstances of widespread civil disobedience, the responsibility for the restoration of order and crowd control should, in the first instance, rest with the civil authorities and Civilian Police (CIVPOL). Should the situation deteriorate to such a degree that a PSF is tasked with providing assistance, such a task will require an Enforcement Stance. The same applies to techniques such as patrolling, cordon and search, and other tactical measures designed to control the activities of populations in designated areas.

d. **Weapon Control Measures.** Weapon control measures may be agreed to, or enforced by, a PSF. Such activities may include: exclusion from, or

restriction within, a specific area; confiscation and destruction; or receipt and control of all weapons or certain weapon types, generally heavy weapons. Control of weapons may be restricted to ensuring that those weapons are only used in self-defence.

524. **Organisation of Control Measures.** Control can be more effectively coordinated and executed if military sector boundaries are harmonised with in-place aid agency structures and deployments, or political and civil authority boundaries, and the locations and deployments of parties to the conflict. When possible, headquarters and troop locations should be positioned within sectors to demonstrate the approach being taken by a PSF.

Early Warning

525. Where a PSF is already deployed the use of the PSF and its intelligence resources to identify the threat of an outbreak of violence - early warning - may buy time for a range of preventative diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and military actions.

Electronic Warfare

526. Electronic Warfare (EW) is essential to ensure the PSF's ability to use the electromagnetic spectrum, and for immediate threat warning and force protection. Commanders at all levels should consider the employment of EW assets to support their overall objectives. All sides to a dispute may have sophisticated electronic systems capable of monitoring, threatening, or disrupting, the activities of the PSF and its partners. EW can provide early warning, which may prevent disputes from escalating into armed conflict, and can support diplomatic activity by monitoring compliance with agreements and sanctions. EW is a deterrent, especially if a potential belligerent knows that the PSF can quickly locate and neutralise threats. If hostilities do occur, EW can reduce the threat posed by certain weapons systems and provide commanders with alternatives to the use of physical or lethal force.

Explosive Ordnance (Mine) Clearance

527. **Clearance Responsibilities.** Explosive ordnance, including mines, pose a significant threat to all people, equipment and animals during, and after, the termination of a conflict, both at sea and on land. With the exception of mines in international waters, unexploded ordnance and minefields in combat zones are the responsibility of the party that laid them. This may pose practical difficulties where the organisation that laid the mines is incapable - for whatever reason - of fulfilling its obligations.

528. **Impact on Campaign Authority.** If the PSF wishes to retain its Campaign Authority, it is obliged not to reveal the location of one party's minefields to the other,

although it should try and ensure that they are adequately marked. Unless the mandate specifies otherwise, a PSF is not permitted to lift a party's unexploded ordnance or minefields, except to destroy or remove mines and other unexploded munitions that prevent the PSF from carrying out its mission, or that offer a hazard along tracks and sea-lanes in use by international shipping or other non-involved parties.

529. **Clearance.** The PSF can be employed to mark, isolate, and clear mines and unexploded ordnance where they present a direct threat to life. They can also be employed to train local forces to do the same. They will generally seek to identify areas of hazard. This information will usually be produced on a master map and disseminated to all elements of the operation, including civilian agencies. This sharing of data is an important feature of PSO and at times it may be the case that the military clearance assets work to a lead civilian agency that may be better equipped and have a long experience of the crisis region. Early liaison with these civil agencies is advisable and efforts to agree upon compatible databases will prove advantageous in the longer-term. Non-military personnel should be made aware of mine threats and the CMOC should be regularly updated with mapping of the explosive ordnance threat. Within the United Nations (UN), the UN Mine Action Service with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is the focus for all mine related and mine clearance operations.

Freedom of Movement

530. The PSF may be required to guarantee or deny movement by air, land or sea. Operations guaranteeing or denying movement will not be credible if they rely for success on the consent of the parties to the conflict. Such operations will therefore need to be conducted by a force capable of adopting an Enforcement Stance when necessary. Examples might include implementing a maritime exclusion zone or no-fly zone to prevent the harassment of an unprotected population, or the creation of a safe corridor to allow for the free and unmolested movement of aid and refugees.

Incident Control

531. **Overview.** At the tactical level, where many hostile incidents are a reaction to a situation elsewhere, an understanding of the operational framework will guide which techniques may be most appropriate and where, within that framework, they can be applied most effectively.

532. **Incident Management.** Faced with a situation of actual or threatened violence, service personnel and the PSF should, at the outset, be capable of defending themselves, either by evasive manoeuvre, or fire, or a combination of both. Having reduced the threat to a manageable level, the resolution of an incident will generally follow a particular sequence of steps:

- a. **Step 1.** Attempts should be made to identify the cause of the problem and to establish accountability for any hostile actions. However, the belligerents involved and the weapons used, especially in the case of indirect fire, may not provide sufficient evidence to show at what level the incident was initiated and therefore at what level it should be resolved.
- b. **Step 2.** The next step will usually require negotiations with the belligerents at the site of the incident in order to contain and defuse the situation. Typically, in PSO, violent incidents cannot be resolved; only controlled at the level they are initiated.
- c. **Step 3.** If an immediate local accountability for actions cannot be established or local negotiations fail to resolve the situation, but the belligerent forces have a coherent command and control infrastructure, the answer may lie in raising negotiations higher in the belligerent party's chain of command. If the belligerent forces do not have a coherent system of command and control, a more robust response on the ground may be necessary from the outset.
- d. **Step 4.** The resolution of the situation will often be beyond the immediate capability of the PSF elements involved in the incident and require the application of other techniques elsewhere and at a more senior level. If negotiations have failed, the key to resolution may lie in a combination of coercive measures of increasing intensity, and more substantive negotiations higher in the chain of command. Escalation may involve the use of threats, demonstrations, or the actual use of direct or indirect fire and longer-range precision fire, should this be available.

533. **Impact of Incidents.** The resolution of every incident, at whatever level, should be viewed and judged within the wider context of the PSO. Hence the significance of mission analysis, and the requirement for commanders to possess both lateral vision and perseverance.

Intelligence Operations

534. **Terminology.** The parties to a conflict in a PSO environment may be suspicious of all intelligence-related activities. They are likely to regard the gathering of intelligence itself as a hostile act. It is for this reason that, in the past, intelligence operations have been termed 'military information operations'. The use of such terminology was an attempt to accommodate both local sensitivities as well as those that might exist within a multinational and multi-agency PSO. However, there is now a general acceptance that the intelligence function is an integral part of the conduct of any operation, be it military or civilian, and will therefore be addressed as such.

535. **The Intelligence Process.** Intelligence operations will drive the conduct of PSO in much the same way as they drive other operations. As an operational function, military intelligence will represent a prime influence in directing and synchronising operations themselves. Intelligence operations work through a continuous cyclical process of direction, collection, interpretation, evaluation, collation, and dissemination that must be controlled and co-ordinated in the Intelligence Management Plan. The intelligence organisation during the conduct of PSO must be flexible and task organised and will probably require considerable augmentation to include specialists in a wide variety of fields.

536. **Intelligence Requirements.** The intelligence requirements of the PSF Commander are likely to be as broad but more complex than those of normal combat operations. As well as requiring detailed assessments of the geopolitical situation, including historical and cultural influences, the commander will also require continuously updated assessments of the attitudes, capabilities, intentions and likely reactions, of all local forces and their leaders, ethnic groupings, and interested parties to the conflict, particularly those that are potentially hostile.

537. **Sources.** Open source material including libraries, the media, multinational business corporations and commercial satellite services, will provide some background information. All other sources of strategic and military intelligence will be available, including technical sources and assessments from higher formation as well as those from national and regional authorities. At the tactical level, the primary source of intelligence will be Human Intelligence (HUMINT) often from reports and routine debriefings of observers, patrols and other elements of the force that pass through areas of interest and are in contact with the local population and human rights monitors. NGOs are often rich sources of information, but must be handled with care to protect their status. Liaison teams will have a key role in meeting the PSF Commander's intelligence requirements. A well-developed information system is vital to the effectiveness of PSO. Military intelligence activities should be directed by the commander to meet clearly defined requirements to satisfy operational needs. In addition, military intelligence will meet a vital early warning requirement in monitoring and reporting those aspects that may destabilise or escalate the overall security situation.

Interposition

538. **Overview.** The interposition of forces between opposing parties remains one of the basic military techniques in PSO. Interposition may be described as 'Separation of Forces Operations'. It is generally undertaken to prevent, or stop the resumption of, conflict by the establishment of a buffer zone, or where the communities are intermingled, the establishment of areas of separation. It may also be a discrete task which, traditionally, has been the establishment and maintenance of cease-fires within the context of demobilisation operations. Although there is consent for interposition,

at least from the states or parties in conflict, a peace plan or formal cease-fire may not have been agreed, and the situation may be characterised by sporadic outbreaks of violence. Where this is the case the PSF must be able to adopt the Enforcement Stance. Interposition operations in a multi-faction dispute or conflict will be highly complex. Whenever possible, interposition actions are pre-planned with the consent of parties to the conflict and normally include the withdrawal and assembly of opposing factions from a cease-fire line or a specified geographical area. The interposition might be phased with advance groups of the PSF deployed to provide a screen between withdrawing factions. Such PSF groups might take the form of individual units including ships, standing patrols or even single armoured vehicles. Interposition in this situation should be accomplished as quickly as possible to forestall clashes and a breakdown of other cease-fire arrangements. Interposition forces may be required to protect the parties to a conflict from outside interference and attack, as well as taking action against the violators of cease-fires.

539. **Emergency Response.** Interposition may also be used as a short-term emergency response to forestall or manage a local crisis. As with a pre-planned interposition, speed is a crucial factor in defusing such a situation. In the early stages of a crisis, it is advantageous if commanders can promptly insert leading elements of an interposition force between the parties concerned, whilst concurrently conducting negotiations with the antagonists. While negotiations may continue to reduce tension, the advance elements of the interposition force should be reinforced until it is sufficiently strong to regain control of the situation, should negotiations fail. Care should be taken not to escalate crises by such action.

540. **Interposition Tactics.** Whether the interposition force has separated the opposing forces by peace agreement or enforcement, the geographical separation may be delineated in any environment by one, or a combination, of the following:

- a. **Cease-fire Line.** The Cease-fire Line marks the forward limit of the area or areas occupied by opposing factions. It is, by its nature, usually the subject of contention, particularly when it is part of a significant tactical feature.
- b. **Zone of Separation.** A Zone of Separation is a neutral space or no-man's land between cease-fire lines. This is a term now being used in the context of intra-state conflict instead of the term Buffer Zone which was more appropriate to inter-state conflict. The width of the Zone of Separation may be based on visual distances or weapon ranges. Out of visual sight is preferable as it reduces the temptation of ill-disciplined soldiers to take pot shots at one another. A Zone of Separation may contain residents, farmland or other assets that the force may need to patrol, monitor, and protect. Access to a Zone of Separation, and perhaps the air space above it, will usually be controlled by,

and limited to, the supervising authority. Any maritime zones should specify the limitations applied to international shipping rights.

c. **Control Zones.** Control Zones are areas either side of a Zone of Separation, the forward limits of which will be the cease-fire line. In these areas, limits are set for numbers of personnel, tanks, artillery (by calibre), and missiles, permitted in the control zone at any one time, or during any particular period.

541. **Delineation Procedures.** The following procedures should be used when delineating a cease-fire line, Zone of Separation or Control Zone:

- a. The designated line or area should be clearly marked on a common large-scale chart, map or air photograph.
- b. The line or area should, if possible, be physically identifiable.
- c. A detailed and accurate description of any demarcation lines, using agreed grid references, should be produced.
- d. The lines on the ground should be surveyed and marked or, if at sea, recorded by some form of recognised maritime marker.
- e. Entry points to the zones should be agreed and clearly marked on the map and ground.
- f. A record of the lines, signed by all sides, should be given to the parties concerned, with the original retained by the PSF. Alterations should be signed and promulgated in the same way.
- g. Designated control lines and areas should, as far as possible, be kept under surveillance.

Observation and Monitoring

542. **Overview.** Observation and monitoring are both fundamental techniques of PSO and a category of task. As a technique, the purpose is to gather information, and monitor, verify, and report, adherence to agreements, thus deterring and providing evidence of breaches, should they occur. Strategic and operational maritime and air assets, including satellites, may conduct observation and monitoring. However, traditionally, individual observer teams have deployed into the same theatre of operations from a number of political authorities, including the UN Security Council. The observers have acted as the authorities' 'eyes and ears'. Observers may be employed individually or in small multinational joint teams to observe, monitor, verify, report and, where possible, to use consent building measures to defuse

situations of potential conflict. As far as is politically possible, their efforts should be co-ordinated with, if not part of, the deployed PSF and their product shared. Examples of specific tasks include:

- a. Operational level observation and intelligence gathering by maritime and air assets. Such operations will generally provide their own force protection.
- b. Observing Zones of Separation and Cease-fire Lines.
- c. Confirming the withdrawal of forces.
- d. Monitoring conditions in a potential conflict area for signs of war preparation or increased tension.
- e. Monitoring and reporting the movement of refugees and displaced persons.
- f. Monitoring and reporting human rights abuses.
- g. Inspecting industrial facilities to verify compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions.

543. **Security.** Observation teams will depend partially for their security on their status, which will be considerably enhanced by a credible and professional performance by the rest of the PSF. At times of low threat, observation may be carried out by unarmed personnel in small multinational teams, often including civilian representatives. At times of higher threat and when the requirements of credibility are paramount, observers may be armed and grouped in national military teams, possibly drawn from Special Forces.

544. **Communications.** Effective liaison with all parties involved is also a valuable supporting element of these methods. The success of observation activities depends largely on accurate, timely reporting using reliable communications. By their nature, observation and monitoring teams are normally limited in the scope of any reaction they may wish to take. However, they may act as a trigger for other more robust joint reaction forces.

Protected or Safe Areas

545. **Overview.** The requirement to establish and supervise a protected or safe area can arise when any community is at risk from persistent attack. However, unless those within the safe area are disarmed, it may be used as a base from which to conduct raids. Clear guidance should be given, therefore, as to what is demanded of any force that is tasked with establishing and supervising a protected or safe area. Inevitably,

efforts will be needed to counter the accusations from those within and beyond the safe area that the operation is designed to assist the other side.

546. **Practical Considerations.** Areas to be protected or made safe may contain residents, refugees, displaced persons and substantial numbers of forces of one or more of the parties to the conflict. The PSF may be charged with the establishment and supervision of such areas and to provide support and assistance to other organisations within the safe area. The first stage in any PSO, designed to protect or make an area safe, is to demilitarise that area. Having accomplished that, and taken all necessary measures to defend the area, specific military tasks may include:

- a. Establishing, monitoring and enforcing weapon exclusion zones.
- b. Establishing and maintaining cantonment areas and weapon holding areas and sites.
- c. Holding ground.
- d. Dominating approaches.
- e. Conducting patrols and searches.
- f. Manning checkpoints and other control measures.
- g. The development of reinforcement and extraction plans.

Provision of Protection

547. Protective tasks include the protection and the safeguarding of individuals, communities, and installations. Commanders should be aware of the need to balance protective tasks against the need for more active operational measures.

Response

548. The ability of the PSF to respond to fresh incidents is essential to retain control and keep the initiative. PSF Commanders should have reserves and contingency plans prepared, noting that responses may consist of a range of measures as well as the use of force. It may be appropriate for reserves to be on call from outside the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

Sanctions

549. Sanctions concern the denial of supplies, diplomatic, economic and other trading privileges, and the freedom of movement of those living in the area of sanctions. Sanctions may be conducted partially against a specific party or impartially over an area embracing all parties. The task may require the PSF to enforce the

restrictions and coerce or deter parties from attempting to circumvent the restrictions. Surveillance will be a key task.

Surveillance

550. The perceived or actual presence of surveillance throughout the crisis area, the JOA and the wider region can help to deter breaches of agreements and embargoes. Surveillance can also provide the means for attribution of blame when compliance is questioned. Moreover, it can act as a basis for judicial proceedings if rules on evidential quality have been adhered to.

SECTION IV – INTERIM MANAGEMENT TASKS AND TECHNIQUES

Co-ordination

551. In most PSO engagements there will be a requirement to co-ordinate the activities of a large number of agencies. Initially, the PSF may have a central role in facilitating effective co-ordination across the actor complex.

Demobilisation, Disarmament and Re-Integration

552. Demobilisation, Disarmament and Re-Integration (DDR) tasks will generally form part of a longer-term Security Sector Reform programme involving civil and military agencies. There is, however, little chance of conducting such a programme without a rudimentary security framework and the agreement of parties to the conflict. Financial inducements and the offer of future employment, either in a reformed military, or as part of the local economy following civilian skills training, are often used to promote participation in a DDR programme. Forcible demobilisation and disarmament may prove necessary. However, experience has shown this to be a high risk and highly demanding task when attempted over a wide area. The final military phase of a Security Sector Reform programme may be the hand-over of security tasks to legally constituted and properly trained local forces. The costs involved are considerable both in terms of the immediately apparent costs of conducting the programme and the subsidiary costs of contracted civilian training. Investment will also be required for commercial ventures that will provide gainful employment for ex-combatants. The SR/HoM and PSF Commanders should pay close attention to the overall co-ordination of a Security Sector Reform programme, recognising that it usually forms a critical point in the overall campaign.

Electoral Process Support

553. The re-establishment of the rule of law and the creation of a secure environment are essential prerequisites to the successful conduct of elections. Without

some guarantee of protection and security, individuals will not have the confidence to vote and the electoral process will lack credibility. Military support for the electoral process may take many forms but will generally consist of the establishment and protection of voting centres and the secure transportation of ballot boxes and electoral staff.

Human Rights Activity

554. The PSF may be involved in human rights monitoring and reporting alongside specialist civil actors.⁸ Where widespread violations are apparent, the mandate should specify the relevant military tasks. The PSF may be called upon to fulfil a variety of functions in close co-ordination with specialist agencies and civilian police. Early consultation with human rights advisors and the civilian police will provide commanders with essential pre-deployment planning details covering this sensitive area. When violations of human rights have occurred, or are still occurring, it is essential that all evidence, and, in particular, details of those involved, is systematically and accurately recorded by trained and equipped investigators for use in future war crime investigations. In particular, the apprehension of the perpetrators of war crimes will generally require the deployment of a force supported by specialist war crimes investigators, international or national police, and other enforcement agencies.

Humanitarian Assistance

555. The foremost task for the PSF will be the creation of a stable and secure environment in which aid can be distributed freely and human rights abuses are curtailed. However, Humanitarian Assistance may be provided within a PSO to relieve the immediate effects of the conflict where the conditions are unsuitable for the specialist agencies to do so without military assistance. In cases of dire emergency, military forces may be required to conduct specific Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operation (HDRO). It is more usually a secondary task to that for which the PSF has been constituted and deployed. The task will be conducted using HDRO doctrine.⁹ In circumstances where aid agencies employ local guards, or where protection is provided by companies from the civil sector, it is important that their activities are co-ordinated within the wider operational context. The SR/HoM and PSF Commander may also wish to act to ensure probity and competence of civil actors providing their own security services. Such humanitarian activities will need the closest co-operation and co-ordination between the PSF, aid agencies, and human rights groups, not least to maintain the independent status of the aid agencies. Guidance on working with humanitarian agencies is at Annex B.

⁸ Amnesty International and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are examples.

⁹ JWP 3-52 '*Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations*' details the United Kingdom military doctrine for such operations.

Interim Administration

556. In the absence of any working indigenous or in-place internationally led, civil administration, the PSF may have to undertake civil administration tasks. Such tasks might range from liaison to the establishment of an interim military government. Between these wide ranging tasks the PSF may be required to assume responsibility for essential services. Care should be taken in planning and execution of these tasks so that responsibility can be transferred to the appropriate authorities with minimum risk.

Reconstruction

557. The reconstruction of a life support infrastructure should be undertaken as part of a civil-led regeneration programme. For the United Kingdom, DFID specialises in assessing, co-ordinating, funding and executing many of these projects. PSF staff will work closely with DFID. A HUMAD may be appointed to the PSF Headquarters to advise the PSF Commander and lead liaison activity amongst the humanitarian sector actors. Logistics staffs may wish to develop knowledge of local contractor facilities and consultation with the humanitarian sector will often prove mutually beneficial. A speedy, considered, and effective response to requests for assistance will enhance the credibility of the PSF with both recipients and the humanitarian sector. Nevertheless, care must be taken to ensure that military activities do not create a dependency culture that will, in the longer-term, prove to be counter-productive. Irrespective of the success of regeneration and reconstruction activities, without rule of law, and an international perception of an acceptable steady state having been reached, inward investment and economic growth will not take place. The long-term success of the campaign must therefore guide the allocation of resources. CIMIC staff should constantly balance short-term military necessity, such as ‘Hearts and Minds’ programmes,¹⁰ against these long-term considerations. In administering these programmes, it is often necessary to appoint a dedicated Civilian Secretary or budgetary officer.

Refugees and Displaced Persons Assistance

558. The abuse of human rights and the migration of displaced persons, those forced to leave their homes, and refugees, those forced to leave their home states, are common features of conflict. The numbers involved can range from individuals to entire ethnic groups. Normally, support to displaced persons and refugees should be conducted by specialist agencies, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UN High Commissioner’s Office for Refugees (UNHCR). However, the scale of the problem may see requests made for military assistance. The

¹⁰ See Para 507.

scale of the task and its duration require special consideration, as does the potential impact of civilians having been associated with the intervening military forces.

Rule of Law

559. Establishing a basic rule of law regime may be a principal task for the PSF ahead of the role being taken on by an international or an indigenous police force. This task will be made more difficult in circumstances where the organs of governance do not exist or are incapable of functioning and armed factions seek to exploit the opportunities this may present to them. The PSF may need to adopt the range of stances and employ a number of types of operation in order to address the security situation, from combat, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism to the protection of human rights. Key to determining the approach to be taken will be the mandate, the legal constraints that flow from it and the existing level of Campaign Authority. Gradually, in the restoration of the rule of law, the security situation will improve and civil agencies will be able to operate. The transition, from security provided by the military to the point where it is provided by police, will require confidence in a functioning legal framework, within which the police and courts retain the capability effectively to tackle crime and the confidence of the local population in so doing. Timing needs to be carefully assessed; for example, functional judicial and penal systems are usually required earlier than police.

SECTION V – COMMON TASKS AND TECHNIQUES

Humanitarian Law Enforcement and Investigation

560. **Overview.** The detailed investigation of war crimes is a highly sensitive activity with political overtones that should be left to specialist teams of investigators generally working directly to the authorising political body. However, military forces have a moral and legal responsibility to prevent violations and, when they have occurred, to ensure that all details and evidence are accurately and systematically collected, recorded and reported for subsequent investigations. Military involvement in such investigations should be precisely defined in the military mission and closely co-ordinated within the mission plan with human rights agencies and officers. Violations of the mandate and breaches of international humanitarian law should be the subject of a formal protest as well as a formal investigation. Where individuals have been indicted for breaches of human rights, the PSF may need to undertake the arrest of the individuals; where possible this should be undertaken with the assistance of international or indigenous civilian police and specialist investigators.¹¹

561. **Protest Procedure.** A protest is a formal notification of an act by one of the parties to a dispute, or by the PSF, which the originator considers to be a violation of

¹¹ See Para 556.

the ‘status quo’ or international law. A protest indicates that the violation has been observed and that action to redress the grievance or an explanation is required as soon as possible. Protests may be communicated verbally but have to be confirmed in writing. While the full details of the protest will be sent to the offending party, the other parties, if formal parties exist, will normally only be told that a protest has been made without further elaboration. This procedure is to reassure all parties that the PSF will not, in the first instance, betray confidences. However, if the violation is not redressed, the PSF may pass details to the other parties. All protests should be recorded.

562. Enforcement and the Investigation of Violations. Every breach of the mandate, international humanitarian law, or peace agreement, which is witnessed by a PSF, should be dealt with immediately in accordance with its mandate and mission statement. A failure by a PSF to prevent violations will undermine its Campaign Authority and the effectiveness of the mission. Enforcement may require the arrest and disarmament of violators and their detainment until they can be handed over to an appropriate civil legal authority. ROE should be designed for such contingencies and to make legal provision for the PSF to use all necessary measures to achieve compliance. Such actions, which must be catered for in detail in the mission plan, may also require the deployments of reserves and reaction forces. Not all violations will be dealt with as official complaints. Those that are minor in nature can often be dealt with at an appropriate level; however, they should still be reported and recorded. Speed of reaction is also essential to secure evidence before it can be removed and to question witnesses before interested parties coach them to adopt a particular line. The procedure for enforcement interventions, investigations, and reporting, should be detailed in the appropriate PSF standing orders in accordance with the mandate.

Information and Media Operations

563. Overview. Info Ops¹² are an integral element of the manoeuvrist approach to the conduct of operations and should be fully co-ordinated with other activities and operations of the PSF, in order to enhance Campaign Authority, shape the operational environment and prepare parties for rebuilding a peaceful civil-led society. In the conduct of a PSO, the PSF Commander’s information operations strategy should be linked to all political, civilian, media-related civil affairs and civil actor programmes associated with the PSO. The media attention given to PSOs is important in maintaining the international will and cohesion to tackle the crisis; this is most obvious during the early stages of a PSO. Thus there is a need for parallel media operations.¹³

¹² See JWP 3-80 ‘Information Operations’.

¹³ Media Operations are defined as ‘*That line of activity developed to ensure timely, accurate, and effective provision of Public Information (P Info) and implementation of Public Relations (PR) policy within the operational environment, whilst maintaining Operations Security (OPSEC)*’ (JWP 0-01.1).

564. **Providing Information.** Indigenous populations may have been subject to propaganda and are likely to be in urgent need of objective factual, truthful and credible information. The core message explaining the objectives and role of the PSF should be propagated in advance of the arrival of the force and updated regularly. Any gap in information is likely to be filled with the propaganda of the hostile parties. How best to disseminate information will be a key factor during planning. The availability of suitable dissemination or broadcast systems and their standing, trusted or otherwise, must be assessed. Funding and the capability to establish a radio or TV broadcast facility as well as high volume printing facilities may be needed in PSO.

565. **Peace Support Force Aspects.** Efficient co-ordination of the use of all available military capabilities to protect the PSF's command and control (C2) in support of the mission will be a high concern. C2 protection is vital to overall force protection and should incorporate an Operational Security (OPSEC) policy that specifically considers vulnerabilities in the PSF's communications and information systems as well as other OPSEC areas. An analysis of the parties subject to the PSO is invaluable to assigning military intelligence priorities and the prioritised use of EW and other specialist resources to support the mission. Continual analysis of hostile parties' media resources is important to ensure their objectivity and that they are not used as a C2 means to incite violence and opposition to the mission. In certain circumstances, the use of deception or physical destruction may be appropriate to deceive or destroy a hostile party's C2 capability. In addition, EW assets may have to be used to secure friendly forces use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and to deny its use by hostile parties. Information planning and activity forms an integral element of deep operations within the PSF Campaign Plan.

566. **Public Information Activities.** Invariably, a PSO will attract intense public scrutiny from the international and local media. The aim of Public Information activities is to assist the media in developing a balanced and fully informed understanding of the campaign objectives, mission execution and events as they unfold. The media will require sophisticated and professional handling from the start of the mission, and is best served by a consistent and transparent information policy that recognises the pressures imposed by the 'real time' reporting of the electronic media. Media staff should be fully integrated into the chain of command and extreme care must be taken to ensure co-ordination of Public Information activities, and civil affairs, as component parts of an overall information campaign. To achieve a consistent and credible message clear 'lines to take' should be passed to all contingent commanders and subordinate headquarters. Media reports may rapidly and decisively, enhance or degrade Campaign Authority. At times it should be recognised that the judicious introduction of press reporters to the scene of an incident may act to restrict hostile parties action and in some cases avert atrocity. An effective media service is an essential element in the conduct of PSO and will require the commander to agree plans and personally participate in their delivery.

567. The Principles of Information Operations in Peace Support Operations.

The following principles may assist the PSF Commander in formulating and directing the information campaign:

- a. **Honesty.** Unless the information promulgated is believed, Info Ops will serve no purpose. Obvious attempts at propaganda, or lies, will impose serious risk to the long-term credibility and viability of any operation. On certain occasions, however, force protection considerations may limit the extent to which operations can be transparent. However, that should not exclude timely and accurate statements concerning culpability when evidence is irrefutable. The commander should be aware of any decision concerning the use of disinformation; its use is to be very strongly discouraged.
- b. **Campaign Authority.** The authority of the PSO mandate has to be repeatedly stressed and enhanced in messages that reach audiences both in the JOA and externally. Nothing should be communicated that might prejudice perceptions of the mandate. Compliance should be encouraged and expectations managed.
- c. **Timeliness.** To be effective, Info Ops must be timely. All activities and operations should be analysed from the perspectives of the media, indigenous population and parties to the conflict so that appropriate responses are prepared. These responses, briefings or press releases should be designed to inform more accurately and, when necessary, pre-empt the potential adverse publicity or misinformation that may be propagated by the parties to the conflict for their own partisan purposes.
- d. **Cultural Knowledge.** A thorough understanding of local culture, including linguistic dialects, is vital. Every effort should be made to gain this understanding. Socio-cultural studies and opinion surveys need to be conducted to identify prevailing attitudes, and expose any misconceptions and misunderstandings that can then be subsequently addressed through any information programme. Close liaison with staffs formulating measures of success is desirable.
- e. **Harmonisation.** As activities that determine and influence perceptions, information operations must be co-ordinated with other lines of activity that seek similar goals. These could include military information operations, specialist agencies, civil-military co-ordination committees, humanitarian and political advisors.
- f. **Style.** Information material should be presented to the local population in the most appropriate and culturally acceptable manner and should avoid being patronising, arrogant, or naively manipulative.

568. **Additional Principles of Public Information Activities.** The principles described above apply to all Info Ops. The following are additional principles that should be given greater emphasis when formulating PSO Public Information plans:

- a. **Accreditation.** Media representatives should normally be accredited in order to gain eligibility for official Public Information support. The accreditation should require the representatives to abide by a clear set of rules that protect the operational security of the PSF. If the rules are violated, consideration should be given to excluding those representatives from access to further official Public Information services.
- b. **Transparency.** Open and independent reporting is the norm. In most situations, unrestricted access should be allowed to accredited media representatives. Warnings of dangers specific to certain areas should be given but without precluding media access. Threats to personal security are an occupational hazard for media representatives. They are ultimately responsible for the consequences of the risks they take.
- c. **Liaison.** Given the potential for political repercussions, commanders should be kept informed of all significant developments of potential media interest. Public Information staff should be available for detachment to incidents at short notice.
- d. **Quality of Service.** Public information support should be prompt, accurate, balanced and consistent. High quality officers with a proper understanding of the operation and the military capabilities involved should assist media personnel where necessary.

Liaison

569. **Overview.** Conflict thrives on rumour, uncertainty, and prejudice. The timely passage of accurate information based on a trusting relationship is a key method of combating uncertainty and promoting stability in a conflict region. Liaison is therefore a vital tool of a PSF and key to the successful execution of operations. Failure to liaise risks misunderstanding, friction, opposition and escalation of the conflict.

570. **Purpose.** The purpose of liaison is to ensure the timely passage of information, to notify intentions, lodge protests, co-ordinate activity, manage crises, and settle disputes. A liaison system is therefore required to link the PSF, the communities, the civil authority (if it exists), the parties to the conflict, the civil actor complex, and critically, the media. It should be established at every possible level including formation, unit, sub-unit, and sometimes at a lower level. The specialist skills and background experience of liaison officers should, if possible, match those of

the organisation with which they are to liaise. The most effective form of liaison is that of an individual who is permanently detached from his parent organisation to the group or faction with which the organisation is liaising. Alternative methods of liaison include patrols, regular or occasional meetings, and visits.

571. **Requirements.** Liaison officers (LOs) are the eyes and ears of the Commander and can be used by him to focus on issues of immediate or more general concern. LOs or liaison teams will require robust, reliable communications with an alternative back-up system. In situations of particular tenseness, consideration should be given to creating 'hot lines' linking force command posts with that of opposing factions in order to facilitate the handling of crises. Liaison must be founded on friendly, working relationships. Team members should familiarise themselves with the names and responsibilities of the leaders they deal with. They should also assess attitudes and attempt to predict and anticipate the direction that events may take. Everything should be done to foster an atmosphere of trust. Daily meetings should be arranged, if necessary 'off the record', to develop relationships and keep channels of communication open.

572. **Priority.** Opportunities for liaison should be explored and exploited by commanders as a priority at every level. It will normally be necessary for commanders to augment their establishments with additional officers, warrant officers, and senior NCOs, for liaison purposes. If liaison is interrupted for any reason, commanders should seek to re-establish it at the earliest opportunity.

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ANNEX A – THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY CONCEPT AND THE EVOLUTION OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

‘The Tao for imposing order on chaos consists of: first, benevolence; second, credibility; third, straightforwardness; fourth, unity; fifth, righteousness; sixth, change wrought by authority; seventh centralised authority.’¹

SECTION I – THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY CONCEPT

A1. Most would accept that the United Nations Charter (UNC) represents the most ambitious attempt, so far, to regulate the behaviour of peoples and states to ensure that a form of world order prevails. However, it seems clear that the ability of the United Nations (UN) to develop as a universal organ of global governance, has been curtailed through an inability to empower the organisation as it was originally intended.² This reality was passively accepted during the Cold War but the contemporary demand for action to defend individual rights and freedoms has resulted in calls for reform. To understand current state practice it is useful to understand the lineage of collective security. (For ease of reference, the UNC is produced in full on light blue pages at Appendix A1.)

The Lineage of Collective Security³

A2. The unacceptability of inter state war as an instrument of national policy was first stated in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, reflected in the Covenant of The League of Nations, and conclusively prohibited in the UN Charter. However, this stance must still be regarded as ‘immature’, with little precedent in history. Some argue that it should be seen as an unproven concept likely to have negative effects on world order.⁴ The Covenant of the League of Nations established a formal process for

¹ Ssu-ma Fa (Methods of the Ssu-ma), 3 in: *The Art of the Warrior*, translated by R D Sawyer, Shambhala, London, 1996.

² The UNC encapsulated the concept of assigned military forces and a Military Staff Committee (MSC) that was to be formed from the Chiefs of Staff of UN Security Council (UNSC) permanent members. The relevant UNC Articles, in this context, are 43-47.

³ In such a system states agree not to use unilateral force in their inter-state relations. Instead, they agree to participate in, and defend, a collective security system. The UN system is set down in the UNC and includes mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes (UNC Chapter VI), as well as options for international peacekeeping and peace-making action. If preventive measures fail and the UNSC determines there to be a threat to international peace and security more forceful action can be initiated under UNC Chapter VII and VIII. The principal responsibility for a collective response rests with the UNSC - see UNC Article 24.

⁴ In a much criticised article entitled *‘Give War a Chance’* Edward Luttwak takes an overt view suggesting that the contemporary predilection toward intervention fails to acknowledge the essential logic of warfare in that it brings about decisive victory and exhaustion of the potential for further conflict.

the settlement of international disputes,⁵ although it did not categorically forbid resort to the use of force.⁶ Eventually, these incremental changes were reflected in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact,⁷ which prohibited recourse to warfare as an instrument of national policy. The concept of an attack on one party constituting an attack on all had been born.⁸

A3. Despite these promising developments, the world was again plunged into conflict with the outbreak of World War II. Nevertheless, preparations to ensure a lasting peace were undertaken even as the war raged. Landmark conferences at Bretton Woods, Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, and finally San Francisco saw strenuous efforts made to identify the weaknesses of the League of Nations Covenant⁹ and work to draft legislation realistically matched to the regulation of international behaviour. The result was the United Nations, and its Charter.

Cold War - 'Traditional' Peacekeeping

A4. World War II demonstrated that the founding fathers of the League of Nations had been idealistic in their rejection of French pressure to establish an International General Staff and associated standing military forces to underpin Article 10¹⁰ of the Covenant. This lack of an enforcement capability was considered a critical feature to be incorporated in the UNC. Indeed, the United States originally proposed a UN standing force of 20 divisions, 3800 aircraft, and 200 ships including aircraft carriers and submarines.¹¹ In parallel, the USSR made a proposal of similar scale. Nevertheless, the adoption of a veto policy in the UN Security Council prevented the evolution of an enforcement capacity. As a result, responses by the UN continue to depend upon the will of member nations to fund and participate in actions for which it provides the mandate. This 'Cold War paralysis' was rarely challenged, although in 1948, Trgyve Lie sought to establish a UN force at the disposal of the UN Secretary General (UNSG) – his proposal was ignored. Sir Brian Urquhart illustrated the frustration felt by many when he wrote:

⁵ To avert war the Covenant outlined three methods of conflict resolution: mediation, judicial settlement by a permanent Court of International Justice and 'enquiry' by the organs of the League.

⁶ In 1927, however, the League took a further step towards outlawing war by adopting a resolution that characterised 'wars of aggression' as international crimes.

⁷ Entitled '*General Treaty for the Renunciation of War*'; the original architect of the legislation was A Briand, the then French Foreign Minister. The pact was signed in Paris on 27 August 1928.

⁸ This concept should not be confused with the 'Stimson Doctrine' which denies recognition of territorial acquisition through conquest, armed force or treaty concluded under coercive conditions. This doctrine was applied by the USA in its response to the Soviet incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

⁹ It is generally accepted that the key functional weakness of the League Covenant was the absence of an explicit obligation for member states to respond collectively to an act of aggression. Devoid of any military capability to either threaten or impose coercive measures, the Covenant was fatally flawed.

¹⁰ This article required states to guarantee the territorial integrity and independence of every other state.

¹¹ G Arnold, '*World Government by Stealth*', MacMillan, 1997, P2.

*‘The ‘United’ in United Nations came from the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and referred to the nations united in war, not in peace. The permanent members of the Security Council with the power of veto were the leaders of the victorious wartime alliance, and the Charter assumed, with a stunning lack of political realism, that they would stay united in supervising, and if necessary enforcing, world peace’.*¹²

A5. Over time, and in response to the unforeseen circumstances of the Cold War, the UN has evolved a complex structure comprising 6 main ‘organs’, and a host of specialised agencies. The originally envisaged purpose of the UN is set down in UNC Article 1.¹³

A6. Despite the problematic evolution of the organisation, the UN was able throughout the Cold War, to moderate tension and aggression through mounting what came to be known as ‘Traditional’ or ‘Nordic Peacekeeping’¹⁴ operations. The fundamental principles of the ‘Traditional’ approach are shown in Table A.1.

- | |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Consent given by all parties to the dispute. ▪ The use of force restricted to self-defence only. ▪ Voluntary participation by national contingents ‘neutral’ in the context of the dispute. ▪ Impartiality, the peacekeeping force is not to become a party to the conflict. ▪ Day-to-day control of Peacekeeping is exercised by the UNSG. |
|---|

Table A.1 -The Fundamentals of Traditional Peacekeeping¹⁵

A7. Notable successes were recorded for this approach largely because consent of belligerent parties would be secured before a peacekeeping force deployed. However, certain features made the task easier to discharge.¹⁶ Few foresaw, least of all UN

¹² B Urquhart, *‘A Life in Peace and War’*, Clarendon, Oxford, P 93.

¹³ See Appendix 1.

¹⁴ The term ‘*peacekeeping*’ does not appear in the UNC and was first adopted following the deployment of a UN force to the Sinai in 1956 (UNEF) to secure a ceasefire between Egyptian and Israeli forces.

¹⁵ These principles are widely attributed to the then UNSG, Dag Hammarskjöld. It must be noted that these guidelines were not the result of an in depth analysis but rather a pragmatic delineation of what could prove effective on the ground and in the diplomatic context of the time. The mandates were derived from UNC Chapter VI, particularly UNC Articles 33 and 34; and UNC Chapter VII, particularly UNC Articles 39, 40, 41, 42 and 43.

¹⁶ Major nations held large standing forces, were prepared to release them and costs were rarely fully attributed to the UN as they could readily be absorbed by Cold War inflated defence budgets. Also, smaller nations sought participation, perceiving their involvement as a demonstration of high ideals and support for the UN. It should also be recognised that for some the financial rewards of participation were significant. Domestic sentiment favoured involvement as the casualty risk was generally low, and only modest force levels were required (The Congo (1960-1964) was an exception to this norm with a force of 20,000 deployed).

headquarters, that the stability of the Cold War era was to end abruptly and with serious implications for the roles, capacity, flexibility and reach demanded of the UN and those seeking to contribute forces.

Post Cold War - ‘Peace Enforcement’ and Evolution of the ‘Peace Support Operation Trinity of Principles’

A8. In the late 1980s the Cold War order was dissembled and the UN Security Council (UNSC) became increasingly willing to act. Consequently, it became abundantly clear that the ‘Traditional’ conceptions of peacekeeping were inadequate in the face of contemporary conflicts, and that UN capacity was poorly matched to the tasks it then faced.

A9. Such was the pace of growth that between 1989 and 1991 the UNSC mandated as many peacekeeping missions as it had done during the preceding 40 years. Successes in Namibia (UNTAG), Central America (ONUCA) and Iraq/Kuwait (UNIKOM) bolstered confidence, arguably unrealistically as the tasks conducted were far from complex. In parallel with efforts to accommodate the ever-expanding tasks placed upon the organisation, demands for coincident and radical reform came from many quarters. That the UN was judged unable to fulfil its destiny is a matter of record. Sir Brian Urquhart’s comment on the failure to reform the UN is typical of the observations made in the early 1990s:

‘Many of the Security Council’s decisions on conflict resolution at present lack either the legal and political strength to make them respected, or the means to implement them in an effective way. After a brief Cold War honeymoon, the UN is once again suffering from the inability to enforce its decisions in critical situations this time without the excuse of the Cold War. If this trend is not reversed, both the credibility and relevance of the organisation for maintaining peace and security will be in more and more doubt.’¹⁷

A10. The key word in Urquhart’s statement is ‘enforce’. In parallel with attempts to reform the UN, military doctrine responded to the more demanding remits now being placed upon PSO mission commanders, the concept of ‘enforcing the peace’ was born. Unfortunately, the habit of conceptualising peace support roles in terms of the chapter divisions of the UN Charter had become the norm. With no clear ‘*locus standi*’¹⁸ for ‘peace enforcement’, the expression ‘*Chapter VI and a half*’ was coined in an attempt to rationalize the stance adopted.

¹⁷ B Urquhart in - A Roberts & B Kingsbury, op cit, P 82.

¹⁸ A recognised or identifiable legal status.

A11. For UK forces, a vast body of learning could be drawn upon for the development of a credible and effective PSO doctrine. Counter Insurgency (COIN) Doctrine, derived during the period of decolonisation,¹⁹ provided an important framework upon which peacekeeping and counter terrorism experience could be built. The resultant peacekeeping doctrine saw the emergence of an increasingly compartmentalised conceptualisation of PSO.

A12. The contrast between the peace support roles and the principles evolved within each stage of development is at Table A.2.²⁰ The PSO ‘Trinity’ of consent, coupled with the principle of impartiality and a term that limits the use of force²¹ are present at each stage.

COIN (1950s)	Traditional Peacekeeping (1950s)	Wider Peacekeeping (1994)	PSO (1998)
Operational Role Conceptions			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Countering Insurgency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Peacekeeping 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Peacekeeping ▪ Wider Peacekeeping ▪ Peace Enforcement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Peacekeeping ▪ Peace Enforcement ▪ Conflict prevention ▪ Peacemaking ▪ Peace Building ▪ Humanitarian Operations
Required UN Mandate			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Chapter VI & VII Mandate needed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Chapter VI Mandate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Chapter VI / VI ½ Mandate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Chapter VI & VII Mandate

¹⁹ The decolonisation programme following World War II obliged UK forces to assist in the transfer of power and governance from colonial authorities to locally elected and staffed administrations. Malaya brought the emergence of a highly effective doctrine known as ‘*Counter Insurgency*’. Penned by Sir Robert Thompson, a Royal Air Force Officer, the doctrine’s prescient central tenet was that military forces alone could not provide an effective solution. He recognised that political, economic and social grievances had to be directly addressed by a complex of actors that included the military as an enabling body to produce the safe and secure environment in which political, economic and social reform could be achieved. Currently, UK Army Field Manual, Volume 1, Part 10 (July 2001), offers ‘*Strategic and Operational Guidelines for COIN Operations*’.

²⁰ For those wishing to trace the evolution of UK approaches in detail the relevant publications are: 1963, War Office Pamphlet 9800 & 9801, ‘*Keeping the Peace*’, 1988, Army Field Manual (AFM) Volume 5, Part 1, ‘*Peacekeeping Operations*’, 1994, AFM Volume 5, Part 2, ‘*Wider Peacekeeping*’. (‘*Wider Peacekeeping*’ was produced to meet an urgent need to guide operations at the tactical level in Bosnia and was only ever intended to be an interim publication. It introduced the expression ‘*Peace Support Operation*’ and its 3 subdivisions, namely: peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping and peace enforcement). 1998, JWP 3-50 (Ed 1) ‘*Peace Support Operations*’, which focused at the Operational level. Tested in the PSO engagements of the 90s the doctrine proved highly influential and was used, in concert with the views of partner nations, to inform the production of AJP3.4.1 NATO’s recent PSO publication.

²¹ The inherent right to use force in self-defence is well grounded in law and is readily understood. However, the range of terms (Minimum Force/Minimum Necessary Force/Restraint in the use of Force (NATO AJP-3.4.1 ‘*Peace Support Operations*’)) have been prone to wide interpretation.

COIN (1950s)	Traditional Peacekeeping (1950s)	Wider Peacekeeping (1994)	PSO (1998)
Principles Applied			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Political Primacy ▪ Political Aim ▪ Co-ordinated Government machinery ▪ Separating Insurgent from support ▪ Neutralising the Insurgent ▪ Popular Support ▪ Long-term post-insurgency planning 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Consent ▪ Use of force in self-defence ▪ Voluntary 'neutral' participation ▪ Impartiality, ▪ Control by UNSG 	<p>Consent Principles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Impartiality ▪ Minimum Force ▪ Legitimacy ▪ Credibility ▪ Mutual Respect ▪ Transparency <p>Management Principles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Coherence ▪ Cord & Liaison ▪ Flexibility ▪ Security ▪ Concentration of Force ▪ Freedom of movement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Consent ▪ Impartiality ▪ Minimum Necessary Force <p>+ The Principles of War:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Selection & maintenance of Aim ▪ Maintenance of Morale ▪ Offensive action ▪ Security ▪ Surprise ▪ Concentration of Force ▪ Economy of Effort ▪ Flexibility ▪ Co-operation ▪ Sustainability

Table A.2 - The Evolution of Peace Support Roles and Principles

A13. The 'Wider Peacekeeping' doctrine responded to the obvious volatility of the Balkans by acknowledging the need for a Peace Support Force (PSF) to act when consent was lost. However, adherence to strict impartiality and the use of minimum force were cast as essential underpinnings of consent.

A14. A central tenet of the doctrine modelled consent as a line or Rubicon²² dividing peacekeeping and 'Wider Peacekeeping' from peace enforcement. Crossing the Rubicon was to be avoided, and re-crossing to regain consent and impartiality was thought to be almost impossible. Once a PSO had transitioned to a peace enforcement stance, operations would be conducted: 'in accordance with standard military principles predicated on the identification of an enemy'.²³ The perception created,

²² General Sir Michael Rose is accredited with conferring upon this conceptual line the epithet 'Mogadishu Line'. During the 1990s, the term was widely used to infer the unplanned and unwelcome escalation of a mission from a peacekeeping to a peace enforcement role.

²³ C Dobie, 'A Concept for Post Cold-War Peacekeeping', Survival, Vol 36, No 3, Autumn 1994, P121.

therefore, was that once consent was lost military force would default to the use of war-fighting techniques²⁴ and, consequently, consent was unlikely to be regained.

A15. Criticised widely for the delineation of an apparent boundary between ‘*Wider Peacekeeping*’ and war-fighting the doctrine did perform a vital role informing beyond the military sphere on the risk of mission creep and uncontrolled escalation of a conflict beyond the combat potential of a PSF. Critically, ‘*Wider Peacekeeping*’ failed to offer doctrine to guide activity in the peace enforcement role; a role UK forces were obliged to perform.

A16. The first edition of JWP 3-50 sought to reassert the initiative and flexibility inherent in the Manoeuvrist Approach and Mission Command²⁵ as enshrined in British Defence Doctrine. This return to familiar and proven fundamentals of defence doctrine, arguably encapsulated by the Principles of War, was welcomed by many²⁶ as an important step forward. The Trinity of PSO Principles was retained, though effort was expended to make their interpretation less absolute. Importantly, the risk inherent in simplistic application of principles meant to guide, rather than constrain action, had been recognised.²⁷

The Need for a Contemporary Peace Support Operations Doctrine

A17. During 1995, as General Sir Rupert Smith adopted an increasingly robust stance in Bosnia (UNPROFOR), progress was made towards a more flexible approach to the ‘Grey Area’²⁸ between peacekeeping and peace enforcement utilising the full spectrum of war-fighting skills. This culminated with the move of the UN PSO in Bosnia to NATO, rather than UN command. In parallel calls for UN reform continued. The prevailing perception was that the UN was poorly matched to the tasks it faced. This led to the UNSC mandating action by regional security structures, effectively outsourcing peace support. The implications of this and recent events in Afghanistan and the Middle East, have created a fundamental shift in the strategic context of PSO. The shift demands recognition in the underlying doctrine, that revision is presented in this volume.

²⁴ Great care must be used to differentiate between the use of war-fighting skills and capacity to undertake combat operations, and the use of the expression when describing participation in an inter-state conflict. War-fighting skills are required within PSO.

²⁵ These terms are defined in the glossary. To appreciate more completely their context and use see JWP 0-01 ‘*British Defence Doctrine*’.

²⁶ A notable and vehement exception was commentary by the distinguished academic and author, Richard Connaughton. Having retired from the army as a Colonel in 1992 his position on PSO doctrine has altered little over the years. Essentially, he questions the centrality afforded to consent and impartiality. Most recently his book: ‘*Military Intervention & Peacekeeping*’ (See Bibliography) has re-stated his beliefs and called for an intellectually rigorous revision of the concepts and terminology used in PSO.

²⁷ A valuable feature of this acceptance has been the widespread adoption, throughout NATO and in other nations, of doctrine influenced by the UK approach to PSO. Developing UN PSO doctrine has also been subject to this influence. The obvious operational benefits that may accrue in any PSO need no explanation.

²⁸ Many commentators have vehemently criticised the inadequacy of doctrinal guidance in *Grey Area Operations*.

A18. This edition of JWP 3-50 identifies the defining characteristic of PSO as the strategic intent that is sought. Uniquely, in PSO the strategic intention is to resolve conflict, through a process of long-term engagement by a complex of actors. In war, deliberate, or focused intervention, the intention is less ambitious focusing on short or near term objectives. Despite these differences of intent, the application of military power in all instances can be soundly guided by adherence to war-fighting doctrine. However, this doctrine must be modified if PSO are to achieve the outcome sought.

SECTION II – REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS - COLLECTIVE SECURITY BY PROXY

‘When bad men combine, the good must associate; else they will fall, one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible struggle.’²⁹

A19. UNC Article 52 embeds a reliance upon regional agencies as a means of ensuring peace and security so long as those agencies’ actions remain consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN. Regional security organisations have reacted to the challenges of the 1990s in a number of ways. Some have expanded whilst others have ceased to exist. The Organisation for African Unity (now re-titled African Union (AU) sanctioned intervention in Liberia by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in particular its military arm, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). This arguably set the trend towards increasing acceptance³⁰ of the role to be played by regional organisations, as did the ceding of UN authority in Bosnia to NATO. The list of potential peace and security ‘actors’ at the regional level is extensive. Under the Organisation of American States (OAS) is the Andean Group, the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) and the Central American Common Market (CACM). In Europe (and beyond if required) is NATO, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the EU, and perhaps the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In Africa,³¹ under the African Union (AU) is ECOWAS,³² the East African Community (EAC) and the South African Development Community (SADC). Finally, in Asia is the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) although it as yet has no effective military capability,³³ and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). It

²⁹ E Burke, *‘Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents’*, 1770.

³⁰ Whilst the UN supported the action, it remained passive in the management of the campaign.

³¹ The relative deficiency of extensive and capable PSO structures in Asia and Africa compared with other regions of the world is notable.

³² The ECOWAS Secretariat has recently established an early warning system with a regional observation and monitoring centre, supported by four zoned offices to monitor and warn of impending conflict.

³³ ASEAN has a number of fora that address disputes between member states such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the South China Sea Security Dialogue (SCSSD), however, resistance to a coherent ASEAN policy on conflict management remains.

is also worth noting that the British Commonwealth³⁴ has the potential to span the north/south divide.

A20. Whilst the list is impressive, there is an undeniable variation in the military capabilities fielded by each body. This variation affects the tasks that can realistically be assigned to the groups and hence the extent to which each can credibly assist the UN. In assessing the potential value of regional solutions, we must retain a sharp focus on capabilities, and avoid projecting the capacity of long-standing military alliances onto bodies whose lineage and intended role are quite different.

NATO

A21. NATO has often been cited as the model upon which a peace and security architecture should be based, however, slavish acceptance of a NATO model and its associated doctrine would be both impractical and undesirable. NATO can offer lessons of value derived from many years of active military integration and co-operation. However, few organisations share its heritage as a military alliance or its *raison d'être*. There are, therefore, major limitations to the crossover of ideas that can realistically be achieved.

A22. At the tactical and operational level, NATO doctrine and operating procedures offer much of value. However, the reality of contemporary regional force structures,³⁵ impose important restrictions upon the extent to which NATO procedures and practices can safely be applied. A more realistic approach would exploit the lessons learnt by NATO,³⁶ applying them pragmatically to accommodate and exploit the diverse capabilities inherent in a multinational PSF.

Emerging European Security Capacity

A23. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) set down a framework of institutions and resource agreements that will implement a European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Article 17 (1) of the Treaty states:

³⁴ A key advantage of the Commonwealth is its diverse membership spanning developed and developing nations across the globe. Through enabling diplomatic exchanges and action outside the more traditional channels the Commonwealth has been an important vehicle in addressing problem in inter alia: Antigua, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Zanzibar, Lesotho, Swaziland, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe. An emphasis on sound governance and standards of behaviour has contributed to conflict prevention with the threat or act of expulsion from the Commonwealth backing up the diplomatic process and peer group review.

³⁵ Interoperability limitations based upon variations in: Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3 I), casualty tolerance, Rules of Engagement (ROE), weapons commonality, and logistical capacity. Decades of development have allowed the evolution of common NATO doctrine and standards that serve to surmount the problems associated with fielding a composite force.

³⁶ It must also be recognised that NATO is itself evolving. Reforming NATO to accommodate expansion and at the same time match a changing mission is a complex process that has many risks.

‘The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to security of the union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy...which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide.’³⁷

A24. Member states have committed to enabling the EU to field, at 60 days notice, a self sustaining force of 50,000 to 60,000 personnel. The tasks assigned to this force are defined by TEU Article 17 (2) and have come to be known as the ‘*Petersberg Tasks*.’³⁸ However, Article 17 (2) is open to very wide interpretation and nations have varying views on the final clause of Article 17(2), which states:

‘Questions referred to in this article shall include: Humanitarian and rescue tasks; Peacekeeping Tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including, peacemaking.’³⁹

A25. Notably absent from this listing is conflict prevention, although reference to common defence is made in Article 17 (1) (see above). It seems unlikely that the ambiguity inherent in the term ‘*Petersberg Tasks*’ will be resolved. Indeed, the ambiguity may prove advantageous in the long-term. For the EU military staffs attempting to define force capabilities the uncertainty does, however, pose considerable challenges.

A26. It seems likely that they must assume that any form of military operation, except for collective territorial defence, could be seen as falling under the Petersberg mantle. Table A.3 contrasts the purpose and characteristics of the EU and NATO.

NATO	EU
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Scope – Security & Defence ▪ Authority of member states ▪ Often perceived as US led ▪ Developed C³ I and assigned forces ▪ Common Defence Focus ▪ Not reliant on others for military capability to meet assigned tasks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Scope –Range that includes CFSP ▪ Authority in its own right ▪ No dominant nation leading ▪ No established C³ I or forces assigned ▪ Petersberg Tasks at core of CFSP ▪ Reliant on external military capability to meet assigned tasks

Table A.3 - Comparison of NATO and EU Purpose and Characteristics

A27. The EU is developing an organisational capacity and capabilities that will permit early warning, conflict prevention, and if necessary the deployment of a PSF. The Military Committee (EUMC), the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis

³⁷ TEU Article 17 (1).

³⁸ These tasks were announced in the ‘Petersberg Declaration’ (a follow on to the June 1992 WEU Ministerial Meeting in Bonn) and were so named after the Conference venue in a suburb of Bonn.

³⁹ Para 2 TEU Article 17 (2).

Management (CIVCOM) and the Joint Civilian Military Situation Centre in the EU Council Secretariat are critical assets in enabling this. It is also worth noting that the EU currently runs the largest humanitarian, development and technical assistance programme in the world. These programmes are taken forward with conditions that demand certain standards in human rights, minority protection, and governance.

The Reality of Regional Solutions

A28. It will be some time before NATO is matched in capacity by any other regional security grouping. No comparable capacity exists elsewhere, although in the context of many PSO missions other regional groupings are more than able to meet mission requirements. Continued international sponsorship of training and equipment programmes will improve regional capacity and enhance overall PSO capacity.

A29. In recent years, default to unilateral NATO action has received mixed reaction amongst the international community. Some saw events in Kosovo as illustrative of the flexibility that regional responses can offer, whilst others regarded the action as having set a dangerous precedent undermining the authority and credibility of the UN. Judged on the basis of its competence to implement and uphold a treaty or charter derived mandate, NATO capacity has been proven. NATO PSO doctrine has reached an advanced stage of evolution,⁴⁰ and many assigned national force elements have undergone extensive interoperability training as well as amassing considerable field experience. Looking more widely, the viability of regional solutions is undoubtedly set to improve, however, the efficacy and operational viability of these arrangements remains inconsistent.

Reforming the United Nations

A30. In Jun 1992, Boutros Boutros - Ghali published ‘*An Agenda for Peace*’,⁴¹ and called for an entirely new approach to the provision of forces to underwrite peace and security. Specifically, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, was called upon to prepare:

‘An analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the UN for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peacekeeping.’⁴²

A31. This tasking came amid great enthusiasm for what then seemed possible, namely the realisation of the intended aims of the UN, with the organisation emerging as a natural and able guardian of peace and security. After its publication, and while the UN bureaucracy debated the manner and extent of adopting the ‘*Agenda for*

⁴⁰ AJP-3.4.1 Edition 1 published August 2001.

⁴¹ Then UN Secretary General (UNSG) Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘*Agenda for Peace*’, United Nations, New York, 1992.

⁴² Boutros-Boutros Ghali: ‘*An Agenda for Peace*’, UN Document A/47/277-S/S24111, 17 Jun 92.

Peace, ethnic and religious conflict became rife. In writing ‘*Agenda for Peace*’, the UNSG was originally asked to consider preventative diplomacy,⁴³ peacemaking,⁴⁴ and peacekeeping.⁴⁵ However, he chose to add a new concept – peace building.⁴⁶

A32. Unfortunately, the instability of the period and power politics allowed little time for reflection, and the spate of reporting continued unabated. Faced with the less than complete support of nations in the southern hemisphere many of the reports sought to resolve the conflicting demands of nations keen to see an expansion of UN development activity with calls for a more robust collective security architecture. Encouragingly, many of these additional studies drew upon the practical experiences of PSO, as well as the lessons of diplomacy. With each operation, the practical detail embodied in study recommendations was refined. Unfortunately, progress toward resolving political division was incomplete. Awareness of this reality underpinned the sponsorship, composition, and remit of a major reform initiative– ‘*The Brahimi Report*’.⁴⁷

A33. Initial enthusiasm for the Brahimi report’s recommendations was followed by a period of criticism from many nations in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Fortunately, sustained diplomatic effort has assuaged some fears, and implementation of the report’s wide reaching recommendations continues. Encouragingly, important reforms within the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) have rapidly become reality.

A34. The capacity of the UN to make informed and timely decisions has been enhanced. Perhaps more importantly, states now share in a more realistic appreciation of the rights and obligations conferred by membership of the world body. Winston Churchill, one of the UN’s founding fathers, offers an insight that should perhaps guide us in our future attempts to underwrite peace and stability:

‘Another phase looms before us, in which alliance will once more be tested and in which its formidable virtues may be to preserve Peace and Freedom.

The future is unknowable but the past should give us hope.’⁴⁸

⁴³ In ‘*Agenda for Peace*’ preventive diplomacy is defined as ‘*action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur*’.

⁴⁴ In ‘*Agenda for Peace*’ peacemaking is defined as ‘*action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the UNC*’.

⁴⁵ In ‘*Agenda for Peace*’ peacekeeping is defined as ‘*the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well*’.

⁴⁶ In ‘*Agenda for Peace*’ peace building is defined as ‘*action to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict*’.

⁴⁷ This report has been the subject of much detailed comment. The bibliography and reading list at the end of this publication offers several important sources on the report.

⁴⁸ W S Churchill, ‘*A History of the English Speaking Peoples*’, Cassell, London, 1999, P614.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A – THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

A1.1. The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 1945, in San Francisco, at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, and came into force on 24 October 1945. The Statute of the International Court of Justice is an integral part of the Charter.

A1.2. Amendments to Articles 23, 27 and 61 of the Charter were adopted by the General Assembly on 17 December 1963 and came into force on 31 August 1965. A further amendment to Article 61 was adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1971, and came into force on 24 September 1973. An amendment to Article 109, adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1965 came into force on 12 June 1968.

A1.3. The amendment to Article 23 enlarges the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen. The amended Article 27 provides that decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven) and on all other matters by an affirmative vote of nine members (formerly seven), including the concurring votes of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

A1.4. The amendment to Article 61, which entered into force on 31 August 1965, enlarged the membership of the Economic and Social Council from eighteen to twenty-seven. The subsequent amendment to that Article, which entered into force on 24 September 1973, further increased the membership of the Council from twenty-seven to fifty-four.

A1.5. The amendment to Article 109, which relates to the first paragraph of that Article, provides that a General Conference of Member States for the purpose of reviewing the Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any nine members (formerly seven) of the Security Council. Paragraph 3 of Article 109, which deals with the consideration of a possible review conference during the tenth regular session of the General Assembly, has been retained in its original form in its reference to a ‘vote, of any seven members of the Security Council’, the paragraph having been acted upon in 1955 by the General Assembly, at its tenth regular session, and by the Security Council.

CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and

to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and

to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS

to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and

to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and

to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

CHAPTER I

Purposes and Principles

Article 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

CHAPTER II

Membership

Article 3

The original Members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco, or having previously signed the Declaration by United Nations of 1 January 1942, sign the present Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110.

Article 4

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.
2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 5

A Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council.

Article 6

A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

CHAPTER III**Organs****Article 7**

1. There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and Secretariat.
2. Each subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the present Charter.

Article 8

The United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs.

CHAPTER IV**THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY****Composition****Article 9**

1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the Members of the United Nations.

2. Each Member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly.

Functions and Powers

Article 10

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 11

1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Council or to both.
2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.
3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.
4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10.

Article 12

1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.
2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of

international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the Members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.

Article 13

1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of:

a. Promoting international co-operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification;

b. Promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

2. The further responsibilities, functions and powers of the General Assembly with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 1(b) above are set forth in Chapters IX and X.

Article 14

Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

Article 15

1. The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security.

2. The General Assembly shall receive and consider reports from the other organs of the United Nations.

Article 16

The General Assembly shall perform such functions with respect to the international trusteeship system as are assigned to it under Chapters XII and XIII, including the approval of the trusteeship agreements for areas not designated as strategic.

Article 17

1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization.
2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.
3. The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned.

Voting**Article 18**

1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council, the election of the members of the Economic and Social Council the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph 1(c) of Article 86, the admission of new Members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of Members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.
3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Article 19

A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for

the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.

Procedure

Article 20

The General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require. Special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the Members of the United Nations.

Article 21

The General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its President for each session.

Article 22

The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

CHAPTER V

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Composition

Article 23

1. The Security Council shall consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect ten other Members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from eleven to fifteen, two of the four

additional members shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

Functions and Powers

Article 24

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.
3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

Article 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

Article 26

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United-Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

Voting

Article 27

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members, provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

Procedure

Article 28

1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the Organization.
2. The Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires, be represented by a member of the government or by some other specially designated representative.
3. The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the Organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work.

Article 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 30

The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

Article 31

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected.

Article 32

Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down

such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations.

CHAPTER VI

PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

CHAPTER VII

ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to

the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

CHAPTER VIII

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of

local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

CHAPTER IX

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CO-OPERATION

Article 55

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote:

- a. Higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development;
- b. Solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation; and
- c. Universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Article 56

All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Article 57

1. The various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 63.
2. Such agencies thus brought into relationship with the United Nations are hereinafter referred to as specialized agencies.

Article 58

The Organization shall make recommendations for the co-ordination of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies.

Article 59

The Organization shall, where appropriate, initiate negotiations among the states concerned for the creation of any new specialized agencies required for the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Article 60

Responsibility for the discharge of the functions of the Organization set forth in this Chapter shall be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in the Economic and Social Council, which shall have for this purpose the powers set forth in Chapter X.

CHAPTER X

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Composition

Article 61

1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of fifty-four Members of the United Nations elected by the General Assembly.
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council shall be elected each year for a term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate re-election.
3. At the first election after the increase in the membership of the Economic and Social Council from twenty-seven to fifty-four members, in addition to the members elected in place of the nine members whose term of office expires at the end of that year, twenty-seven additional members shall be elected. Of these twenty-seven additional members, the term of office of nine members so elected shall expire at the end of one year, and of nine other members at the end of two years, in accordance with arrangements made by the General Assembly.
4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative.

Functions and Powers

Article 62

1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly to the Members of the United Nations, and to the specialized agencies concerned.
2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.
3. It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with respect to matters falling within its competence.
4. It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United Nations, international conferences on matters falling within its competence.

Article 63

1. The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with any of the agencies referred to in Article 57, defining the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations. Such agreements shall be subject to approval by the General Assembly.
2. It may co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations.

Article 64

1. The Economic and Social Council may take appropriate steps to obtain regular reports from the specialized agencies. It may make arrangements with the Members of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies to obtain reports on the steps taken to give effect to its own recommendations and to recommendations on matters falling within its competence made by the General Assembly.
2. It may communicate its observations on these reports to the General Assembly.

Article 65

The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request.

Article 66

1. The Economic and Social Council shall perform such functions as fall within its competence in connection with the carrying out of the recommendations of the General Assembly.
2. It may, with the approval of the General Assembly, perform services at the request of Members of the United Nations and at the request of specialized agencies.
3. It shall perform such other functions as are specified elsewhere in the present Charter or as may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.

Voting**Article 67**

1. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Economic and Social Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Procedure

Article 68

The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions.

Article 69

The Economic and Social Council shall invite any Member of the United Nations to participate, without vote, in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that Member.

Article 70

The Economic and Social Council may make arrangements for representatives of the specialized agencies to participate, without vote, in its deliberations and in those of the commissions established by it, and for its representatives to participate in the deliberations of the specialized agencies.

Article 71

The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned.

Article 72

1. The Economic and Social Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.
2. The Economic and Social Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.

CHAPTER XI

DECLARATION REGARDING NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES

Article 73

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:

- a. To ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;
- b. To develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;
- c. To further international peace and security;
- d. To promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to co-operate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and
- e. To transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.

Article 74

Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which this Chapter applies, no less than in respect of their metropolitan areas, must be based on the general principle of good-neighbourliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters.

CHAPTER XII

INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM

Article 75

The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed there-under by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territories.

Article 76

The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:

- a. To further international peace and security;
- b. To promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
- c. To encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and
- d. To ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.

Article 77

1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements:
 - a. Territories now held under mandate;

- b. Territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; and
- c. Territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

Article 78

The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.

Article 79

The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a Member of the United Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 85.

Article 80

1. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.

2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77.

Article 81

The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or more states or the Organization itself.

Article 82

There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43.

Article 83

1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council.
2. The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of each strategic area.
3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and without prejudice to security considerations, avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political, economic, social, and educational matters in the strategic areas.

Article 84

It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for local defence and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.

Article 85

1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.
2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.

CHAPTER XIII

THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

Composition

Article 86

1. The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following Members of the United Nations:
 - a. Those Members administering trust territories;
 - b. Such of those Members mentioned by name in Article 23 as are not administering trust territories; and
 - c. As many other Members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those Members of the United Nations which administer trust territories and those which do not.
2. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall designate one specially qualified person to represent it therein.

Functions and Power

Article 87

The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may:

- a. Consider reports submitted by the administering authority;
- b. Accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority;
- c. Provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority; and
- c. Take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.

Article 88

The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administering authority for each trust territory within the competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual report to the General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire.

Voting**Article 89**

1. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Trusteeship Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Procedure**Article 90**

1. The Trusteeship Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.
2. The Trusteeship Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.

Article 91

The Trusteeship Council shall, when appropriate, avail itself of the assistance of the Economic and Social Council and of the specialized agencies in regard to matters with which they are respectively concerned.

CHAPTER XIV**THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE****Article 92**

The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present Charter.

Article 93

1. All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 94

1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.

Article 95

Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of the United Nations from entrusting the solution of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the future.

Article 96

1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.
2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.

CHAPTER XV**THE SECRETARIAT****Article 97**

The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the Organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the Organization.

Article 98

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.

Article 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 100

1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.
2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 101

1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly.
2. Appropriate staffs shall be permanently assigned to the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and, as required, to other organs of the United Nations. These staffs shall form a part of the Secretariat.
3. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

CHAPTER XVI

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Article 102

1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.
2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.

Article 103

In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.

Article 104

The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes.

Article 105

1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.
2. Representatives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization.
3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may propose conventions to the Members of the United Nations for this purpose.

CHAPTER XVII

TRANSITIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Article 106

Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, 30 October 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that Declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other Members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

Article 107

Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.

CHAPTER XVIII

AMENDMENTS

Article 108

Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

Article 109

1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any nine members of the Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference.

2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly following the coming unto force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council.

CHAPTER XIX

RATIFICATION AND SIGNATURE

Article 110

1. The present Charter shall be ratified by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

2. The ratifications shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America, which shall notify all the signatory states of each deposit as well as the Secretary-General of the Organization when he has been appointed.

3. The present Charter shall come into force upon the deposit of ratifications by the Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, and by a majority of the other signatory states. A protocol of the ratifications deposited shall thereupon be drawn up by the Government of the United States of America which shall communicate copies thereof to all the signatory states.

4. The states signatory to the present Charter which ratify it after it has come into force will become original Members of the United Nations on the date of the deposit of their respective ratifications.

Article 111

The present Charter, of which the Chinese, French, Russian, English, and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatory states.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the representatives of the Governments of the United Nations have signed the present Charter.

DONE at the city of San Francisco the twenty-sixth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and forty-five.

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ANNEX B – UNDERSTANDING KEY NON-GOVERNMENTAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS, UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTS’ DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

SECTION I – UNDERSTANDING THE ACTOR COMPLEX

B1. Experience has shown that the context of Peace Support Operations (PSO) can vary markedly. A common feature, however, is the complex of actors engaged in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) and beyond. In addition to the indigenous population, and the parties to the conflict, multinational military forces find themselves operating alongside the media, diplomats, international organisations (IOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and aid workers.¹ This disparate complex must increasingly operate in a co-ordinated and complementary style, ideally orchestrated by a Special Representative (SR) of the [United Nations (UN)] Secretary General (SRSG) or European Union, Head of Mission (HoM) or Peace Support Force (PSF) Commander. Unfortunately, stereotypical images, over zealous idealism, bigotry, and plain ignorance have, individually or collectively, often hindered or prevented fully effective complementary activities. Individual elements in the complex have regarded each other with suspicion, disdain, envy and, at times, sheer contempt. As a result, groupings of like-minded actors have tended to function independently, and in consequence less efficiently than may have been possible had efforts to identify a unifying focus for complementary planning been successful.

B2. Over time, actor groupings have also developed an exclusive language that has institutionalised the unhelpful division. The situation has been further compounded by a failure to rationalise terms and acronyms, or to seek rigour in their application in military doctrine, advocacy publications, policy statements, diplomacy, debate, or the literature of academe. Planning exercises that bring together the actor complex can do much to improve the situation, and it should be clear to all that exercises at every level can only truly claim to be realistic if they encompass and accommodate the full range of actors demanded by the PSO approach.

B3. This chapter seeks to offer PSF commanders and their civil equivalents an insight into the key NGOs and IOs, including the UN system. An outline of the key United Kingdom government departments is included. Given their importance in many operations, US government agencies’ roles and responsibilities are also

¹ National governments, private individuals, religious groups, special interest groups or foundations may sponsor these workers.

described. It is hoped that this insight will improve awareness and understanding, and hence the prospects for complementary action in the future.

SECTION II – NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

B4. Description. The UN formally recognises certain private associations as a result of their consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The UN collectively refers to these associations as NGOs. In common usage, however, the term is applied to any private body engaged in humanitarian/charitable activities, whether or not they maintain UN consultative status. In recent decades there has been an enormous increase in the number and scale of NGOs. At one extreme the body may resemble a multinational corporation, with significant budgets, international presence and considerable diplomatic leverage. At the other end of the scale local NGOs may pursue a narrow agenda with a low budget and limited means.

B5. Principles and Values. NGOs are often highly motivated, displaying a vocational drive and belief in the causes championed by their donors. Increasingly, they are willing to concede that co-ordination is necessary in pursuit of high-level aims. Caution over partiality and association with a PSF remains a very real and understandable issue. Military personnel must understand the necessity for NGOs to defer the values their donors expect them to be championing. This ‘donor sentiment’ demands that NGOs seek effective solutions in the most pressing of circumstances; including many instances where sympathetic military forces are absent. NGOs are first and foremost accountable to their beneficiaries ensuring that the effects of their actions do benefit those that they are trying to help. Secondly, NGOs are accountable to their benefactors, be they individuals or national donors, ensuring that funds donated are spent effectively and appropriately. Finally NGOs are accountable to their trustees ensuring that their actions remain true to their organisation’s values.

B6. Liaison and Understanding. Closer liaison through Civil Military Operations Centres (CMOC) and Humanitarian Information Centres (HICs) and information pooling has repeatedly proved that an acceptable degree of complementary activity can be achieved whilst adhering to the humanitarian principles that must guide NGO activity. Most NGOs have now become signatories to the ‘Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief’. This voluntary code lays down principles of conduct for NGOs and describes how host governments, donor governments and IOs should shape the working environment to deliver humanitarian assistance (HA). It is important that military personnel understand the true basis of these humanitarian principles and the rationale for their adoption. To this end, Annex 1C contains extracts from the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs. In addition to guiding the actions of NGOs the code also describes the ‘working environment’ that humanitarian actors would like to see created by donor governments, host

governments, and IOs. Annex 1D contains extracts from an operational example of a voluntary NGO Code of Conduct adopted in Sierra Leone. Stereotypical imagery and a lack of mutual respect often underpin antagonism between military forces and the NGO community. To this end the UN has published ‘Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies’.² Transparency over PSO campaign objectives, developing NGO/Military contact and understanding, as well as the conjoint approach to planning promoted in PSO offers the prospect of the actor complex working with greater harmony towards shared goals.

B7. Organisation. Most NGOs will operate within a territory using a recognisable and flat command and control (C2) structure based upon a Country Director, supported by a small number of deputies and beneath that level, field personnel bring policies and programmes into effect.

SECTION III – WORKING WITH THE HUMANITARIAN SECTOR

Standards and Evaluations

B8. The rapid growth in the number of NGOs and past criticism of NGO actions have led to an increase in professionalism within the humanitarian sector. This has been manifested by an increasing focus on standards and on accountability.

B9. The most well known set of standards is the **SPHERE** standards. These standards provide a widely accepted set of universal minimum standards in core areas of humanitarian assistance (HA) and aim to improve both the quality and the accountability of assistance. The cornerstone of the standards is the ‘Humanitarian Charter’,³ which describes the core principles that govern humanitarian action. The standards themselves are broken down into 5 sectors: water & sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter & site planning and finally health services.

B10. PSF personnel involved in humanitarian activities should be familiar with the SPHERE standards⁴ and apply them as appropriate, taking into account the local situation. Although The SPHERE project has been adopted by most NGOs there is some criticism of them, and consequently some NGOs refer instead to the ‘Quality Project’. This project provides tools to assist with the 3 stages of a project: initial diagnosis and context analysis, design and implementation and evaluation and learning.

² Published in March 2003. Available from the ReliefWeb library www.reliefweb.int.

³ The Charter is based upon the ICRC Code of Conduct (See Appendix 1B), international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and refugee law.

⁴ The SPHERE standards can be accessed and downloaded directly from the Internet via their website at www.sphereproject.org.

B11. All major NGOs are now subject to evaluations both during and on concluding projects, and many have their own lessons identified processes. Evaluations seek to measure the effectiveness of HA drawing on relevant minimum standards and the views of the beneficiaries. External assessors conduct many evaluations and the results are open to public scrutiny. Encouragingly, lessons are increasingly shared amongst NGOs enabling them to learn from each other's experiences. Participation in the lessons learned process by military personnel should be of mutual benefit in improving understanding and procedures.

Potential Areas of Discord

B12. Discord between the military and humanitarian community is usually focused on three areas, the need to maintain 'humanitarian space', military provision of humanitarian assistance and the use of language.

B13. **Humanitarian Space.** Conceptually humanitarian space can be thought of as the distinction between politically motivated actions to bring conflict to an end, and apolitical humanitarian assistance to ameliorate the effects of conflict. The maintenance of this distinction is essential for humanitarian agencies; it is this distinction that assures their independence and allows them access throughout the conflict zone, enabling them to distribute relief on the basis of need (impartiality). This distinction is also a key element in the security of their staff. Where humanitarian space becomes compromised the effectiveness of humanitarian agencies is reduced and their staff endangered. In the field, the need to maintain this distinctiveness leads NGOs to consider carefully the extent to which perceptions of their relationship with the military can undermine their mission. It is these considerations that underpin NGOs hesitancy over the use of military facilities, transport, logistics and escorts, or about associating too closely with the military at the operational and strategic level.

B14. **Humanitarian Assistance.** The area that causes NGOs the most concern, however, is the perceived move by many nations' armed forces towards direct involvement in the provision of humanitarian relief. Where humanitarian resources are clearly overwhelmed, it is accepted that the use of the military may be appropriate. In these 'exceptional circumstances' the military should act in support of the most appropriate humanitarian agency and should hand over responsibility as soon as suitable humanitarian resources are available. However, many humanitarian actors see the routine involvement of military forces in humanitarian activity as inappropriate. The NGOs recognise the rationale behind military 'hearts and minds' programmes, but object vehemently to these being in anyway described as 'humanitarian'.

B15. **Use of Language.** The use, or misuse, of humanitarian language can cause considerable friction between military and humanitarian actors. The majority of misunderstandings hinge around the following words:

a. **Humanitarian.** There is no common definition of ‘humanitarian’ amongst the NGO community however most would agree that humanitarian action is motivated by a moral concern for other human beings on the basis of a common humanity. It is not subject to political interests or military objectives and can only be conducted in accordance with the principles of impartiality and universality. Clearly military actions are invariably in pursuit of military and political objectives and will rarely be conducted fully in accordance with humanitarian principles. The use of terms such as humanitarian interventions to describe military interventions or humanitarian tasks (conducted to achieve military objectives) therefore directly contradict the understanding of NGOs and will inevitably lead to friction.

b. **Impartiality.** Impartiality is a word used by both military and NGOs. For the military, impartiality is with respect to the mandate; the military interpret and apply the mandate⁵ rather like a football referee, impartially, imposing the rules of the game. NGOs, on the other hand, are impartial with respect to the absolute humanitarian needs of the civilians and the non-combatants that they seek to assist; they will distribute relief supplies impartially with respect to the greatest need. Impartiality is thus highly subjective. Its use in earlier versions of PSO doctrine proved highly contentious and operationally difficult to achieve. Whilst the military may be applying the mandate impartially, that application may well appear partial to one or other party. Similarly, whilst NGOs may be distributing relief supplies impartially, and according to need, to a community that does not receive aid that distribution may appear decidedly partial.

c. **Security.** Military and NGOs are both concerned about security and both use the term. The intended meanings frequently differ. The military tend to view security from a relatively narrow perspective equating it to the absence, presence or level of violence. The provision of a secure environment therefore relates to a reduction in levels of violence against priorities set, usually, by the military. NGOs view security from a broader perspective that takes account of an individual’s immediate physical security as well as their longer-term situation, their vulnerability to future conflict or disaster, their access to food and a livelihood, and the sanctity of their fundamental human rights. When dealing with NGOs, it is therefore more productive, and important, if agreement can be reached on where responsibility for the broader facets of security actually lie.

⁵ NGOs would be swift to highlight the fact that our mandates are invariably born of a political process and are therefore inherently partial.

Complementary Working

B16. It has already been stated that working in a complementary manner is perceived as a realistic goal in both the humanitarian and military sectors. The ideas offered below seek to reduce discord between the military and humanitarian sector and thus enhance the mutual benefits of civil/military interaction:

a. **Focus on the Best.** The number of NGOs has increased dramatically, and in consequence it is impossible to deal with them all. Commanders at all levels must learn to differentiate between the various agencies, focusing on the key organisations and the individuals of influence within them. Do not overlook local organisations; they will frequently have more experience and knowledge than external organisations. The following questions may assist:

- (1) Does the organisation have a clear mandate and purpose?
- (2) Are their objectives clear?
- (3) What experience do they have in the region and how long have they been operating there?

b. **Share Information.** Get to know the key players, personal contact is critical and will permit considerably more manoeuvrist solutions than might otherwise be the case. Be as open with information as possible, and be transparent. Recognise that good NGOs can be trusted with sensitive information; in certain circumstances they may have better local knowledge than that available to the military commander. Understand that experienced NGO staff, and their parenting HQs appreciate the need for OPSEC. At all times, humanitarian actor security depends upon Intelligence and OPSEC; they have no other means of defence. Most NGO staff are highly qualified and experienced. They are experts in their field and often possess years of region specific knowledge. Be prepared to listen to them and recognise that differing operational cultures prevail.

c. **Respect their Independence.** Humanitarians are rightly, and at times fiercely, independent. They are not under command; attempts to dominate or command them will usually be counter-productive. Recognise and accept the difference between military and NGO objectives, but work to identify those high level objectives upon which complementary activity must be based. Respect and maintain humanitarian space.

B17. **Understand their Methods.** For humanitarian actors the process by which objectives are achieved matter as much as the end result. Methods may appear slow and ineffective. However, they will be designed to build local skills and empower local people to take responsibility for themselves. They will also attempt to make use

of local staff that are often highly experienced⁶ and capable individuals. Do not always assume that expatriate staffs, particularly western ones, are in charge.

SECTION IV – HUMANITARIAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

B18. Directory. Whilst a full directory of NGOs is beyond the scope of this publication, an insight into the purpose and structure of selected major agencies is given below:

AFRICARE

B19. AFRICARE focuses its activity on improving the quality of life in the rural regions of Africa. Projects commonly deliver: agricultural reform, water resource development, environmental management, health reform and humanitarian relief. Funding is derived from Canada, Switzerland, Guinea, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, UK, USA, ZAMBIA, and Zimbabwe. Additional funding also comes from the African Development Bank, European Union (EU) development funds, UN agencies, and private donors.

Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere

B20. Co-operative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) was originally established to aid victims of World War 2 and the subsequent conflicts in Asia. CARE International, based in Brussels, is a confederation of 11 national CARE partners that seek to assist the developing world's poor in achieving self-sustaining social and economic well-being. It co-operates closely with UN, national governments, and NGOs in running a wide range of programmes from AIDS awareness to forest management and health reform. CARE insists upon written general agreement with host governments where it establishes a presence. This general agreement is then augmented by project specific agreements.

Catholic Relief Services

B21. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) was founded in 1943 by Catholic Bishops in the United States, initially to provide aid to refugees during World War II. CRS now manages development projects worldwide responding to disasters, assisting refugees, distributing humanitarian aid, and supporting development programmes.

⁶ Some caution is wise when dealing with recently arrived agencies or the more inexperienced. In these cases staff may not have been adequately vetted in terms of competence or loyalties. In some cases they may retain an allegiance to a particular party to the conflict.

Concern Worldwide Limited

B22. Founded in response to the 1968 Biafran famine the organisation seeks to feed the hungry and improve the conditions of those threatened by natural or man made disasters. Concern is experienced in assessing relief needs, resource distribution, and training of local personnel in agricultural, hygiene, public health, water and sanitation skills. Headquarters of the organisation is in Dublin, Ireland, and funding is derived from the governments of: France, USA, UK, and Tanzania as well as the EU, and UN.

International Medical Corps

B23. International Medical Corps (IMC) was established in 1984 to address the medical care needs of the Afghan population. IMC HQ is in Los Angeles, and supports 5 regional offices in Brussels, London, Nairobi, Split, and Windhoek. Its volunteer work force of physicians and medical staff provide emergency medical care, and training in regions where health care and resources are scarce, and notably, where other organisations refuse to operate. Through reporting and advocacy action IMC also raises awareness of abuse and need. A key focus in IMC action is enabling self-sufficiency and avoidance of protracted dependency on external assistance. IMC is funded by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United States Agency for International Development/ Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA), World Health Organisation (WHO), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the EU, UK government, the Soros Humanitarian Foundation, and the Swedish International Development Authority.

International Rescue Committee

B24. Founded in 1933, to assist with the relocation of those fleeing from Nazi oppression the International Rescue Committee (IRC) now seeks to help victims of racial, ethnic or political oppression, as well as those displaced by conflict whether within borders or across national boundaries. IRC personnel can provide refugee relief services and training for income generating and self-reliance projects. As a defence against diseases, epidemics, and malnutrition, IRC trains health educators, midwives, immunisation teams, paramedics, and nursing assistants. IRC engagement with the international community encompasses the UN, national governments, Inter-governmental organisation (IGOs) and the multitude of agencies specialising in resettlement of refugees. It has its HQ in New York and 15 domestic offices throughout the USA. In addition, IRC maintains regional offices in Madrid, Rome, Paris, Geneva, Switzerland, Vienna, Zagreb, Split, and Moscow.

Medecins Sans Frontieres

B25. *Medecins Sans Frontieres* (MSF), Doctors Without Borders, assists victims of natural disaster and war on a basis of absolute neutrality and impartiality. In co-

operation with local authorities and agencies of the UN, MSF sends field missions to provide emergency medical care, rehabilitate health facilities, and train indigenous medical personnel. MSF has also established a network of emergency medical supply stores adjacent to regions of conflict, as well as logistics centres in Amsterdam, Bordeaux, and Brussels. MSF is able to mount large-scale operations in response to conflict, population movement, famine, or natural disasters. MSF pre-positioned equipment packs can also rapidly provide: feeding centres, water & sanitation kits, vaccinations, epidemiological survey equipment, shelter and communications sets, and power supplies. In observing its strict code of impartiality, MSF commonly operates with local health agencies, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, WHO and UNHCR. When mounting major operations, MSF's 6 operational centres (Amsterdam, Barcelona, Brussels, Geneva, Luxembourg, and Paris) act as a network, recruiting staff, co-ordinating logistical support, and finance to field a highly responsive and robust capability.

Mercy Corps International

B26. Mercy Corps International (MCI) specialises in sustainable community development projects focussed on the needs of children and their caregivers. Commonly training packages include enterprise, agriculture and the environment, education and literacy, infrastructure and housing as well as civil society initiatives that foster self-help, accountability, and respect for the rule of law. Noted for its ability to rapidly mount high impact programmes MCI is active in most of the world's conflict regions.

Mercy Ships

B27. The Mercy Ships organisation is a Christian volunteer body that brings advanced medical and dental care to troubled regions in an attempt to alleviate, poverty, hunger and the inadequacy of local health provision. Uniquely, Mercy Ships brings its resources to regions using ocean-going vessels. In addition to medical care Mercy Ships also indulge in community development and evangelism.

Oxfam International

B28. Originally the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, Oxfam International (OI) is now a partnership of NGOs from 10 countries. It acts to ameliorate poverty and distress, providing emergency supplies, managing development projects, and helping developing countries to market goods. Internationally most highly regarded, OI has consultative status with UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and proven linkages to The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), WHO, World Food Programme (WFP), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), EU, Commonwealth Secretariat. Oxfam does not accept government funding from any nation, preferring instead to call upon private donations.

Save the Children

B29. Save the Children is a relief and development alliance spanning 25 countries. As its name suggests, the focus is firmly upon the needs of children and their families. Capabilities range from preventative health care to food relief, education, rehabilitation, and programmes leading to long-lasting self-sufficiency. Infrastructure projects to improve water resource management, village pump location and installation, as well as road access works can also be undertaken. The largest member of the Save the Children alliance is based in London, a subordinate network of regional offices provides technical support to field offices. A Field Director guides country programmes.

World Vision

B30. World Vision International is a Christian relief and development organisation established in 1950 to care for orphans in Asia. It is an international partnership focusing on community development and advocacy for the poor in its mission to help build sustainable futures for children. It provides emergency relief, education, health and social justice development. Partnership Offices are located in Geneva, Bangkok, Nairobi, Vienna, Los Angeles, and San Jose (Costa Rica).

SECTION V – INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

B31. **Description.** An international organisation (IO) is an organisation which operates in more than one country. Within IOs there are both NGO and IGOs. For the purposes of this Chapter national and international humanitarian NGOs have already been discussed in the previous sections. This section therefore deals with IOs, IGOs and NGOs, that are not humanitarian. For clarification, IGOs are deemed to exist when two or more governments have agreed to finance and form the 'IGO'. Unlike NGOs, many IGOs are treated as a legal entity in international law; as a result they can be party to agreements, treaties, or conventions. Their staff are afforded diplomatic status, although the body itself can be sued or indeed sue others. Membership generally extends to many more than two states, and treaties or charters set down the organisation's purpose, operating parameters, and principles.

B32. **Principles and values.** The disparate nature of IOs makes it difficult to generalise about their characteristics. Clearly, a security focussed body like NATO is fundamentally different to an IO that serves a humanitarian or diplomatic agenda. Security actors tend to have evolved characteristics that mirror military hierarchical structures, whilst the humanitarian sector will reflect the decentralised and flattened approaches needed to derive maximum field based impact. The humanitarian bodies' decision-making, financing, and resourcing procedures will be highly devolved with individuals operating with considerable autonomy in the JOA. Rather than being appointment based, 'authority' is derived from competence and egalitarian

negotiations where the impact of personal dynamics can be very important. Internal management is achieved through policy statements that can readily be challenged.

B33. Between humanitarian organisations co-ordination is rarely ‘ordered’. Instead, it tends to reflect a temporary accommodation born of pragmatism and necessity. However, as the sophistication of the solutions fielded by security and humanitarian actors has increased there is some convergence in the nature of those operating in the field. Both sectors value characteristics such as: loyalty, integrity, initiative, humanity, leadership, perseverance and intellect. Cross flow of personnel from the military into IOs has increased so that many major IO country teams will now contain ex-military staff. Nevertheless, a distance between the military and IO actors remains a reality that should not necessarily be resented. In many situations, it is this distance that affords the space or latitude needed for the actor complex as a whole to achieve the high level aims of a PSO campaign.

B34. Military personnel spanning the Operational/Strategic levels of operation will notice that IOs can suffer the same discontinuities in perspectives between the field and headquarters. These discontinuities can become pronounced when communications become difficult, or the tempo of events exceeds the decision-making capacity of IO institutions. An awareness of these differences and similarities can serve to improve overall capacity and hence the extent to which international action can achieve its higher aims.

United Nations System⁷

B35. The United Nations Charter (UNC) established a General Assembly; the Security Council; the Economic and Social Council; a Trusteeship Council;⁸ the International Court of Justice located in The Hague, and the Secretariat headed by the Secretary General. The UN ‘system’ also incorporates a variety of specialised agencies and programs.

United Nations Security Council

B36. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is charged with acting, on behalf of all member states to maintain international peace and security. It has five permanent members, the victorious powers of World War II, and ten non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly from regional groups. Permanent members have a veto right except when the question is procedural or they are parties to a dispute. According to the Charter,⁹ a Military Staff Committee composed of the chiefs of staff of the five permanent members should serve the Security Council; currently

⁷ The UN is an IGO. Discussion of IOs has also omitted regional security structures as these have been covered elsewhere.

⁸ The Trusteeship Council has no extant role. However, calls have been made for reform of the charter provisions to allow the council to again become active in the governance of failed states.

⁹ UNCA 45-47.

the committee performs a presentational rather than active role. The UNSC can initiate action under Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) or Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression). The UNSC may also choose to authorise a member state or regional grouping to act on its behalf, examples of this approach are the actions taken in Kuwait, Korea and more recently the Democratic Republic of Congo.

UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs/UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs

B37. Established in 1992, the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) seeks to co-ordinate international emergency responses, especially through the UN system. Now renamed as the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the body brings together the heads of several UN agencies,¹⁰ the ICRC, and umbrella organisations of humanitarian agencies when appropriate.

United Nations Development Programme

B38. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) aims to assist countries to achieve sustainable development using a network of over 160 country offices. The Resident Representative normally also serves as the local co-ordinator of development activities for the United Nations system as a whole, seeking to ensure the most effective use of UN and international aid resources. Drawing upon the knowledge of local officials, specialised UN agencies, and relevant NGOs, UNDP can offer unparalleled assistance in wisely shaping long-term development objectives. UNDP also acts to promote effective and culturally appropriate governance through its regional Democracy, Governance and Participation Program. It is funded by voluntary contributions from member states, and has an annual budget of roughly US \$2 billion. Beneficiary countries are expected to absorb more than half of program costs by providing personnel, facilities, equipment, and supplies.

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

B39. Formed in 1945, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) is a voluntary association of member states which seeks to promote collaboration in education, science, and culture¹¹ to further respect for the rule of law and human rights. Most members have established National Commissions for UNESCO to advise their governments. UNESCO assesses obligatory contributions based on a scale routinely used in the UN. Germany, Japan, and Russia are the largest contributors, and annual budgets routinely exceed US \$ 500 million.

¹⁰ UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, WHO.

¹¹ UNESCO assists in preservation of national monuments in Bosnia under the Dayton Agreement.

United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation

B40. The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (UNFAO) seeks to improve food production and distribution through agricultural programs and technical assistance or training.

United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

B41. The UNSG appoints the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) with the approval of the UN General Assembly. UNHCHR promotes human rights, provides technical assistance to states that request help, and co-ordinates United Nations information programs that seek to raise awareness of human rights issues. UNHCHR bases its efforts on the tenets enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly in 1948.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

B42. Created in 1951, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was tasked with resettling European refugees left homeless by World War II. Under its mandate, UNHCR is a humanitarian body, and is thus expected to adopt an apolitical stance. It is charged with protecting refugees from harm and helping to derive lasting solutions to their problems. UNHCR has over 5,000 staff, most of them in the field, and is currently concerned with over 25 million people in some 140 countries.

B43. In the past, UNHCR focused upon refugees who had crossed international borders. Now, however, it is clear that Internally Displaced Persons also require assistance from UNHCR. Minority returns and reintegration is a major aspect of UNHCR's work. The problems to be faced in this area are complex, involving property rights, identity documents, employment opportunities, police protection, and the presence of a capable PSF to guarantee the secure environment.

B44. UNHCR is largely funded by voluntary contributions from governments, NGOs, and individuals. Its total budget exceeds US \$ 1.4 billion per year. Close co-operation with UNHCR to track refugee movements and predict need has been an important feature of several operations.

United Nations Children's Emergency Fund

B45. The United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) sponsors immunisation programmes, combats malnutrition, promotes family planning, provides care to women during pregnancy and childbirth, and in so doing greatly assists in ameliorating suffering, especially in developing countries, or those recovering from protracted conflict. Voluntary donor contributions come from governments, foundations, corporations, and individuals.

Department of Peacekeeping Operations

B46. The Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations heads the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). The UN conception of ‘Peacekeeping’ embodies impartiality with respect to the parties, initial consent for the arrival of the PSF, and limitations on the use of force to self-defence only. From a peak of some 70,000 deployed personnel during 1993-1994, DPKO now has direct responsibility for much smaller force levels that include troops, civilian staff, military observers, and civilian police. DPKO’s responsibility for Civilian Police (CIVPOL) is an important aspect of the department’s work. Experience has shown the need to encompass a monitoring role, the training of local police and, in some cases, limited law enforcement.

B47. The military division of the DPKO was expanded following recommendations made in the Brahimi report and now has 4 service divisions under the Office of the Military Advisor (OMA). The divisions are as follows:

- a. **The Military Planning Service.** The Military Planning Service (MPS) conducts initial and subsequent mission planning.
- b. **The Force Generation Service.** The Force Generation Service (FGS) runs all aspects of the force generation process and its associated personnel employment policy.
- c. **The Current Military Operations Service.** The Current Military Operations service (CMOS) runs current operations.
- d. **The Training and Evaluation Service.** The Training and Evaluation Service (TES) develops and implements training policy and evaluation standards.

B48. Although the division of responsibilities may suggest that an operation will be sequenced through these services in reality each will remain engaged throughout the life of a mission. MPS will develop plans as the mission unfolds, responding to events as they occur and ultimately planning closure of the engagement. Having generated an initial force, FGS must plan and execute roulement of forces and match force capabilities to the emerging task. Changed international sentiment and Troop contributing Nation’s resolve may also demand that the FGS act to accommodate shifting force levels during an operation. The task of CMOS is similarly broad, demanding not only the daily tracking and assistance to current operations, but also the exercise of fine judgement in taking issues to the appropriate agencies before events in the JOA become critical. TES must maintain close liaison between active operations and the lessons learned process. Thereby ensuring that forces earmarked for UN operations are suitably trained and equipped.

- B49. The role of the FGS is further subdivided into 4 functional teams:
- a. **The Stand-by Arrangements Team.** The Stand-by Arrangements Team (SAT) maintains and operates the UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS) database.¹² Tables of Organisation and Equipment (TOE) are also maintained by the SAT to act as a guide to those attempting to formulate initial plans. SAT also receives CIVPOL pledges from member nations and adds these to the UNSAS database.
 - b. **The Force Generation Team.** The Force Generation Team (FGT) uses the SAT database and its understanding of the planned operation to approach likely Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) in preparation for an operation. This action is informed by the MPS determined Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and guidance from the [UN] Department for Political Affairs (DPA) on any political or diplomatic constraints that may apply. Responsibility covers TCN formed contingents and individually deployed personnel such as UN Military Observers (UNMOs), (UN) Military Liaison Officers (MILOs) and staff officers deployed on DPKO operations. In addition, the FGT is the Military Division lead on all Contingent Owned Equipment issues.
 - c. **The Military Personnel Team.** The Military Personnel Team (MPT) is responsible for the rotation of individuals, including UNMOs and MILOs and staff officers who are not part of formed contingents deployed to DPKO and DPA field missions, and for setting policy and undertaking staff action on personnel matters for military personnel deployed on UN operations. This includes selection, employment and conditions of service, discipline, appraisal, and honours/awards action.
 - d. **The Generic Planning Team.** The Generic Planning Team (GPT) is used as the staffing branch to respond to perceived policy shortfalls that may be identified. In executing its task the GPT may enlist the assistance of any of the other Services of the Military Division. Importantly, the GPT acts as the point of contact for policy proposals emanating from field missions.

B50. **Mounting a UN Operation.** Having gained an understanding of the DPKO internal structure, it is important that military personnel understand the process involved in mounting, deploying and executing a UN led operation. However, just as every conflict has a unique set of causes and circumstance leading to it, so every UN

¹² The UNSAS database details the equipment and personnel pledges made by TCNs with full details of the agreed response times. SAT liaise with the Office of Legal Affairs to prepare Stand-by Memoranda of Understanding MOUs that define the agreed force capabilities and readiness states. Despite the production of these MOUs the deployment of any force or capability remains subject to the case-by-case approval of the TCNs.

response will be different. The notes below serve only to sketch a likely course of events:

- a. As a potential operation develops, the UN will employ various means to monitor, survey, and evaluate the conflict. This fact-finding activity can be undertaken by the UNSG, an international panel of jurists, the ICRC, or a UN appointed Commissioner.
- b. If action by the UN seems likely a SRSG may be appointed to consider the form that the operation will take, and to initiate early contact with likely TCNs.
- c. Based upon assessments and the efforts of any SRSG, a report will be made to the UNSC. This will define the CONOPS, support and finance proposals, and a draft Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). If the UNSC approves the plan a UN Force Commander (UNFC) will be identified and appointed and a mandate issued.
- d. Informed by the detail of the mandate, the emerging reality of troop and equipment contributions, and national Rules of Engagement (ROE), the Mission Plan and its associated CONOPS will be finalised.
- e. Once deployment has started the overall direction of the operation, including redeployment, is under the direction of the UNSG, who acts on behalf of, and is accountable to the UNSC. Normally, the UNSG will devolve day-to-day operational direction to the SR, HoM or UN PSF Commander. Key policy decisions and mandate issues tend to remain with the UNSG, and he will periodically report to the UNSC on the operation and its fulfilment of the mandate. As an absolute minimum this reporting process is undertaken in conjunction with mandate renewal. In practice, reports are made more frequently, notably when significant developments occur, or when adjustments to the mandate are sought, or when force enhancements or budgetary uplifts are required. The UNSC may also call upon the UNSG to make a report. The final report on an operation will usually encompass closure and redeployment, as well as an overall analysis of the engagement.

United Nations World Food Programme

B51. The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) monitors food availability, and where need is identified provides food on an emergency basis during disasters and conflicts. It also provides food on a continuing basis to populations in developing countries. The WFP has a long experience of local government co-operation. WFP activity is made possible by voluntary cash, commodity, or service contributions by member states and multilateral organisations.

World Health Organisation

B52. The World Health Organisation (WHO) was formed in 1946 to co-ordinate international health work and promote health research. Importantly, the organisation has been able to develop international standards for agricultural and pharmaceutical products. The WHO reports internationally on outbreaks of communicable diseases, and helps co-ordinate medical disaster preparedness.

International Organisation for Migration

B53. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) was created to deal with the plight of displaced persons following World War 2. It provides technical assistance and guidance on the orderly transfer of refugees, displaced persons, and those who seek to establish their independence by working in another country. Key capabilities include the ability to process migrants, provide language training, orientation services, as well as reception and integration facilities. Directed from its Geneva HQ, the IOM maintains a cadre of high readiness trained personnel who are able to respond to unforeseen migration challenges such as those that may be faced in PSO. The organisation has an extensive network of field offices in over 90 countries.

International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

B54. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is a private organisation, established through treaty, agreement, and usage. To an extent it is both NGO and IGO; arguably occupying a unique position. It encompasses the International Committee of the Red Cross¹³ (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and The Red Crescent Societies, and other affiliated societies. Its mandate is derived from the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and two additional protocols signed in 1977. The ICRC assumes particular prominence in promoting the observance of international legal norms particularly with respect to humane conduct. It works to secure and protect the rights of prisoners of war, civilian internees, displaced persons, refugees, and persons living under occupation. Best known for its activities in delivering aid to prisoners, it also acts to trace missing persons, organise repatriation, and as a powerful advocacy body. Funding comes from the Swiss government, parties to the Geneva Convention, affiliated societies, and private donation.

B55. The **International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies** promotes affiliated societies and seeks to give unity to the movement. The affiliated societies, e.g. The British Red Cross, operate within their respective national borders. The Red Cross emblem was adopted from the Swiss national insignia, and has no religious significance, nevertheless, some Islamic countries perceive a Christian symbolism, and hence prefer the use of a Red Crescent. Use of the 'Red Cross' and

¹³ The ICRC works to a board of governors drawn from prominent members of Swiss society. It has observer status in the UNGA and its chief delegate in New York meets monthly with the UNSC President.

‘Red Crescent’ emblems confer immunity through strict adherence to the movement’s humanitarian codes of practice, and hence neutrality. These codes¹⁴ are highly developed, widely disseminated and rigidly adhered to. As a result continuity and coherence in the approaches adopted is assured. Unlike many IGOs its activity is restricted to instances of inter and intra state war.

World Bank Group

B56. The World Bank Group includes the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), usually known as the World Bank, and four other institutions.¹⁵ The World Bank’s director is normally a US citizen. To join the IBRD, countries must belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Shares are allocated to reflect national quotas in the IMF, which are, in turn, based on relative economic strength. IBRD borrows money from capital markets and central banks and loans are made to creditworthy nations for projects that promise high rates of return to the countries involved. The IDA, however, loans money without interest to the world’s poorest countries at the governmental level. In the PSO context, the World Bank itself is by far the largest and most active part of the group and is very likely to come into contact with PSO forces. Often the World Bank will lead in producing a prioritised Regeneration Program and design implementation plans. Habitually it will work closely with UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, and leading NGOs. The World Bank has permanent offices in over 100 countries.¹⁶

International Monetary Fund

B57. The director of the IMF is normally a European. Its Board of Governors is composed of ministers of finance or heads of central banks empowered to act for their countries. By mandate the IMF is charged with maintaining a stable system of currency exchange among its members. It may lend money to members but a system of ‘conditionality’ prevails. The IMF has resident representative offices in many countries and may send a variety of task oriented missions. Staff are also frequently seconded to work with local institutions. Generally, the IMF is constrained to public finances, economic management and the balance of payments. Important technical assistance can be requested from the IMF in public finance and central banking. In this capacity, the IMF can greatly assist¹⁷ in post-conflict Regeneration and Sustained Conflict Prevention. Membership is voluntary, with each member contributing a quota subscription based on an IMF estimate of the country’s wealth and economic performance. Special drawing rights and voting rights are proportionate to this quota.

¹⁴ See Annex C.

¹⁵ These are the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).

¹⁶ For a listing see – <http://web.worldbank.org>

¹⁷ The Dayton Agreement tasked the IMF with appointing the governor of the newly founded Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The World Trade Organisation

B58. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) succeeded the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1995. With an annual budget of US \$ 70 million it seeks to ensure that trade and commerce is conducted, freely, fairly, and predictably. It achieves this aim through trade agreements; acting as a forum for trade negotiations; settling trade disputes; reviewing national trade policies; assisting developing countries in trade policy issues through technical assistance and training programs; and co-operating with other international organisations. The WTO's highest-level decision-making body is the Ministerial Conference, which meets at least once every two years. Below this is the General Council (normally composed of ambassadors and heads of delegation in Geneva), which meets several times a year in the Geneva headquarters. The WTO Secretariat, based in Geneva, has around five hundred staff and is headed by a director-general. It also has a Dispute Settlement Body to resolve trade disputes. The WTO does not have country offices, however, request for technical assistance in the context of a PSO are likely to be favourably viewed.

International Court of Justice

B59. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), which is also known as the World Court consists of 15 judges elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council. Its role is to adjudicate in disputes between states. Only countries may be parties in a case before the ICJ. If a country does not wish to take part in a proceeding, it does not have to do so, unless required to do so by specific treaty provisions. However, if a state agrees to recognise the court's jurisdiction in a dispute then it becomes duty-bound to comply with the court's decision. In July 1998, 160 nations decided to establish a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) to try individuals for the most serious offences of global concern, such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The 1998 Rome Statute created the ICC. Like the ICJ, the ICC will be seated at The Hague. Unlike the ICJ, which deals with states, it may deal with individuals in its courtroom.

International Criminal Court

B60. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was intended to be a permanent court with world wide jurisdiction for trying individuals charged with the most serious breaches of international law, namely: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of aggression. The court's statute was adopted on 17 July 1998 and recognises the Court's competence with regard to war crimes¹⁸ committed during international and internal armed conflicts. The ICC is able to charge individuals and time or place does not limit its jurisdiction.

¹⁸ ICC Statute Article 8 defines the ICC jurisdiction in respect of war crimes.

B61. It is important to recognise, however, that unlike the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the ICC does not have primacy over national criminal jurisdictions. Instead the ICC must complement national systems. Thus the ICC will only be able to initiate proceedings if the national body is ‘*unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution*’.¹⁹ An additional compromise imposed on the Court’s jurisdiction demands that the state of nationality of the accused or the state on whose territory the crime was committed accepts the Court’s jurisdiction.²⁰ In practical terms, this constitutes a serious impediment to the Court’s jurisdiction with respect to internal conflicts. In such situations the nationality of the criminal and the state in which the crime was committed will often be the same. The statute further limits jurisdiction over war crimes for seven years after the statute’s entry into force for that nation.²¹

B62. It is also significant that the UNSC is afforded special status in the Court’s statute. In practical terms the UNSC can forbid action²² by the ICC, or override the requirement for state consent by referring a case directly to the Court.

B63. The ICC may impose imprisonment of up to 30 years, or at most a term of life imprisonment. Uniquely, it may also order fines and confiscation of proceeds, property, and assets derived from crime.²³ The principle of ‘*Ne Bis in Idem*’²⁴ is enshrined in the ICC Statute, and therefore an individual judged by a national body is not vulnerable to ICC prosecution, or vice-versa, for the same crime.²⁵ At this early stage in the Court’s existence it is realistic to regard the ICC as an independent judicial body operating under political tutelage and sponsorship. The significance of the Court’s existence is great. However, state practice in relation to the Court has yet to be established.

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

B64. The UNSC established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The ICTY Statute gives it power to prosecute persons who breached the Geneva Conventions of 1949, violated the laws or customs of war, committed

¹⁹ ICC Statute Article 17. This may be overruled if it can be proved that the national proceeding are not being undertaken in good faith e.g. cases of unjustifiable delay, or proceedings conducted other than independently and impartially (ICC Statute Article 17 and 20). The Court may exercise its jurisdiction if it can be shown that the national judicial system has collapsed (ICC Statute Article 17.3).

²⁰ ICC Statute Article 12.

²¹ ICC Statute Article 124.

²² ICC Statute Article 16. The adoption of a resolution under Chapter VII of the UNC can prohibit an investigation or prosecution from being started or proceeded with for one year. Such a resolution may be for one year, renewable indefinitely.

²³ ICC Statute Article 77.

²⁴ Commonly known as the double jeopardy rule this forbids (in both criminal and international law) judgement of a person twice in relation to a single crime.

²⁵ ICC Statute Article 20.

genocide, or were responsible for crimes against humanity in the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1st January 1991. The tribunal sits in The Hague and is funded through the UNGA and voluntary donations. The tribunal is empowered to investigate crimes, indict suspects, and conduct trials, but it has no power of arrest. Although the Dayton Agreement²⁶ stipulates that all competent authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina shall co-operate with the tribunal, The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska have shown little regard for its task. NATO forces have assisted investigators, exhumation programs, and arrested several indicted individuals. Many indicted suspects remain at large.

The Commonwealth

B65. It is often forgotten that The Commonwealth can also be considered an IGO; although its budget is small its extensive membership²⁷ constitutes a unique strength. The Commonwealth is a voluntary association of fifty-four developed and developing nations, with one Special Member, Tuvalu; a small island state in the Pacific. The Commonwealth has no charter, however, member's actions are regulated by guiding principles, pursuit of international understanding, and recognition that common interests are best served by working in partnership with members.

B66. The main body is the Commonwealth Secretariat. Other bodies include the Commonwealth of Learning, and the Commonwealth Foundation, which supports over 300 Commonwealth NGOs with financial and assistance.

SECTION VI – UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT AND KEY DEPARTMENTS

Overview of UK Government

B67. The United Kingdom is a parliamentary democracy, based on universal suffrage. It is also a constitutional monarchy in which ministers of the Crown govern in the name of the Sovereign, who is both Head of State and Head of the Government. There is no 'written constitution'; instead, the relationship between the State and the people relies on statute law, common law and conventions.

B68. The UK Parliament makes primary legislation (other than for matters devolved to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh and Northern Ireland Assemblies) and is the highest authority in the land. It continues to have the supreme authority for

²⁶ Annex 4, Article 2 (8).

²⁷ Members: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Britain, Brunei, Darussalam, Cameroon, Canada, Cyprus, Dominica, Fiji, Islands, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

government and law-making in the UK as a whole. The executive comprises the Government (members of the Cabinet and other ministers responsible for policies), government departments and agencies, local authorities, public corporations, independent regulatory bodies, and certain other organisations subject to ministerial control. The judiciary determines common law and interprets statutes.

B69. In her role as Monarch, the Queen is head of the executive and plays an integral part in the legislature. She heads the judiciary and is both the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the Crown and ‘supreme governor’ of the established Church of England.

B70. Following devolution, the responsibilities of the Secretaries of State for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland changed considerably, although they retain their positions in the UK Cabinet. They ensure that the ‘reserved interests’ of the countries they represent are properly considered in central government and they lead the presentation of government policy in their parts of the UK. They are also responsible for safeguarding and promoting the devolution settlements of their respective countries.

Cabinet Office

B71. The Cabinet Office supports the Prime Minister in ensuring that the government delivers its priorities, particularly in relation to health, education, transport, crime and asylum policies. It provides secretarial support to the cabinet and services cabinet committees, where ministers work together across departments on key issues. It also provides practical advice and support on the machinery of government.

B72. It is the lead department for communicating the work of government through Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, which produces official publications, the Government Information and Communications Service, which runs government press offices, and the Government News Network, which distributes news releases.

B73. It works to make government more open and accessible through its e-government strategy and UK Online, aiming to improve the online information provided by government. Through the Strategy Unit, it takes a lead role on cross-cutting issues, including those relating to information technology, which don’t sit in a single government department. The Cabinet Office is also leading the drive for reform of the civil service, as the main co-ordinating department for the civil service, which is headed by the Cabinet Secretary.

HM Treasury

B74. HM Treasury is responsible for formulating and putting into effect the UK Government’s financial and economy policy. It aims to raise sustainable economic growth, improve the prosperity of the nation, creating economic and employment

opportunities for all. The Treasury works to achieve economic stability, low inflation, sound public finances, efficient public services and a more productive economy.

B75. The Treasury promotes a fair and efficient tax and benefit system. Income taxes are collected by the Inland Revenue, and value added tax and customs duties are the responsibility of HM Customs and Excise. A system of tax credits to provide incentives to those in work has also been developed. The Treasury provides tax relief to encourage people to save. In May 1997 the Government gave the Bank of England operational independence to set monetary policy by deciding the short-term level of interest rates to meet the Government's stated inflation target.

B76. The Treasury has a strategic oversight of banking, insurance and financial services and is responsible for the Government Accountancy Service which brings professional accountants in government together. The Treasury is also the lead department on government statistics, which are independently produced by National Statistics.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

B77. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) promotes UK interests abroad and works with international bodies to support a strong world community. The FCO (is responsible for the conduct of business with other governments and international organisations. This includes developing Britain's role as a member of the European Union, the Commonwealth and the United Nations. The FCO also promotes human rights, improved global security and assists those countries which are developing new democratic institutions.

B78. The department is responsible for the protection of British citizens abroad through a network of 232 Embassies, Consulates and High Commissions worldwide, which assist 50,000 people every year, and which promote British commercial and other interests abroad. The FCO also provides practical advice to British people travelling abroad about travel, security and health conditions in countries they are planning to visit.

B79. With the Department of Trade and Industry, the FCO manages British Trade International to support international trade by UK exporters and inward investment by overseas firms in Britain. It also promotes British culture through the British Council, which has offices in 109 countries and the BBC World Service, with accurate and impartial broadcasts heard by 150 million people worldwide in many different languages.

Department for International Development

B80. The Department for International Development (DFID) is the UK Government department responsible for promoting development and reducing poverty overseas. Its

central goal is to work with other countries to halve the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by 2015.

B81. The Department funds projects in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe to improve basic health care and develop universal access to primary education. It helps poorer communities to improve their economic situation, by better managing the process of globalisation and protecting their local environment.

B82. A major objective is supporting the economic development of the poorest countries through debt relief linked to practical measures to reduce poverty. The Department also funds projects and works with other organisations to provide humanitarian support for victims of war, famine and natural disasters. DFID works with other governments, business, development agencies and researchers to achieve its goals. It is also the lead UK department working with the World Bank, EU and UN development agencies.

B83. Within the UK, DFID works to increase public understanding of our global mutual dependence and the need for international development. It also supports schools in educating their pupils about development issues, so that they can understand the key global considerations that will shape their lives.

Home Office

B84. The Home Office is responsible for internal affairs in England and Wales. It seeks to promote a safe, just and tolerant society through its policies to reduce crime, deliver justice and regulate entry to the United Kingdom.

B85. Police forces are organised regionally, with the Home Office setting national targets for crime reduction, particularly seeking to cut youth crime. It supports initiatives to cut crime and fear of crime. The Home Office is also responsible for all sentencing legislation. It regulates illegal drugs offences and works to prevent drugs misuse. The Home Office funds the police, the Crown Prosecution Service, the Prison Service and the Probation Service and sets their overall policy framework. Administration of the courts and legal services is the responsibility of the Lord Chancellor's Department.

B86. Immigration and Nationality policy is also a Home Office responsibility. This includes regulation of entry to Britain, providing passports for British citizens to travel overseas (through the Passport Agency), supporting destitute asylum seekers while their claims are considered, and integrating those accepted as refugees. The Home Office is also the lead department on constitutional, citizenship and human rights issues within the UK. It promotes race equality and diversity, with the help of the Commission for Racial Equality.

Ministry of Defence

B87. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) provides the defence capabilities to ensure the security and defence of the United Kingdom and the Overseas Territories. It supports the government's foreign policy objectives, particularly those relating to peace and security.

B88. The MOD has responsibility for the Armed Forces, including 200,000 regular members of Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, together with over 47,000 reserves. It is the lead department in the government's policy of defence diplomacy through the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Western European Union and the United Nations. It provides strategic direction on UK participation in conflict prevention, crisis management and operations.

B89. The MOD procures equipment through the Defence Procurement Agency which most cost effectively meets agreed military requirements, including fighter aircraft, tanks and submarines. It also supports British defence exports, within the framework of the government's arms sales policy.

B90. The MOD funds the Meteorological Office, which provides the national weather forecasting service. It also operates military schools and academies, including the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. The MOD provides services for military veterans, including war pensions, through the Veterans Agency.

SECTION VII – KEY AGENCIES AND ORGANS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

U.S. Congress

B91. The US Congress oversees activities of the Executive Branch, through 200 committees and subcommittees assisted by approximately 2,000 staff members. Committees have their own operating procedures, and operate independently. A committee may request written advice from the Executive Branch or the Executive may comment on proposals that affect conduct of their affairs. Several committees²⁸ routinely consider PSO engagements and their implications for the federal budget, missions of the armed forces, and foreign policy.

National Security Council

B92. Initially established in 1947, the National Security Council (NSC) is the highest-level body that focuses upon all aspects of US national security. Statutory

²⁸ In the House of Representatives: The Committee on Appropriations, The Committee on International Relations, and The Committee on National Security. In the Senate comparable committees are: Appropriations, Foreign Relations, and Armed Services.

membership includes the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and secretaries and under secretaries of other executive departments as required by the President. The National Security Advisor is not a statutory member of the council. He is appointed by the President to co-ordinate the council's activities, and to oversee its permanent staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is the principal military advisor to the NSC. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) may attend and participate in meetings of the council. Important outputs from the NSC are Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) that promulgate decisions, set objectives, and codify procedures. The NSC will also issue Presidential Review Directives (PRDs) that direct policy studies. Importantly, it is the NSC that has responsibility for the interagency process, which seeks to co-ordinate US activity across departments of state. PDD-56 assigned the NSC a central role in planning and co-ordinating civilian and military aspects of complex contingency operations.

Department of State

B93. The Department of State (DOS) has a primary responsibility for foreign policy and The Secretary of State is considered fourth in succession to the Presidency. Assistant secretaries head seven regional bureaus. Other key posts include:

- a. The Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs oversees police affairs abroad, e.g. the International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia, and gives direction to the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) in the Department of Justice.
- b. The Bureau of International Organisation Affairs oversees most UN operations.
- c. The Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration works with UNHCR in areas of conflict.
- d. The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) in Arlington, Virginia, trains Foreign Service officers.

B94. As in most nations the DOS is responsible for US embassies headed by ambassadors whose staffs normally include representatives from other agencies of the government, including Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Justice, and US Agency for International Development (USAID). The US adopts a 'country team concept', which grants the ambassador responsibility for co-ordinating all activities of the US government in his geographic area of responsibility.

US Agency for International Development

B95. USAID is described as an independent agency operating under the guidance of the US DOS. USAID manages programs under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and other US national laws. Staff monitor need and develop appropriate assistance programs, funding, and delivery of the plan. The administrator of USAID is also designated as Special Co-ordinator for International Disaster Assistance. Using the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), he will deploy Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to assess need and help co-ordinate responses, normally under direction of the US ambassador. USAID donates US agricultural commodities to meet humanitarian needs. These donations are made under government-to-government agreements, or through public and private agencies. USAID also provides government-to-government development grant funding for long-term development.

US Information Agency

B96. US Information Agency (USIA) is an independent agency operating under the guidance of the US DOS. The agency advises US officials on non-US attitudes to US policy, and acts to shape perceptions of US policies overseas. It is the office of Research and Media Reaction, which makes attitude assessments and summarises foreign media coverage. USIA also has responsibility for:

- a. Operating the 'Voice of America' and other broadcasting services.
- b. Managing Fulbright Scholarships, and sponsoring academic exchange programmes.
- c. Providing public affairs officers to US embassies.
- d. Liaison with US Army psychological operations (PSYOPS) units.

Department of Defense

B97. The President and the Secretary of Defense or their representatives constitute the National Command Authority (NCA) with command of all US armed services. Main divisions of the department include the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the military departments, and the combatant commands.

B98. **Military Departments.** Civilian secretaries head the military departments, and using military chiefs, these secretaries control forces **not** assigned to combatant commands. The military departments organise, equip, train, and supply forces but do not normally control them operationally. They are controlled operationally by unified commanders and commanders of joint task forces.

B99. Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the chiefs of the armed services headed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), who is the principal military advisor to the NCA. The Joint Staff assists the CJCS in developing US military strategy. Within the Joint Staff, the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5) takes responsibility for military planning in peacetime. He prepares the plan mandated by PDD-56, and oversees its implementation.

B100. Unified Commands. A Unified Command Plan establishes missions, responsibilities, and areas of responsibility for unified commands. Some unified commands are functionally organised while others are responsible for geographic areas. Unified commanders' report through the Joint Staff and the CJCS, to the NCA. However, unified commanders do enjoy a high level of local autonomy, e.g. the Commander, US European Command (USEUCOM), will liaise directly with the Special Representative for Bosnia. US Special Operations Command is treated as an arm of service charged with action to train and equip special operations forces and has a notably high level of autonomy and an inherently interagency structure.

Central Intelligence Agency

B101. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is led by the DCI, who is the principal intelligence advisor to the President and heads the intelligence community, including the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the intelligence organisations of the armed services. The DCI co-ordinates assignment of tasks for all intelligence agencies and provides National Intelligence Support Team to combatant commands. The CIA has broad intelligence responsibilities outside the country and conducts counterintelligence inside the country in co-operation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

Department of Agriculture

B102. The US Department of Agriculture (USDA) develops foreign markets for US agricultural products, and importantly in the context of PSO it manages food aid programs abroad. It administers government-to-government sales, donates surplus commodities to developing and friendly countries, and finances the credit or grant based sale of agricultural commodities in support of developing nations.

Department of Commerce

B103. The Department of Commerce (DOC) promotes US competitiveness, acts to prevent unfair competition. In PSO, DOC guided by the DOS, funds the US Foreign and Commercial Service that provides counselling to US business and encourages

joint commercial ventures²⁹ DOC operates alongside USAID on programs with commercial potential, liaising with the US commercial sector.

Department of Energy

B104. The Department of Energy (DOE) administers national programs concerning energy, sponsors research into energy technologies, and has special responsibility for US nuclear weapons programs. To deal with contingencies such as nuclear accidents, terrorism, or nuclear weapons, the DOE maintains an emergency operations centre and runs an Emergency Response Program.

Department of Justice

B105. The Department of Justice (DOJ) includes the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS). In conjunction with the Coast Guard, the INS deploys agents to interdict illegal immigrants. Under DOS guidance, and funded by USAID, DOJ runs ICITAP. ICITAP trains and equips policing agencies in many countries of the world.³⁰

Department of the Treasury

B106. In addition to offering advice on economic, financial, and tax policy the Department of the Treasury (DOT) manages U.S. government finances; serves as the U.S. government's financial agent; enforces federal law. It includes the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. Customs Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF), and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centre. The influence of the DOT with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund is of obvious importance in PSO, and its experience in financing regeneration activity can be critical. Some US embassies have DOT placements.³¹

Overseas Private Investment Corporation

B107. Established by Congressional Act, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) is a self-sustaining, government-owned corporation. OPIC protects U.S. investors by providing insurance against currency inconvertibility, expropriation, and political violence. It finances overseas projects by guaranteeing loans and making direct loans to small businesses and co-operatives.

²⁹ The DOC appointed a representative in Sarajevo to monitor contracts issued through the World Bank and USAID.

³⁰ ICITAP planned and executed law enforcement reform in Haiti. Although initially excluded from Bosnia as the UN had responsibility for the IPTF, ICITAP eventually became involved in training both IPTF personnel and indigenous police.

³¹ The US Embassy in Sarajevo operates a Bosnia Task Force to assist in debt management, fiscal policy, projects and loans.

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B – EXTRACTS FROM: THE CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN DISASTER RELIEF

Purpose

This Code of Conduct seeks to guard our standards of behaviour. It is not about operational details, such as how one should calculate food rations or set up a refugee camp. Rather, it seeks to maintain the high standards of independence, effectiveness and impact to which disaster response non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement aspires. It is a voluntary code, enforced by the will of the organisation accepting it to maintain the standards laid down in the Code.

In the event of armed conflict, the present Code of Conduct will be interpreted and applied in conformity with international humanitarian law.

The Code of Conduct is presented first. Attached to it are three annexes, describing the working environment that we would like to see created by Host Governments, Donor Governments and Inter-governmental Organisations in order to facilitate the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Definitions

Non-Governmental Organisations. NGOs refers here to organisations, both national and international, which are constituted separately from the government of the country in which they are founded.

Non-Governmental Humanitarian Agencies. For the purposes of this text, the term Non-Governmental Humanitarian Agencies (NGHAs) has been coined to encompass the components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement – The International Committee of the Red Cross, The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and its member National Societies – and the NGOs as defined above. This code refers specifically to those NGHAs who are involved in disaster response.

Inter-Governmental Organisations. Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs) refers to organisations constituted by two or more governments. It thus includes all United Nations Agencies and regional organisations.

Disasters. A disaster is a calamitous event resulting in loss of life, great human suffering and distress, and large-scale material damage.

The Code of Conduct

Principles of Conduct for The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes.

1. **The Humanitarian imperative comes first.** The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries. As members of the international community, we recognise our obligation to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed. Hence the need for unimpeded access to affected populations is of fundamental importance in exercising that responsibility. The prime motivation of our response to disaster is to alleviate human suffering amongst those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster. When we give humanitarian aid it is not a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such.
2. **Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind.** Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone. Wherever possible, we will base the provision of relief aid upon a thorough assessment of the needs of the disaster victims and the local capacities already in place to meet those needs. Within the entirety of our programmes, we will reflect considerations of proportionality. Human suffering must be alleviated whenever it is found; life is as precious in one part of a country as another. Thus, our provision of aid will reflect the degree of suffering it seeks to alleviate. In implementing this approach, we recognise the crucial role played by women in disaster-prone communities and will ensure that this role is supported, not diminished by our aid programmes. The implementation of such a universal, impartial and independent policy, can only be effective if we and our partners have access to the necessary resources to provide for such equitable relief, and have equal access to all disaster victims.
3. **Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.** Humanitarian aid will be given according to the need of individuals, families and communities. Notwithstanding the right of NGHAs to espouse particular political or religious opinions, we affirm that assistance will not be dependent on the adherence of the recipients to those opinions. We will not tie the promise, delivery or distribution of assistance to the embracing or acceptance of a particular political or religious creed.
4. **We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.** NGHAs are agencies which act independently from governments. We therefore formulate our own policies and implementation strategies and do not seek to implement the policy of any government, except in so far as it coincides with our own

independent policy. We will never knowingly - or through negligence - allow ourselves, or our employees, to be used to gather information of a political, military or economically sensitive nature for governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian, nor will we act as instruments of foreign policy of donor governments. We will use the assistance we receive to respond to needs and this assistance should not be driven by the need to dispose of donor commodity surpluses, nor by the political interest of any particular donor. We value and promote the voluntary giving of labour and finances by concerned individuals to support our work and recognise the independence of action promoted by such voluntary motivation. In order to protect our independence we will seek to avoid dependence upon a single funding source.

5. We shall respect culture and custom. We will endeavour to respect the culture, structures and customs of the communities and countries we are working in.

6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities. All people and communities - even in disaster - possess capacities as well as vulnerabilities. Where possible, we will strengthen these capacities by employing local staff, purchasing local materials and trading with local companies. Where possible, we will work through local NGHAs as partners in planning and implementation, and co-operate with local government structures where appropriate. We will place a high priority on the proper co-ordination of our emergency responses. This is best done within the countries concerned by those most directly involved in the relief operations, and should include representatives of the relevant UN bodies.

7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid. Disaster response assistance should never be imposed upon the beneficiaries. Effective relief and lasting rehabilitation can best be achieved where the intended beneficiaries are involved in the design, management and implementation of the assistance programme. We will strive to achieve full community participation in our relief and rehabilitation programmes.

8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs. All relief actions affect the prospects for long-term development, either in a positive or a negative fashion. Recognising this, we will strive to implement relief programmes which actively reduce the beneficiaries' vulnerability to future disasters and help create sustainable lifestyles. We will pay particular attention to environmental concerns in the design and management of relief programmes. We will also endeavour to minimise the negative impact of humanitarian assistance, seeking to avoid long-term beneficiary dependence upon external aid.

9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources. We often act as an institutional link in the partnership between those who wish to assist and those who need assistance during disasters. We

therefore hold ourselves accountable to both constituencies. All our dealings with donors and beneficiaries shall reflect an attitude of openness and transparency. We recognise the need to report on our activities, both from a financial perspective and effectiveness. We recognise the obligation to ensure appropriate monitoring of aid distributions and to carry out regular assessments of the impact of disaster assistance. We will also seek to report, in an open fashion, upon the impact of our work, and the factors limiting or enhancing that impact. Our programmes will be based upon high standards of professionalism and expertise in order to minimise the wasting of valuable resources.

10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects. Respect for the disaster victim as an equal partner in action should never be lost. In our public information we shall portray an objective image of the disaster situation where the capacities and aspirations of disaster victims are highlighted, and not just their vulnerabilities and fears. While we will co-operate with the media in order to enhance public response, we will not allow external or internal demands for publicity to take precedence over the principle of maximising overall relief assistance. We will avoid competing with other disaster response agencies for media coverage in situations where such coverage may be to the detriment of the service provided to the beneficiaries or to the security of our staff or the beneficiaries.

The Working Environment

Having agreed unilaterally to strive to abide by the Code laid out above, we present below some indicative guidelines which describe the working environment we would like to see created by donor governments, host governments and the inter-governmental organisations - principally the agencies of the United Nations.

These guidelines are presented in a spirit of openness and co-operation so that our partners will become aware of the ideal relationship we would seek with them.

Recommendations to the Governments of Disaster Affected Countries

1. **Governments should recognise and respect the independent, humanitarian and impartial actions of Non-Governmental Humanitarian Agencies.** NGHAs are independent bodies. This independence and impartiality should be respected by host governments.
2. **Host governments should facilitate rapid access to disaster victims for Non-Governmental Humanitarian Agencies.** If NGHAs are to act in full compliance with their humanitarian principles, they should be granted rapid and impartial access to disaster victims, for the purpose of delivering humanitarian assistance. It is the duty of the host government, as part of the exercising of sovereign responsibility, not to

block such assistance, and to accept the impartial and apolitical action of NGHAs. Host governments should facilitate the rapid entry of relief staff, particularly by waiving requirements for transit, entry and exit visas, or arranging that these are rapidly granted. Governments should grant over-flight permission and landing rights for aircraft transporting international relief supplies and personnel, for the duration of the emergency relief phase.

3. Governments should facilitate the timely flow of relief goods and information during disasters. Relief supplies and equipment are brought into a country solely for the purpose of alleviating human suffering, not for commercial benefit or gain. Such supplies should normally be allowed free and unrestricted passage and should not be subject to requirements for consular certificates of origin or invoices, import and/or export licences or other restrictions, or to importation taxation, landing fees or port charges.

The temporary importation of necessary relief equipment, including vehicles, light aircraft and telecommunications equipment, should be facilitated by the receiving host government through the temporary waving of licence or registration restrictions. Equally, governments should not restrict the re-exportation of relief equipment at the end of a relief operation.

To facilitate disaster communications, host governments are encouraged to designate certain radio frequencies, which relief organisations may use in-country and for international communications for the purpose of disaster communications, and to make such frequencies known to the disaster response community prior to the disaster. They should authorise relief personnel to utilise all means of communication required for their relief operations.

4. Governments should seek to provide a co-ordinated disaster information and planning service. The overall planning and co-ordination can be greatly enhanced if NGHAs are provided with information on relief needs and government systems for planning and implementing relief efforts as well as information on potential security risks they may encounter. Governments are urged to provide such information to NGHAs.

To facilitate effective co-ordination and the efficient utilisation of relief efforts, host governments are urged to designate, prior to disaster, a single point-of-contact for incoming NGHAs to liaise with the national authorities.

5. Disaster relief in the event of armed conflict. In the event of armed conflict, relief actions are governed by the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law.

Recommendations to Inter-governmental Organisations

- 1. Inter-Governmental Organisations should recognise Non-Governmental Humanitarian Agencies, local and foreign, as valuable partners.** NGHAs are willing to work with UN and other inter-governmental agencies to effect better disaster response. They do so in spirit of partnership which respects the integrity and independence of all partners. Inter-governmental agencies must respect the independence and impartiality of the NGHAs. NGHAs should be consulted by UN agencies in the preparation of relief plans.
- 2. Inter-Governmental Organisations should assist host governments in providing an overall co-ordinating framework for international and local disaster relief.** NGHAs do not usually have the mandate to provide the overall co-ordinating framework for disasters which require an international response. This responsibility falls to the host government and the relevant United Nations authorities. They are urged to provide this service in a timely and effective manner to serve the affected state and the national and international disaster response community. In any case, NGHAs should make all efforts to ensure the effective co-ordination of their own services. In the event of armed conflict, relief actions are governed by the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law.
- 3. Inter-Governmental Organisations should extend security protection provided for UN organisations, to Non-Governmental Humanitarian Agencies.** Where security services are provided for inter-governmental organisations, this service should be extended to their operational NGHAs partners where it is so requested.
- 4. Inter-Governmental Organisations should provide Non-Governmental Humanitarian Agencies with the same access to relevant information as is granted to UN organisations.** IGOs are urged to share all information, pertinent to the implementation of effective disaster response, with their operational NGHAs partners.

ANNEX C – A SYNOPSIS OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF BRITISH DEFENCE DOCTRINE

C1. This annex sets down a synopsis of the essential elements, including the Principles of War, of British Defence Doctrine (BDD) that guide the use of military force across the spectrum of tension. The synopsis is provided for ease of reference and to place understanding into the context of Peace Support Operations (PSO).¹

SECTION I – THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS

A Warfighting Ethos

C2. The UK considers the need to prepare for and, if necessary, to fight and win in war as the most important function of its Armed Forces. Every member of the Armed Forces must be prepared to fight and die for whatever legitimate cause the UK is pursuing through military endeavour. It follows that doctrine must have at its core a warfighting ethos and, as was highlighted earlier, warfighting techniques will often be required in the context of PSO. Given the destructive nature of warfighting, those involved are forced to endure a constant threat to their lives and well-being. They will themselves be attempting to create the same fear in the minds of opposing forces and factions. The dynamic and destructive nature of this exchange produces massive uncertainty, confusion, chaos, and an inevitable abandonment of initial plans for the conduct of the campaign. With parties to the conflict attempting to gain advantage, surprise and shock will be a constant drain on resources, both physical and mental. For those who have not experienced it, it will be difficult to imagine just how demanding and frightening the deployment of warfighting skills can be. No one can be sure how he or she will react. Fear is commonplace, even within the minds of those most conditioned to cope with its challenges; courage and leadership coupled with cohesion and discipline are the best counters to that fear. The bravest men and women are frightened; it is their ability to carry on despite their fears that is the measure of their courage. Importantly, by its very nature, military activity is about confronting risk and managing it. It is emphatically never about avoiding risk; the military profession is not one for those who are risk averse.

C3. In recent years in particular, its ability to mount, conduct and sustain a wide range of PSOs has led to extensive and prolonged involvement in activities not directly related to the maintenance of the UK's own political independence and territorial integrity. The success of UK forces in these operations has been based largely upon their ability to escalate and control the level of force they deliver whenever the circumstances demanded it.

¹ Military readers may wish to cross reference these notes with JWP 0-01 'British Defence Doctrine' (BDD) Chapter 3 and JDP 01 'Joint Operations' Chapter 3.

C4. A warfighting ethos thus provides the UK's Armed Forces with the vital moral and emotional capacity to cope with all the circumstances that they are likely to confront whether pursuing aims associated with war, typically Deliberate or Focused Intervention or, more frequently those associated with PSO. The ethos imbues casualty tolerance within the military and the wider population. This is perhaps most pronounced when military action has proved necessary to support a legitimate and justifiable cause, or through a widely acknowledged and ethically based obligation.

The Manoeuvrist Approach

C5. The manoeuvrist approach is one in which action is taken to affect the adversaries' cohesion and will to flout international mandates; rather than simply seeking to destroy military capacity. Significant features are momentum and tempo, which in combination seize the initiative and apply constant pressure at the times and places of maximum effect. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed.

C6. Such thinking offers the prospect of rapid results or of results disproportionately greater than the resources applied. It is therefore attractive to a numerically inferior force, or to a stronger one that wishes to minimise the resources committed. However, it does entail the risk that disruption of an adversary will not occur as predicted and hence can be less certain than an operation which relies on the use of overwhelming force.² A key characteristic of the manoeuvrist approach is undermining of the adversaries' leadership or commanders' decision-making processes by attempting to get inside their decision-making cycle (often described as the 'OODA Loop' - see Figure C.1), and hence achieve a superior decision-making tempo. This involves accelerating the rate of decision-making to a faster rate than the adversary can cope with. Thus pressurised, an adversary is likely to initiate or take increasingly inappropriate action or indeed, none at all. Any degradation of the adversaries' command systems by physical or other means will hasten the onset of paralysis.

² The manoeuvrist approach does not preclude the use of attrition.




Figure C.1 - The OODA Loop

Mission Command

C7. A sound philosophy of command has four enduring tenets. It requires timely decision-making, a clear understanding of the superior commander's intention, an ability on the part of subordinates to meet the superior's remit, and the commander's determination to see the plan through to a successful conclusion. This requires a style of command that promotes decentralised command, freedom, and speed of action and initiative, whilst remaining responsive to superior direction. Mission command is the British way of achieving this. It has the following key elements:

- a. First, a commander ensures that his subordinates understand his intentions, their own missions, and the strategic, operational and tactical context.
- b. Second, subordinates are told what effect they are to achieve and the reason why it is necessary.
- c. Third, subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions.
- d. Fourth, a commander uses a minimum of control so as not to limit unnecessarily his subordinate's freedom of action.
- e. Finally, subordinates decide how to achieve their missions.

Joint, Integrated and Multinational Operations

C8. All components of the UK's Armed Forces have the potential to offer ways and means of enhancing manoeuvrist operations. To do this most effectively, all are allowed to play to their particular strengths in order to make their unique contribution.

Maritime, land and air forces have different but complementary attributes that are amplified in maritime, military and air power doctrine. These are: the access, mobility, versatility, sustained reach, resilience, lift capacity, forward presence, poise and leverage of maritime forces; land forces' capacity for shock action, protection, the ability to take and hold ground and endurance; and air power's flexibility, penetration, perspective, speed, responsiveness and reach.

C9. These are the inherent strengths and they are used to overcome relative weaknesses. The weaknesses are both those that are themselves inherent and those that arise for reasons of circumstance or situation. Land forces, for example, may experience difficulties on their own in achieving surprise in time because the terrain and physical features may severely restrict mobility. In such circumstances, a combination of airlift and maritime mobility may enable them to move significant distances and re-deploy to maximum effect.

C10. Joint and integrated operations are not simply a matter of forces from different arms of the armed forces and people from other agencies and organisations operating in the same Joint Operations Area (JOA). One vital key to the effective command of joint manoeuvrist operations is recognition of the relative strengths and weaknesses (both inherent and situational) of each component of the force and the playing of each to its strengths in support of the others. The commander must concentrate on the effects he needs to generate and employ the best means possible of achieving them. This will often require lateral thinking and the employment of units in ways not traditionally associated with their principal operating environment.

C11. By adopting an approach³ which concentrates on the effect to be achieved by operations and utilising all elements in an integrated fashion, the value of a joint force is more than merely the sum of its component parts. To achieve this requires a state of mind that instinctively capitalises on joint and integrated strengths. This is only achieved when all are working effectively and harmoniously with those from the other Services, from other government departments, and from other nations in pursuit of a common purpose. 'Effectively and harmoniously' is meant as merely the ability to get along with each other and obtain the lowest common denominator of agreement, it means having an ability to deal with complexity, to have specialist understanding of a high order and to apply that to the task in hand.

C12. A pivotal role is played by the civilian actors in the planning and execution of many operations. In PSO, this blending of staffs occurs at the strategic, operational and at times the tactical level of operations. Although the application of military force

³ An effects based approach maintains a focus on the outcome or result that is to be achieved. All possible routes to achieving that outcome are considered before selecting the optimal means, or combination of means, that will deliver the desired effect. In PSO at the operational and tactical level, the desired effect is often compliance with the conditions of a mandate or ceasefire. This will require a combination of credible diplomacy, legitimate action, and when necessary, sufficient force to coerce or deter a party or faction in pursuit of the mandate.

at the tactical level is primarily a military function, its effective delivery will depend on all components - military and civil - working toward mutually derived and complementary goals. Increasingly military forces depend not only on joint endeavour but also on their ability to co-ordinate and work with the plethora of civilian agencies engaged in PSO. The full integration of the actor complex into a single campaign plan is a demanding goal, especially as the actors' aims and objectives will often appear inconsistent and incompatible. Nevertheless, successful peace support campaigning will demand that commanders and civil leaders work towards a comprehensive campaign plan⁴ that addresses the underlying causes of conflict. In doing this, they must take into account the need for co-operation without the benefit of a unified command and control architecture. This requires a fluid and flexible approach to others who have a legitimate role in the campaign and a willingness to shape decisions by taking into account the needs of others.

C13. Finally, the ability to operate with the armed forces of other nations is an essential quality in PSO. The UK may still, from time to time, deploy forces on its own, without support from other allies or coalition partners. However, those occasions are likely to be rare and, in much the same way as different components bring different attributes and limitations to a joint campaign, so allies and coalition partners will do the same. A clear understanding of the ways in which other nations' armed forces operate and the ability to merge units from several nations into one cohesive force, are increasingly important factors in the conduct of military operations.

Flexibility and Pragmatism

C14. The fifth element to be understood is that of flexibility and pragmatism. Manoeuvrist operations require a conditioned and resilient attitude of mind developed through experience in training and, if possible, in practice. They also require considerable thought and imagination in both planning and execution. Commanders and leaders must be conditioned to think constantly of new ways of approaching an objective. Imaginative and innovative thinking is a source of initiative. To allow for such thinking, BDD adopts a flexible approach in two ways. First, it is constantly reviewed and reconsidered and, if found wanting, is changed to reflect the developing military environment. Second, and in many ways more important, it allows for deviation. Doctrine is promulgated for guidance only, not for slavish adherence. An intelligent and talented commander or leader faced with unique circumstances will always be better placed than the writer of doctrine to assess the most appropriate way of achieving his objective. This combination of flexibility and pragmatism is necessary for the successful conduct of the range of military operations across the spectrum of tension. It is reflected in British doctrine by the simple expedient of avoiding obligatory prescriptive rules while encouraging a distinctive way of thinking

⁴ This feature is critical to success in PSO and thus forms the 'Master Principle' of PSO.

about military operations. This way of thinking should be guided but not constrained by the principles that conclude this chapter.

SECTION II – THE PRINCIPLES

First Principle - The Selection and Maintenance of the Aim⁵

C15. In the conduct of military operations, it is essential to select and clearly define the aim. The ultimate aim in warfighting is to break the enemy's will to fight. Each phase of the conflict and each separate operation is directed towards this supreme aim, but will have a more limited aim, which must be clearly defined, simple and direct. Once the aim⁶ is decided, all efforts are directed to its attainment until a changed situation calls for re-appreciation and probably a new aim. Every plan or action must be tested by its bearing on the chosen aim.

Second Principle - Maintenance of Morale

C16. Success in military operations often depends more on moral than on physical qualities. Numbers, armament, and resources cannot compensate for lack of courage, energy, determination, skill, and the bold offensive spirit that springs from a determination to succeed. The development and subsequent maintenance of the qualities of morale are, therefore, essential to success.

Third Principle - Offensive Action

C17. Offensive action is the necessary forerunner of success; it may be delayed, but until the initiative is seized and the offensive taken, success is unlikely.

Fourth Principle - Security

C18. A sufficient degree of security is essential in order to obtain freedom of action to launch a bold offensive in pursuit of the selected aim. This entails adequate defence of high value assets and information that are vital to the nation or the armed forces. Security does not, however, imply undue caution and avoidance of all risks, for bold action is essential to success. On the contrary, with security provided for, unexpected developments are unlikely to interfere seriously with the pursuit of a vigorous offensive.

⁵ The selection and maintenance of the aim is regarded as the 'Master Principle' across the spectrum of tension. (JWP 0-01). It has therefore been placed first in the list. The remaining principles are not given in any particular order since their relative importance varies according to the nature of the operation.

⁶ In PSO, the overall campaign aims are more complex than those set down for war. Reduction to simple end-states is likely to result in narrow planning that will see essential features of the intended outcome or effect neglected in the formulation of the campaign plan. Accordingly, the campaign plan should seek, from the outset, to establish the 'steady-state criteria' that express the politically defined objectives of the PSO campaign. See Chapter 2.

Fifth Principle - Surprise

C19. Surprise is a most effective and powerful influence and its moral effect is very great. Every endeavour is made to surprise the adversary and to guard against being surprised. By the use of surprise, results out of all proportion to the efforts expended can be obtained and, in some operations, when other factors are unfavourable, surprise may be essential to success. Surprise can be achieved strategically, operationally, or tactically or by exploiting new material. The elements of surprise are secrecy, concealment, deception, originality, audacity and rapidity.

Sixth Principle - Concentration of Force

C20. To achieve success, it is essential to concentrate superior force, moral and material, to that of the adversary at the decisive time and place. Concentration does not necessarily imply a massing of forces, but rather having them so disposed as to be able to unite to deliver the decisive blow when and where required, or to counter the adversary's threats. Concentration is more a matter of time than of space - and has more to do with the effects it has than on the massing of force for its own sake.

Seventh Principle - Economy of Effort

C21. Economy of effort implies a balanced employment of forces and a judicious expenditure of all resources with the object of achieving an effective concentration at the decisive time and place.

Eighth Principle - Flexibility

C22. Modern warfighting demands a high degree of flexibility to enable pre-arranged plans to be altered to meet changing situations and unexpected developments. This entails good training, organisation, discipline and staff work and, above all, that flexibility of mind and rapidity of decision on the part of the commander and his subordinates which ensures that time is never lost. It also calls for physical mobility of a high order, strategically, operationally and tactically, so that forces can be concentrated rapidly and economically at decisive places and times.

Ninth Principle - Co-operation

C23. Co-operation is based on shared goals and spirit. It entails the co-ordination of all actors so as to achieve the maximum combined effort from the whole. Above all, goodwill and the desire to co-operate are essential at all levels. The increased interdependence of the individual Services and their increasing mutual dependence on the armed forces of allies and potential coalition partners has made co-operation amongst them of vital importance in modern warfare. It is also necessary to co-operate closely with other non-governmental agencies, many of which will have aims and objectives that are not aligned with those in the military plan.

Tenth Principle - Sustainability

C24. Sound logistics and administrative arrangements are crucial for success. They should be designed to give the commander maximum freedom of action in carrying out the plan. The logistics and administrative organisation should be kept as simple as possible with Component Commanders having a degree of control over logistics and administration within their sphere of command, corresponding to their responsibilities for the operational plan.

SUMMARISING THE APPROACH

C25. Woven together the Elements and Principles detailed above represent the British approach to military operations across the entire spectrum of tension. Retention of a **warfighting ethos** is central, ready to be applied if the circumstances demand it. In PSOs, it is the key characteristic that gives the UK's Armed Forces the ability and credibility to establish a base of influence from which both they and other agencies can operate. **Joint, integrated and multinational** operations are the means by which the UK's full range of capabilities and attributes are brought to bear. The UK's Armed Forces operate together as a coherent entity to maximise their ability to deliver operational effect. In doing this, they are guided by these Elements and Principles, which are as applicable at the strategic level as they are at the tactical. The intelligent application of the Principles underpins the **manoeuvrist approach** that results in commanders being allowed and encouraged to prosecute their objectives using methods of their own choosing through a **flexible and pragmatic** state of mind. To do this they need the necessary means; not only the physical means – men, equipment and other tangible resources - but also the command conditions inherent in **mission command** that are conducive to seizing the initiative, obtaining the advantage of tempo and achieving surprise.

ANNEX D – COMPONENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE SUPPORT FORCE JOINT OPERATIONS

D1. The following sections describe the nature of contributions that can be made by individual military components to a joint force engaged in a Peace Support Operation (PSO) as a Peace Support Force (PSF). The descriptions are based on the United Kingdom Armed Forces.

SECTION I – THE MARITIME COMPONENT

Principles

D2. **Application of Maritime Power.** BR 1806 *‘British Maritime Doctrine’* provides high-level UK maritime environmental doctrine, which complements the capstone source of Allied maritime doctrine, AJP-3.1 *‘Allied Joint Maritime Operations’*. Maritime forces possess a number of inherent characteristics, including access, mobility, versatility, sustained reach, resilience, lift capacity, forward presence, poise and leverage.¹ The sea is a valuable strategic medium, as manoeuvre space for Power Projection, Theatre Entry and the application of combat power. Whilst the capability to operate in ‘blue water’ is retained, the focus for manoeuvre forces now lies in these characteristics being used to contribute effectively to a joint operation whose main effects will invariably influence the land environment. In this context, maritime forces (and particularly amphibious forces) can provide manoeuvre from the sea, where mobility is used to best effect (a maritime force can move up to 400 nautical miles in a day).

Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations

D3. Maritime power provides the PSF Commander with an enduring and flexible combat capability that can be employed from the open ocean or in the littoral environment, in benign to high intensity operations. The maritime contribution to joint operations consists principally of Sea Control, Sea Denial and Maritime Power Projection, supported by a maritime command, control, communications, information, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and Sea-Based Logistics:

- a. **Sea Control.** This is the condition that exists when one has freedom of action to use an area of sea for one’s own purpose for a period of time and, if necessary, deny its use to an opponent. Sea control includes the airspace above the surface and the water volume and seabed below.

¹ The ability of maritime forces, through suitable positioning and force packaging, to exploit access and to have influence on events ashore disproportionately greater than the scale of force applied. (BR 1806)

b. **Sea Denial.** This is the condition, short of full Sea Control, that exists when an opponent is prevented from using an area of sea for his purposes.² At the operational level, this may be used to provide outer or flank defence for a force or area, or as a means of containing adversaries' capabilities. At the strategic level, Sea Denial may be used to deny adversaries the ability to reinforce by sea or operate in certain areas. For a PSO this may be the imposition of sanctions through an embargo.

c. **Maritime Power Projection.** Maritime Power Projection is the threat or use of maritime combat capabilities, at global range, to achieve effects in support of national policy objectives. It exploits sea control to achieve access to the littoral in order to deter or coerce an adversary or, if necessary, to project force ashore directly. Maritime fire power can be delivered ashore in the form of amphibious forces, organic air power, Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) and Naval Gunfire Support. Maritime forces can also deliver Special Forces ashore and can conduct offensive Information Operations. Maritime forces may provide a critical contribution to a joint campaign through their ability to project sea-based firepower in areas that are less accessible to land forces.

d. **Sea-Based Logistics.** The logistics support provided to other components from maritime assets. This may include bulk stocks, medical support, a limited maintenance capability, personnel movement capability and temporary accommodation.

Functions

D4. Sea Control is the ultimate enabler for all aspects of maritime operations, however a distinction can be made between the functions of maritime power from the sea, which broadly equate to Power Projection operations, and those at sea, to which Sea Control operations are focused. Power Projection operations have an inherent relationship to joint operations, whereas some aspects of Sea Control may be purely naval in nature, but might contribute to joint PSO.

D5. **Types of Maritime Operations.** The Maritime Component will be task-organised to undertake the various types of maritime operations required for the conduct of a given mission, each encompassing and contributing to the full range of joint operations envisaged in the campaign plan. These types of maritime operations are described in detail in maritime tactical doctrine, and are inherently linked to the composite combat functions discussed below; however, they can be drawn into 3 groups:

² Mining is a classic application of Sea Denial.

- a. **Military.** Combat is used or threatened. This grouping pre-supposes a combat capability.
- b. **Constabulary.** Maritime forces used to enforce law or to implement a regime established by international mandate.
- c. **Benign.** Maritime forces have specialised capabilities that may contribute to a range of tasks in which violence has no part to play, nor is a necessary backdrop. Increasingly large scale operations are critically dependent on access to commercial shipping.

Task Organisation

D6. **Composite Warfare Commander.** The prosecution of maritime Military operations is undertaken through an applied combination of distinct Composite Warfare Commander areas³ or functions, the degree of effort in each depending on the size and scope of the operation (analogous to Teeth Arms within the Combined Arms approach in the Land Component). Elements of these Warfare Areas may be applicable to Constabulary Operations (e.g. in the conduct of Maritime Interdiction Operations). Although combat skills are unlikely to be required in a benign scenario, specific capabilities inherent to a particular Warfare Area (such as a high frequency sonar) may be of critical benefit.


D7. **Multinational Aspects.** The task organisation inherent in the Maritime Component, and widespread adherence to standardised maritime tactical procedures amongst Allied navies, permits integration of multinational naval and amphibious forces down to unit level. Standing naval forces, such as NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) may provide the nucleus of a larger multinational Naval Expanded Task Force (NETF). Other bilateral arrangements, such as the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force (UKNLAF), provide multinational maritime forces in being.

Maritime Component Command and Control

D8. Mission Command involving delegation of composite warfare functions to designated Principal Warfare Commanders is central to maritime command and control. For a small naval Task Force, the Maritime Component Commander (MCC) may elect to perform certain functions directly through his own Maritime Component Headquarters battlestaff,⁴ but it is more likely he will delegate certain functions, with appropriate levels of tactical command or control, to the Officer in Tactical Command of each selected Task Group or Task Unit making up a larger maritime force.

³ Ant-air Warfare, Anti-submarine Warfare, Anti-surface Warfare and Strike Warfare constitute the principal warfare areas. The other functional areas are: Naval Mine Warfare; Amphibious Warfare; Electronic and Acoustic Warfare and Naval Co-operation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS).

⁴ COMUKMARFOR is the UK's standing MCC battlestaff. COMUKAMPHIBFOR is the amphibious force equivalent.



NOTES:

1. TG 999.4 under OPCON the submarine operating authority, who may delegate TACOM to the MCC.
2. Logistics shipping is likely to be temporarily assigned throughout the Task Force elements for replenishment purposes.
3. The above Operational Task Organisation is also the basis of the Maritime Components TF/TG broadcasts and Strategic Communications Structure. Thus; when units are re-assigned their broadcast support structure will be re-configured accordingly

Figure D.1 - Exemplar Maritime Task Force Organisation

D9. **Command and Control of Amphibious Forces.** The command and control arrangements for amphibious forces may be based on one of three models:

- a. The Commander Amphibious Task Force and Commander Landing Force are under the OPCON of the MCC. This is the most conventional model.
- b. The Commander Amphibious Task Force is also the Maritime Component Commander. This may occur when the sole or primary maritime task is an amphibious operation.
- c. The Commander Amphibious Task Force is under the direct OPCON of the Peace Support Force Commander as a component commander in his own right. This may be appropriate when it is impractical or inappropriate for the Maritime Component Commander to exercise OPCON of the amphibious force. In this case, command and control arrangements between the Commander Amphibious Task Force and other component commanders must be clearly defined.

SECTION II – THE LAND COMPONENT

Principles

D10. The UK doctrinal authority for Land operations is Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) *‘Land Operations’*. The ADP reflects the explanation of the Land Component as part of a joint task force, such as a PSF, at Chapter 6 to AJP-01(B) *‘Allied Joint Doctrine’*. The number and variety of combatants, factions, non-combatants and other involved and interested parties, together with the potential for confusion, error and friction, is the dominating feature of operations on land. PSO are inherently land-centric as the military role is usually that of establish security within a territory. The degree of complexity in the tasks allocated to Land forces demands an approach that is reliant on and positively encourages decentralised command, freedom of action, and initiative at every level.

D11. Land forces must be equipped, trained and prepared to provide, on an independent or integrated basis, formations capable of tactical manoeuvre, with the combat power, to deter, coerce, defeat, destroy or accept the surrender of hostile forces. The UK accepts that the minimum level of combined arms capability that can operate independently and deliver these requirements is the armoured division.⁵ In addition, it is recognised that a UK division will be supported by a Corps level⁶ framework.

⁵ With and without 3 Commando Bde and 16 Air Assault Brigade.

⁶ Currently residing in the UK’s command of the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).

Land Contribution to Joint Operations

D12. The land contribution to joint operations consists principally of Ground Manoeuvre forces, Air Manoeuvre forces, Firepower, the capability to Find, support operations through Logistics and the ability to enhance the Mobility of forces while imposing Counter-mobility on the adversaries.

- a. **Ground Manoeuvre.** The combined effects of ground forces that enable the land commander to achieve tactical success in conflict.
- b. **Air Manoeuvre.** Those land elements that contribute directly to surface operations against adversaries using the air environment as their medium of employment or deployment.
- c. **Firepower.** Firepower's purpose is to demoralise, suppress, neutralise, and destroy, the adversaries under all conditions, contributing to the undermining of their will, the shattering of their cohesion and denying them freedom of manoeuvre. It can achieve both lethal and non-lethal effects.
- d. **Finding the Adversary.** Through the employment of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance linked to command, control, communications, computers and intelligence systems and units.
- e. **Logistics.** Support to land forces, and other components and possibly agencies beyond the military. The provision of medical support is a key land logistic capability given the manpower intensive nature of land operations. This is the main source of support for humanitarian and disaster relief operations.
- f. **Mobility and Counter-mobility.** Dependent upon the operating environment and the nature of the operation.

Functions

D13. The Land Component uses 4 core functions: to Find, to Fix, to Strike and to Exploit in a framework of Shaping, Decisive and Sustaining operations.⁷ These may be consecutive or simultaneous, and apply across the full range of operational activity. Finding endures throughout operations. It spans locating, identifying and assessing the adversary or protagonists. Fixing is to deny the adversary or protagonists their goals, distract them and thus deprive them of freedom of action, while ensuring one's own. Striking takes freedom of action to manoeuvre into a position of advantage from which force can be threatened or applied. Exploit operations express the ability to

⁷ Deep, Close and Rear are now only used to refer to geographical areas.

rapidly respond to a changed situation, probably not anticipated, which so long as the risk is deemed acceptable, can bring unexpected results.

D14. The land environment demands, above all, a deployed presence that can be resource heavy, particularly in terms of manpower. Land forces, by their nature, have a limited stand-off capability, and their most enduring feature is their persistent ability to conduct close combat and dominate ground, hence their dominance in PSO.

Task Organisation

D15. The prosecution of land operations is characterised by its combined arms nature. That is a mix of: combat forces (such as infantry or armour), combat support forces (such as artillery or engineers) and combat service support forces (such as logistical or medical, held within a hierarchical command and control framework enabled by Communications and Information Systems (CIS)). The Land Component Commander (LCC) will normally be organised by task, with combat, combat support and combat service support assets allocated as required.

D16. **Multinational Aspects.** It is generally accepted in ‘constructing’ Land components that the lowest level which it can be multinationalised is formation level⁸ and risk is acceptable, where:

- a. A high degree of interoperability and/or confidence pre-exists.
- b. Niche capabilities are being provided.
- c. It is assessed the threat level is low.

Land Component Command and Control

D17. Mission command is a central philosophy of Army doctrine and pervades every aspect of how soldiers operate, and at every level. Mission command demands a modular Command and Control (C2) structure which can allocate missions or tasks, provide resources, but does not micro-manage how the task is executed. However, it does mean that when required, commanders might have to impose constraints because of the operational situation, or to concentrate force and to synchronise combat support. Mission command negates the requirement for all but essential information to be passed up and down the chain of command so allowing appropriate decisions to be made rapidly in the confusion and uncertainty of land operations. During operations local commanders may have to use their initiative and might even break both the chain and states of command to ensure timely and effective action in unexpected circumstances. Their only guidance will be their training, experience and understanding of what they think their superior wants.

⁸ Division, and more rarely brigade.

SECTION III – THE AIR COMPONENT

Principles

D18. The UK doctrinal authority for Joint Air Operations is IJWP 3-30. AP 3000 describes British Air Power Doctrine whilst Joint Force Air Component Headquarters (JFACHQ) Concept of Operations (CONOPS) describes the JFACHQ processes in detail. The air power characteristics of reach, ubiquity, speed of response and flexibility provide the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) with capabilities that are inherently manoeuvrist. It is these very broad capabilities that require not only a detailed understanding of their employment attributes but also a different, more centralised command philosophy to maximise air power's impact across the whole of the Joint battlespace. Air power:⁹

- a. Is inherently Joint, combined and multinational.
- b. Encompasses forces drawn from all three Services.
- c. Is concerned with effective exploitation of air power assets.
- d. Is supported by national and commercial resources.
- e. Is influenced by, and in turn influences, the land, sea and space environments.

The Air Contribution to Joint Operations

D19. A combatant commander in his own right, the JFACC may not be an air force commander but will be the officer who has the best capability, or the most pressing need to plan, task and control joint air operations. Dependent on the scale of the operation, the JFACC will vary from a 2* at medium scales of effort to an OF-4 for minor operations.¹⁰ The nominated Joint Force Air Component Commander will need an equipped and trained staff; the UK JFACHQ is a standing cadre of air command and control experts, ready to provide the core of a deployable air component headquarters. As well as providing experts on the processes and execution of air power, JFACHQ staff will be fully conversant with the five basic core air power missions:¹¹

- a. Air Reconnaissance and Surveillance.
- b. Air Defence.

⁹ 'British Air Power Doctrine' AP3000 3rd Edition.

¹⁰ JFAC CONOPS initial issue.

¹¹ Developed in detail in 'British Air Power Doctrine' AP3000 3rd Edition.

- c. Anti-Surface Force Operations.
- d. Air Transport.
- e. Combat Support Air Operations.

Task Organisation

D20. The JFACHQs sits centrally within a dispersed structure. Aircraft are usually brigaded into Wings (usually between 6-24 aircraft) located on supporting Deployment Operating Bases (DOBs). Tasking is direct to the Wings thereby maximising the benefits of centralised planning. Air assets from various Wings/ DOBs will form a task-orientated group in order to fulfil a specific mission(s) as per the Air Tasking Order (ATO). Each day will see different combinations of air assets to best fulfil the tasks as emphasis and demand on air assets moves across the battlespace; this demands maximum flexibility from air assets and Joint standardisation.

Air Component Command and Control

D21. The characteristics of air power, already described, impact on the leadership style within the air environment. Although all personnel involved in air operations may be attacked, only a small minority - aircrew - directly and regularly engage in combat or are placed in harms way. Therefore these tactical air commanders must be able to lead ground-based support personnel, and must be capable of inspiring aircrew by demonstrating technical mastery and personal courage in the air. At more senior levels of command, air leaders are isolated from the immediate air action by the centralisation of control that the efficient use of air power demands, fostering what can be perceived as a remote style of leadership.¹²

D22. **The Air Planning Cycle.** The principal air control mechanism is the ATO supported by the associated Air Co-ordination Order (ACO). A schematic of the JFACHQ planning process is at Figure D.2. The cycle can be anything from 48 hours UK JFACHQ SOP to 96 hours (for large-scale operations). Often deemed to be overly long and inflexible, much confusion and misunderstanding arises over the Air Tasking Order cycle. The ATO and the ACO represent a single day's snapshot of the long-term plan and must, therefore, reflect the Joint Air Operations Picture, the current situation, the PSF Commander/ JFACC latest guidance, and the immediate needs of the other components. It is critical that the Joint Air Operations Picture (JAOP) is aligned to the PSF Commander's Joint Campaign Plan (JCP) and is fully coordinated with the other components through proper representation at the Joint Co-ordination Board (JCB). Heavy emphasis is placed on liaison staffs to represent their respective commanders at the various stages of the cycle. The ATO captures in one single document all air activity down to the lower tactical level by detailing units to tasks and targets. Such in-

¹² A G B Vallance, *The Air Weapon*.

depth deliberate centralised planning best enables the effective and efficient delivery of air power. Although air does not hold a reserve force, flexibility and responsiveness is afforded in a number of ways by allowing updates to the tasking at any stage of the process even to include airborne re-tasking.¹³ That said, large-scale re-tasking can result in less efficient use of assets due to the inter-connected/supporting nature of air tasks and missions.




Figure D.2 - Joint Force Air Component Headquarters Planning Cycle

SECTION IV – THE SPECIAL FORCES COMPONENT

Principles

D23. UK Special Forces (SF) conduct SF operations in peace, tension or war, in order to support the achievement of strategic or operational objectives. They are selected, trained, equipped and organised to be inserted by sea, land or air and operate in hostile territory and can be isolated from the main combat forces.

The Special Forces Contribution to Joint Operations

D24. SF support the achievement of military, political, and economic objectives of the highest value, and are versatile troops with the capacity to operate across all levels of conflict. Although they can be used for discrete operations at the strategic level, at

¹³ Improved data-links will further enhance airborne responsiveness, better enabling Time Sensitive Targeting (TST).

the operational and tactical levels they more often operate in concert with other forces and agencies. When operating with main combat forces, they are best employed in support of a main effort, either to enable main forces to achieve a decision or to extend the capability of these forces. It is thus appropriate to consider SF as an enabling capability rather than a decisive force in itself except that, when operating in support of the civil power, they may be employed in a defensive role.

Functions

D25. SF have 3 principal functions, which are equally applicable in any theatre, in war, conflict and peace. Each can be used in isolation or to complement another:

a. **Surveillance and Reconnaissance.** SF conduct covert surveillance and reconnaissance by land or sea in a static or mobile role. They can provide timely information to political and military decision-makers and commanders. This contributes to the overall intelligence picture and may provide collateral for information from other intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, be used to cue such systems to confirm technical intelligence or to trigger interdiction. SF may provide a more appropriate means of obtaining information due to hostile terrain or climate and by developing information from human contact. Where ambiguity exists SF can provide 'ground truth'. In Other Operations,¹⁴ potentially PSO, SF have the ability to reach and communicate with civilians and indigenous forces in order to gather information.

b. **Offensive Action.** Offensive Action operations are designed to achieve a tailored and precisely focused effect with minimum collateral damage. The effect can be physical or psychological. They are directed against high value strategic or operational targets, which may be well protected and will therefore require covert infiltration or special techniques to gain access. Offensive Action operations may be conducted by SF units varying from patrol to multiple squadrons in strength, either independently or supported by conventional forces. Offensive Action includes Counter Terrorist operations, conducted in support of the civil power.

c. **Support and Influence.** Support and Influence operations are often conducted in support of the work of other government departments (OGDs), or as part of a wider initiative to achieve political or military objectives. The role encompasses:

- (1) Training tasks in support of Foreign and Defence Policy.

¹⁴ Other Operations are those that are conducted in situations other than war: it replaces 'Operations Other Than War' to reflect the need for similar combat capabilities in situations short of warfighting.

- (2) The support and/or influence of ‘third parties’ within the operational environment (e.g. forward presence, training and liaison with allies and other relevant parties).
- (3) ‘Hearts and Minds’ support for and influence of indigenous populations.
- (4) Raising, training and supporting indigenous forces.
- (5) Information Operations.

Support and Influence operations may also contribute to a Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) campaign although this is not a specific UK SF role. Although SF operations are normally conducted covertly the product may be used to support the Government's Information Campaign. The role also includes any other tasks that support Government objectives and the PSF Commander's Campaign Plan.

Task Organisation

D26. SF assigned to a PSF Commander are commanded by a Joint Forces SF Component Commander nominated by Director SF. He will command SF Task Groups within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). The responsibilities of the Joint Forces SF Component Commander include, but are not limited to; planning, co-ordination, allocation, and tasking SF based on the PSF Commander's CONOPS.

Special Force Component Command and Control

D27. The limited number of SF means that they would normally only be employed on high value tasks where the use of regular forces would be inappropriate. Command of SF will always be retained at the highest appropriate level to ensure best use of available resources. Elements of the three Services are earmarked to support Special Forces operations.

SECTION V – THE LOGISTICS COMPONENT

Principles

D28. The UK doctrinal authority for Joint Logistics operations is JWP 4-00 ‘*Logistics for Joint Operations*’. In the publication a Joint Force Logistic Component (JFLogC) is defined as ‘a command and control headquarters, based on an existing framework HQ, charged with executing the Joint Logistic Plan (JLP) on behalf of the PSF Commander to achieve maximum logistic efficiency in common areas for all

components, in order to optimise the logistic footprint, prevent undue stress on the Coupling Bridge and leverage logistic capability in the JOA'.¹⁵

The Logistic Component Contribution to Joint Operations

D29. The requirement for a JFLogC is not always a foregone conclusion. However, joint logistics provides the best opportunity of achieving flexibility and balanced support with limited UK logistic assets thinly spread between the Services.

Fundamentally, a JFLogC provides a means of co-ordinating logistic activity either into and/or within the JOA. A JFLogC also provides a joint logistics staff, who can determine tactical level requirements across the JTF, and also a HQ that can command units allocated to it, forming a component. On the one hand, the staff is in a position to co-ordinate the 3 separate Services logistic systems and on the other hand, can plan joint logistic operations such as Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM), rehabilitation of a formation or logistic realignment in the context of redeployment. For these reasons, a key logistic principle is that assets are controlled at the highest appropriate level.

Functions

D30. The Joint Force Logistic Component Commander (JFLogCC) has responsibility for:

- a. Producing logistic input to the campaign plan.
- b. Controlling in-theatre logistic support in accordance with the PSF Commander's priorities by activation and maintenance of a robust Line of Communication (LOC) within the JOA.
- c. Maximising logistic efficiencies and economies of scale.
- d. Exercising TACOM of any Area of Operation (AOO)¹⁶ allocated to him by the PSF Commander (including the maintenance of security).
- e. Contributing to the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) J1/J4 staff's operational estimate process where necessary.

¹⁵ Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense those aspects of military operations that deal with: design, development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposal of material; transport of personnel; acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; acquisition and furnishing of services; medical health and support. (AAP 6)

¹⁶ Subject to a rear area threat assessment, the JFLogCC could be allocated an AOO. If the JFLogCC is not responsible for Force Rear Support Area (FRSA) security he would need to liaise closely with the HQ performing this function in order to ensure co-ordination of the security effort with his support functions.

Task Organisation

D31. Figure D.3 illustrates a typical structure for a ‘large scale’ JFLogC and as a consequence encapsulates the scope of its responsibilities.

D32. The UK does not currently maintain a dedicated standby JFLogC HQ.¹⁷ Therefore the requirement for, and composition of a JFLogC, including its commander, must be determined early in the planning cycle. The JFLogC HQ may be selected from a range of existing headquarters such as, on the smaller side, the Commando Log HQ, extending up to, for large operations, a Logistic Brigade HQ, another Service logistic HQ, or a bespoke organisation put together specifically for the operation. Whatever structure is chosen requires substantial augmentation from tri-Service logisticians and it must remain focused on JOA-wide activity, and should not be drawn into the provision of support to one component at the detriment of others. Where risk exists of this occurring, the Joint Force Element Table (JFET) should be adjusted to provide additional component support.¹⁸ On multinational operations, the JFLogCC is also likely to assume the role of head of the UK National Support Element (NSE).

D33. **UK Logistics within a Multinational Context.** When undertaking logistic planning the default is to consider how the UK will support its deployed force elements alone. Indeed, in most multinational operations, even Alliance operations, it is always assumed that logistic support is a national responsibility. However, pragmatism dictates that opportunities to exploit economies of scale will soon materialise, particularly as a multinational operation rich in nations would be correspondingly logistically excessive. Contributions to multinational logistics could be templated, perhaps by following NATO models, but are more likely to be ad hoc. For this reason, it is one of the key considerations at early force provider meetings for the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) or the JFLogCC if he has been chosen, to seek maximum opportunity to find economies and reduce duplication.¹⁹ The Commander of the JFLogC/NSE will need to determine precise logistic command relationships externally with coalition partners, internally between the UK components, as well as with any deployed contractors.

¹⁷ There is an aspiration to create a dedicated JFLogC.

¹⁸ For example, a JFLogC should not also be expected to undertake a full Land component 3rd line support roll without the proper resourcing of staff and assets.

¹⁹ Without compromising lead, or framework nation, status.

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

The primary references for the terms and their definitions used in this Glossary are indicated in parentheses.¹ New terms and/or definitions introduced by this publication are annotated as ‘*New Term*’ or ‘*New Definition*’. While every effort has been made to rationalise terminology and remove ambiguity or duplication, implicit in the Ratification of JWP 3-50 (2nd Edition) is ‘UK agreement’ to the Terminology and to its future incorporation into JWP 0-01.1 ‘*The United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*’. Where appropriate, new terms and their definitions will be submitted by the UK Terminology Co-ordinator as candidates for incorporation in AAP-6 ‘*The NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*’ under the NATO Terminology programme.

Armed conflict

(Armed) Conflict (usually abbreviated) is a situation in which violence or military force is threatened or used. Generally it is a contest between two opposing sides, each seeking to impose its will on the other; however intra-state conflict may involve several factions. (JWP 0-01.1)

Advance Planning

Planning conducted principally in peacetime to develop plans for contingencies identified by strategic planning assumptions. Advance planning prepares for a possible contingency based upon the best available information and can form the basis for Crisis Response Planning. (JWP 5-00)

Campaign Authority

Campaign Authority is the amalgam of four related and inter-dependent factors: the perceived legitimacy of the international mandate that establishes a PSO; the perceived legitimacy of the freedoms and constraints, explicit or implicit in the mandate, placed on those executing the PSO; the degree to which factions, the local population and other actors subjugate themselves to the authority of those executing the PSO; from unwilling compliance to freely given consent; and the degree to which the activities of those executing the PSO meet the expectations of the factions, local population and others. *New Term*. (JWP 3-50)

Campaign Effectiveness Analysis

Analysis conducted at the strategic, operational and tactical level to monitor and assess the cumulative effects of military actions with respect to centres of gravity in order to achieve the overall campaign end-state. (JWP 0-01.1)

¹ JWP 0-01 ‘*British Defence Doctrine*’, JDP 01 ‘*Joint Operations*’, JWP 5-00 ‘*Joint Operations Planning*’, JWP 0-01.1 ‘*The United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*’, AAP-6 ‘*The NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*’.

Centre of Gravity

Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. (AAP-6)

Civil-Military Co-operation

The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies. (AAP-6)

Complex of Actors

Representatives from the international community working together with representatives of the indigenous populations involved regenerating each of the constituents of a society or nation as part of the resolution of a complex emergency. The Complex of Actors may include a Peace Support Force working in collaboration with an international civil authority, such as a Special Representative of the [UN] Secretary General (SRSG) or European Union (EUSR), or a Head of Mission (HoM). *New Term.* (JWP 3-50)

Comprehensive Peace Support Operation Plan

A master plan of how the international community plans to employ the Instruments of National Power to achieve the Interim or Steady-State Criteria in a Peace Support Operation; and how the indigenous population and other organisations, that are willing to complement diplomatic, economic and military campaign plans, intend to make their contribution to the same effect. *New Term.* (JWP 3-50)

Conflict Prevention

A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and - when necessary - military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. *See also peacebuilding; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace support operation.* (AAP-6)

Conflict resolution

The resolution of conflict by conciliation. (JWP 0-01.1)

Counter-Insurgency

Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency. (AAP-6)

Crisis Prevention

Diplomatic, economic and, on occasion, military measures to modify the causes of potential conflict and prevent its onset. (JWP 0-01.1)

Crisis Response Planning

Planning based on current events and conducted in time-sensitive situations. (JWP 5-00)

Culminating Point

An operation reaches its culminating point when the current operation can just be maintained but not developed to any greater advantage. (JWP 0-01.1)

Decisive Point

A point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information environment. (AAP-6)

Defence Diplomacy

The promotion of conflict and crisis prevention by dispelling hostility, building trust and inculcating the supremacy of civilian control of the military, and, more generally, to support and develop wider British interests. (JWP 0-01.1)

Deterrence

The convincing of a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains. This requires the maintenance of a credible military capability and strategy with the clear political will to act. (AAP-6)

End-state

That state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of a campaign either to terminate or to resolve the conflict on favourable terms. The end state should be established prior to execution. (JWP 0-01.1)

Enforcement (Force Stance)

Military Forces are part of the complementary of Instruments of National Power used to secure and/or implement a ceasefire or settlement. When necessary, they will employ the coercive and deterrent effects of military force to implement and uphold an internationally derived mandate. The level of Campaign Authority will be uncertain, and a high risk of conflict escalation will exist. *New Term.* (JWP 3-50)

FCO Advisor (FORAD)

Appointed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the advisor will offer a wealth of in-depth knowledge particularly of regional actors and the diplomatic scene. *New Term.* (JWP 3-50)

Force Protection

A process which aims to conserve the fighting potential of a deployed force by countering the wider threat to its elements from adversaries, natural and human hazards, and fratricide. (JWP 0-01.1)

Force Stance

A Force Stance is characterised by principles that condition and guide the use and the capabilities of military force in relation to the desired outcome or effect. Three peace support force stances are acknowledged: **Enforcement, Stabilisation, and Transition.** *New Term.* (JWP 3-50)

General war

A conflict between major powers in which their large and vital national interests, perhaps even survival, are at stake. (JWP 0-01.1)

Humanitarian Advisor (HAD)

Appointed by the Department for International Development the HAD provides a valuable linkage with the Humanitarian Sector and should be seen as a full member of the battle staff operating at OF 4 or 5 level. *New Term.* (JWP 3-50)

Humanitarian Assistance

Support provided to humanitarian and development agencies, in an insecure environment, by a deployed force whose primary mission is not the provision of humanitarian aid. Should the deployed force undertake such humanitarian tasks, responsibility should be handed-over/returned to the appropriate civilian agency at the earliest opportunity. (JWP 0-01.1)

Humanitarian Disaster Relief Operations

Operations where the primary mission of a deployed force is to relieve human suffering. HDR operations are conducted in an entirely benign posture (except for essential force protection) and are normally conducted in support of the co-ordinating humanitarian agency. (JWP 0-01.1)

Information Campaign

Co-ordinated information output of all Government activity undertaken to influence decision-makers in support of policy objectives, while protecting one's own decision-makers. (JWP 0-01.1)

Information Operations

Co-ordinated actions undertaken to influence an adversary or potential adversary in support of political and military objectives by undermining his will, cohesion and decision making ability, including his information, information based processes and systems while protecting one's own decision-makers and decision making processes. (JWP 0-01.1)

Insurgency

An organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (AAP-6)

Interim Criteria

Interim criteria are circumstances, actions or events that are preconditions to achieving the steady-state criteria. *New Term.* (JWP 3-50)

Internal Conflict

Situation in which violence is threatened or used within a state's borders between competing groups for political reasons beyond levels that might be controlled by levels of civilian policing that are normal for that state. (JWP 0-01.1)

Internally Displaced Person

A person who, as part of a mass movement, has been forced to flee his or her home or place of habitual residence suddenly or unexpectedly as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violation of human rights, fear of such violation, or natural or man-made disasters, and who has not crossed an internationally recognised State border. (AAP-6)

Intervene (PSO activity type)

An activity type within a PSO that demands action to bring about and uphold a ceasefire/agreement or impose a mandated settlement. *New Term.* (JWP 3-50)

Legal Advisor (LEGAD)

The Legal Advisor has also become a common augmentee to standing battle staffs entering into a PSO engagement. The military officer deployed will be appointed by the legal services and will commonly be OF4 or 5 rank. *New Term.* (JWP 3-50)

Line of Operation

In a campaign or operation, a line linking decisive points in time and space on the path to the centre of gravity. *See also campaign; centre of gravity; decisive point; operation.* (AAP-6)

Locus Standi

A recognised or identifiable legal status.

Main Effort

A concentration of forces or means, in a particular area, where a commander seeks to bring about a decision. (JWP 0-01.1)

Manoeuvrist Approach

An approach to operations in which shattering the enemy's overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed. (JWP 0-01.1)

Media Operations

That line of activity developed to ensure timely, accurate, and effective provision of Public Information (P Info) and implementation of Public Relations (PR) policy within the operational environment, whilst maintaining OPSEC. (JWP 0-01.1)

Mission Command

A style of command that seeks to convey understanding to subordinates about the intentions of the higher commander and their place within his plan, enabling them to carry out missions with the maximum freedom of action and appropriate resources. (JWP 0-01.1)

Non-governmental Organisations

A voluntary, non-profit making organisation that is generally independent of government, international organisations or commercial interests. The organisation will write its own charter and mission. (IJWP 3-90)

Operation

A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (AAP-6)

Operational Art

The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of theatre strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. (NATO agreed)

Operational Level (Of War)

The level, of war, at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. (AAP-6)

Operational Pause

A periodic pause in operations while initiative is retained in other ways. (JWP 0-01.1)

Operations Other Than War

Those military operations which are conducted in situations of conflict other than war. Such operations, in which military activities are likely to be firmly subordinated to the political throughout, will be designed to prevent conflict, restore peace by resolving or terminating conflict before escalation to war, or assist with the rebuilding of peace after conflict or war. (JWP 0-01.1)

Peace

A condition that exists in the relations between groups, classes or states when there is an absence of violence (direct or indirect) or the threat of violence. (JWP 0-01.1)

Peace Building

A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil and - when necessary - military means, to address the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. It requires a commitment to a long-term process and may run concurrently with other types of peace support operation. (AJP-3.4.1)

Peace Enforcement

A peace support operation conducted to maintain a cease-fire or a peace agreement where the level of consent and compliance is uncertain and the threat of disruption is high. A Peace Support Force must be capable of applying credible coercive force and must apply the provisions of the peace agreement impartially. *See also conflict prevention; peacebuilding; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace support operation.* (AAP-6)

Peace Support Force (PSF)

A military force assigned to a peace support operation. (AJP 3.4)

Peace Support Force Campaign Plan

The plan of how the Military Instrument of National Power, the Peace Support Force, will be employed in achieving the Interim or Steady-State Criteria in a Peace support Operation. *New Term.* (JWP 3-50)

Peace Support Force Commander (PSF commander)

The military commander with responsibility for the military component of a Peace Support Operation. *New Term.* (JWP 3-50)

Peace Support Operation

An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and/or humanitarian operations. *See also conflict prevention; peacebuilding; peacekeeping; peacemaking.* (AAP-6)

Peace Support Operation Pause

A pause in Peace Support Operation activities whilst retaining the initiative in other ways. *New Term.* (JWP 3-50)

Peacebuilding

A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil and - when necessary - military means, to address the underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term needs of the people. It requires a commitment to a long-term process and may run concurrently with other types of peace support operations. *See also conflict prevention; peacekeeping; peacemaking; peace support operation.* (AAP-6)

Peacekeeping

A peace support operation following an agreement or ceasefire that has established a permissive environment where the level of consent and compliance is high, and the threat of disruption is low. The use of force by peacekeepers is normally limited to self-defence. *See also conflict prevention; peacebuilding; peacemaking; peace support operation.* (AAP-6)

Peacemaking

A peace support operation, conducted after the initiation of a conflict to secure a ceasefire or peaceful settlement, that involves primarily diplomatic action supported, when necessary, by direct or indirect use of military assets. *See also conflict prevention; peacebuilding; peacekeeping; peace support operation.* (AAP-6)

Phase

A phase is a discrete and identifiable activity along a Military Line of Operation in time and/or space that allows for the reorganisation and redirection of forces as part of the superior commander's plan. (JWP 0-01.1)

Political Advisor (POLAD)

A Political Advisor, usually an MOD Civil Servant appointed through PJHQ staffs. He or she will possess broad Whitehall experience and will advise on the political implications of actions, events, and decisions. Normally, the individual will deploy with and become part of the battle staff acting with an equivalent military rank of OF 5. *New Term.* (JWP 3-50)

Prevent (PSO activity type)

An activity type within a PSO that demands action to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. *New Term.* (JWP 3-50)

Preventative Deployment

Deployment of forces to avert a conflict. (JWP 0-01.1)

Preventative Diplomacy

Action to prevent disputes arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. (JWP 0-01.1)

Regenerate (PSO activity type)

An activity type within a PSO that demands action in pursuit of the internationally mandated Steady State Conditions. *New Term.* (JWP 3-50)

Regional Conflict

A conflict where the fighting is contained within a particular geographic area. Its political and economic effects, however, may reverberate further afield and there may be involvement from beyond the region, such as the supply of military equipment, advisers and/or volunteers by third parties. (JWP 0-01.1)

Rules of Engagement

Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (JWP 0-01.1)

Spectrum Of Conflict

The full range of levels of violence from stable peace up to and including general war. (JWP 0-01.1)

Stabilisation (Force Stance)

Following an agreement or cease-fire, and the emergence of a generally permissive environment, the PSF acts as part of a complementary Instrument of National Power to reduce the level of tension and increase the level of Campaign Authority. The coercive and deterrent effects of military force to uphold the internationally derived mandate may be necessary, however, the level of Campaign Authority will normally warrant the use of military force in self-defence only. *New Term.* (JWP 3-50)

Steady-state Criteria

Steady-State Criteria are a broadly based list of essential conditions that must be achieved and be self-sustaining before the PSO can be deemed to have been accomplished. *New Term.* (JWP 3-50)

Strategic Level (of Conflict)

The application of the full gamut of national resources to achieve policy objectives and is the domain of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. (JDP 01)

Strategic Level Of War

The level of war at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them. (AAP-6)

Sustain (PSO activity type)

An activity type within a PSO that demands action by indigenous bodies/agencies to maintain or better the Steady-State Criteria set by the international mandate.

New Term. (JWP 3-50)

Tactical Level Of War

The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units. (AAP-6)

Transition (Force Stance)

Military Forces act as one of the Instruments of Grand Strategy to address the underlying causes of conflict. Through a long-term commitment to reform, re-integration, training, and reconstruction the international military forces help to achieve the steady-state criteria specified as the PSO campaign objectives. The level of Campaign Authority will generally be high, with the use of military force rarely warranted. *New Term.* (JWP 3-50)

War

The most extreme manifestation of armed conflict, characterised by intense, extensive and sustained combat, usually between states. (AAP-6)

Warfighting (war-fighting)

The conduct of combat operations against an adversary. (JWP 0-01.1)

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAP	Allied Administrative Publication (NATO)
ACC	Air Component Commander
ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
AFM	Army Field Manual
AJP	Allied Joint Publication (NATO)
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BDD	British Defence Doctrine.
BR	Book of Reference (Royal Navy)
C2	Command and Control
C3I	Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
CACM	Central American Common Market
CARICOM	Caribbean Community and Common Market
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CFSP	[EU] Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CIS	Communications and Information Systems
Civ Sec	Civil Secretary
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CJO	Chief of Joint Operations
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Centre
CMOS	[UN] Current Military Operations Service
COE	Contingent Owned Equipment
CoG	Centre of Gravity
COIN	Counter Insurgency
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
DCMO	Defence Crisis Management Organisation
DDR	Demobilisation, Disarmament and Re-Integration
DFID	[UK] Department for International Development.
DOBs	Deployment Operating Base
DPA	[UN] Department for Political Affairs
DPKO	[UN] Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EAC	East African Community
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOSOC	[UN] Economic and Social Council

ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EUCIVCOM	EU Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
EUMC	EU Military Committee
EUSR	EU Special Representative
EW	Electronic Warfare
FGS	[UN] Force Generation Service
FGT	[UN] Force Generation Team
FORAD	[UK] Foreign and Commonwealth Office Advisor
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)
GPT	[UN] Generic Planning Team
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HDR	Humanitarian Disaster Relief
HDRO	Humanitarian Disaster Relief Operations
HIC	Humanitarian Information Centres
HMG	Her Majesty's Government. The UK National Government
HoM	Head of Mission
HUMAD	Humanitarian Advisor
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IBRD	The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICSID	International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
IDA	International Development Association
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organisation
IJWP	Interim Joint Warfare Publication
Info Ops	Information Operations
IO	International Organisation
IX	Information Exploitation
JDCC	Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre
JDP	Joint Doctrine Publication
JF	Joint Force
JOA	Joint Operations Area

JTF	Joint Task Force
JTFC	Joint Task Force Commander
JWP	Joint Warfare Publication
L of C	Line of Communication
LCC	Land Component Commander
LEGAD	Legal Advisor
LO	Liaison Officer
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
MCC	Maritime Component Commander
MDB	Multinational Development Banks
MIGA	Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
MILO	[UN] Military Liaison Officers
MNC	Multi-national Corporation
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War (US origin)
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPS	[UN] Military Planning Service
MPT	[UN] Military Personnel Team
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCC	National Contingent Commander
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NSC	[US] National Security Council
NSE	National Support Element
OA	Operational Analysis
OAS	Organisation of American States
OAU	Organisation of African Unity, now re-titled ' <i>African Union</i> ' (AU)
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OMA	[UN DPKO] Office of the Military Advisor
OOTW	Operations Other than War (UK origin)
OPSEC	Operations Security
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PB	Peacebuilding
PE	Peace Enforcement
PK	Peacekeeping
PM	Peacemaking
PMC	Private Military Company
POLAD	Political Advisor

PSF	Peace Support Force
PSO	Peace Support Operation
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SADC	South African Development Community
SAM	Surface to Air Missile
SAT	[UN] Stand-by Arrangements Team
SCSSD	South China Sea Security Dialogue
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SR	Special Representative
SRSB	Special Representative of the [UN] Secretary General
TCN	Troop Contributing Nation (some publications will refer to TCC – Troop Contributing Country)
TCP	Temporary Control Point
TE	Task Element
TES	[UN] Training and Evaluation Service
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TF	Task Force
TG	Task Group
TLAM	Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
TU	Task Unit
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCK	Ustria Çlirimtare e Kosevës (Kosovo Liberation Army)
UH/T	Utility and Transport Helicopter
UN	United Nations
UNC	United Nations Charter
UNCA	United Nations Charter Article
UNDHA	United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation
UNFAO	United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation
UNFC	UN Force Commander
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMO	United Nations Military Observer
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia
UNSAS	United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System

UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSG	United Nations Secretary General
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIA	United States Information Agency
WBG	World Bank Group
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation

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